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Title: Community and Communication in Ancient Israelite Wisdom Texts 
 
 
Abstract: The authors of the ancient Israelite texts portray complex ideas about how their 
communication involved the divine. Tied up in these ideas are assumptions about 
communication between and by community members.  This dissertation identifies and 
discusses key “speech” concepts in ancient Israel, which are most explicit in the wisdom 
literature, and which reflect the interests and ideas of a literate class within Israel. The 
perceptions of this class, as evidenced by their portrayal of speech and speech rules in the 
texts, are as important as any questions about the historicity of that portrayal. To better frame 
the identified speech concepts, this dissertation uses modern theories about speech and 
explores the development of writing and its relationship with oral communication. It 
concludes that ancient Israelite texts portray speech as the means by which individuals were 
evaluated by the community and God. The texts depict the spoken word as expressing strong 
commitment; even in an age of treaties and contracts, the vow is described as essentially a 
spoken phenomenon. Speech was also exposure: aspects of its commitment explain wisdom 
texts’ emphasis on discretion: the texts portray speech (or restraint) as a marker of relative 
class, through which individuals assert or subordinate themselves. Ultimately, the wisdom 
texts describe a community hyper-focused on communication, with communicative rules to 
honour the divine and foster community order.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The biblical sources reflect the interests and ideas of a literate class within Israel, 
which tends to project its own literacy onto its depictions of religion and society—despite the 
fact that, historically, much of the population may not have belonged to that class. These 
sources do show, however, a continuing interest in speech as a vehicle for communication, 
and this interest is often most explicit in the wisdom literature. It seems that, even within the 
literate class, there is a specific “sphere for speech”, and the purpose of this dissertation is to 
identify that space and to assess the attitudes to speech displayed within it. It is concerned 
with the portrayal of speech and speech rules by the literate class more than reconstructing 
actual historical practice.  
Chapter 1 begins, therefore, with a brief overview of modern theories about speech 
and an introduction to concepts and vocabulary. Chapters 2-4 then look at the place of 
literacy and the importance of distinguishing between literate and non-literate attitudes. 
Chapter 2 looks at literacy and writing in a socio-historical context and chapter 3 at the 
relationship between speech and writing in biblical sources, while chapter 4 examines, via the 
differences between the written and the oral, the nature of truth and utterances about truth. 
Chapters 5-7 then look at depictions of and applications of speech. Chapter 5 shows the 
continuing ability of the spoken word to express strong commitment: even in an age of 
treaties and contracts, the vow remains essentially a spoken phenomenon. Chapter 6 finds 
these ideas in biblical depictions of speaking to God. Finally, Chapter 7 finds aspects of such 
commitment in social situations, with respect both to speech and to deliberate silence, and 
emphasises that silence, too, is a matter of social construction. Chapter 7 also identifies 
speech and restraint as markers of relative class, through which individuals assert or 
subordinate themselves. 
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The theories examined in this first chapter will form a background for the more 
specific studies in the following chapters—a sociological and linguistic lens through which to 
view the texts. In a short dissertation, it is not my purpose, of course, to reconstruct the whole 
picture in full, or even in part, and I am attempting rather to provide a starting-point and 
prolegomenon for broader studies of these matters. My conclusions, therefore, summarise key 
points and draw out indicative issues, but my intention here is to emphasise the value and 
importance of this area, rather than to provide a definitive guide to it. 
Language and Society 
Speech is represented with poetic and symbolic care in the Bible, whether recorded as 
“direct speech” or when evaluated in reflective, prophetic, legal or didactic texts. The system 
of language in ancient Israel, however, is only available to us in one dimension, that of the 
written text. If we are to understand the portrayal of communication in ancient Israel, then it 
is useful to explore the relationships between language and text, orality and literacy. 
Accordingly, this chapter focuses on major linguistic and sociological theories related to 
language and society, as well as to the “rules” of communication, before concluding with an 
examination of why wisdom and legal texts offer the best evidence for a study interested in 
language and community in ancient Israel. 
Language is both generated through, and generative of social life, a dynamic that 
forms the focus of linguistic anthropology: linguistic anthropologists aim to understand the 
relationships between language and other socio-cultural phenomena. This is not a monolithic 
discipline, and they variously treat language as an autonomous entity, foreground language as 
a kind of practice in itself, understand language using universalist and relativist perspectives, 
or view language contextually by analysing speech in terms of non-linguistic phenomena. A 
number of these approaches are limited by the textual confines of historical study, but it 
remains a given in all of them that language, culture, and society interact in multiple ways. A 
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range of philosophical, psychological, sociological, linguistic, and anthropological studies 
contribute to the understanding of communication (verbal, non-verbal, and written) as a 
social activity fixed in cultural contexts. Language creates and maintains social realities and 
reproduces cultural traditions and forms, such as status, identity, roles, power relations, race, 
and knowledge. It also informs and enforces what kinds of behaviour are considered 
appropriate in each culture. It aids in the construction of culture and in producing shared 
cultural ideologies and practices.  
A convenient point at which to begin any survey of this field is provided by J. L. 
Austin’s 1962 How to Do Things with Words, a watershed work that was among the first to 
emphasise that the use of language was a social action, revealed in the “total speech act.”1 
Austin’s concept of the “speech act” resonated with the much earlier, foundational works of 
Sapir, who highlighted language’s dynamism, and of Malinowski, who viewed language as 
“a mode of action” rather than primarily as a ”means of thinking.”2 Austin describes 
“performative” language, which brings about change, as opposed to “constative” language, 
which merely describes, consisting of, for the most part, statements which can be proved true 
or false.
3
 Austin and J.R. Searle, whose own work on the subject was to follow in 1969, also 
present two important categories of speech-acts: the illocutionary act (the act “in saying” 
something, that is, performing something by saying it, like promising or offering) and the 
perlocutionary act (the act “by saying” something, that is, to achieve something by saying 
something, like impressing or persuading).
4
 The writings of the prophets are a ready example 
                                                        
1 J. L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); See also Richard 
Bauman and Charles L. Briggs, “Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social 
Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 19 (1990): 62. Bauman and Briggs provide an excellent review of the 
history of speech, poetics, and performance interpretation. 
2 E. Sapir, Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1921); B. Malinowski, “The problem of meaning in primitive languages,” pages 296-336 in The Meaning of 
Meaning, edited by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1923). See also Bauman and 
Briggs, “Poetics and Performance,” 62. 
3 Austin, How to Do Things, 5. 
4 Austin, How to Do Things, 65-66,91-95, 122; J. R. Searle, Speech Acts, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 22-23. 
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of both illocution and perlocution: they warn, promise, and indict, which illocutionary acts all 
have perlocutionary aspects of, variously, encouragement and persuasion.
5
 
Searle expanded on Austin’s category of illocutionary acts, further subdividing it into 
assertives (which are either true or false, like descriptions), directives (which cause the hearer 
to do something, like commands), commissives (which commit the speaker to do something, 
like promises), expressives (which communicate attitudes and emotions, like congratulations 
or apologies), and declarations (which change the state of affairs upon being pronounced, like 
marriage vows).”6 L. Dairo has argued that proverbs are both per-and illocutionary. As 
speech acts, their functions include “adjudication, expression of facts, warning/admonition, 
offer of advice, issuance of threat, and issuance of directives.”7  
Austin’s work gave rise to a number of studies examining various performances of 
language—conversation, ritual speech, poetry, and so on—as “social acts.”8 Some of this 
work has extended the scope of the claims: Bauman and Briggs, for example, have sought to 
shift the focus of research from single sentences and isolated features to Austin’s “total 
speech act,”9 and Alessandro Duranti’s recent work on linguistic anthropology describes 
                                                        
5 See Robert P. Carroll, When Prophecy Failed: Cognitive Dissonance in the Prophetic Traditions of 
the Old Testament (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 72. 
6 Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 12-20. 
7 Though this is in an analysis of the proverbs of the Yoruba, a west African ethnic group. L. Dairo, “A 
Speech-Act Analysis of Selected Yoruba Proverbs,” Journal of Cultural Studies Vol. 8 No. 3 (2010).  
8 There is a great deal of literature, but we may note, for example, McDowell, who studied the use of 
language in ritualistic acts, arguing that the “formalisation of ritual speech decreases its accessibility to both 
potential performers and audiences; this suppression of the referential function enhances its efficacy.” J. H. 
McDowell, “The semiotic constitution of Kamsa ritual language,” Language in Society 12 (1983): 23-46. 
Conversation analysts, like Schegloff, Goodwin, Moerman, and Sacks, examined the organisation of 
conversation and concluded that the an utterance’s communicative function is “relative to its location in the 
linear stream of discourse.” Bauman and Briggs, “Poetics and Performance,” 63; H. Sacks, E. A. Schegloff, G. 
Jefferson, “A simplest systematics for the organisation of turn-taking for conversation,” Language 50 (1974): 
696-735; M. Moerman, Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1988); C. Goodwin, Conversational Organization: Interaction Between Speakers and 
Hearers (New York: Academic, 1981); “Notes on story structure and the organization of participation,” pages 
225-46 in Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis, edited by J. M . Atkinson and J. 
Heritage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); M. H. Goodwin “‘Instigating’: storytelling as social 
process,” American Ethnologist 9 (1982): 799-819.  
9 Bauman and Briggs, “Poetics and Performance,” 64. Here, illocutionary force is meant to indicate the 
intent of the speaker or author. Similarly, Bauman and Briggs determined that “illocutionary force is not simply 
a product of the referential content and/or syntactic structure of particular sentences.” Instead, they argued, it is 
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language as not merely a social act but a cultural resource and practice.
10
 Such research has 
bearing on how we can understand language in the Bible—most saliently sections of 
dialogue, praise or blame, proverbs, and poetry.
11
 Linguists assume that “both the speaker 
and hearer share the same knowledge of everyday events, as well as cognitive patterns, 
linguistic schemas, and cultural conventions.”12  
However, it remains exceedingly important to retain a balance between supposedly 
“universal” theories and the dynamic and heterogeneous character of language and its use.13 
It would be a mistake to use a modern study’s conclusions about ritual language, for example, 
as a blanket theory for the ritual language of the Bible. In understanding biblical texts (and by 
extension, their authors and audience) through the lens of language theories, it is all too easy, 
as Bauman warns, to take “culturally and historically specific ideas about the nature of 
language and its role in social life and elevate them to the level of purportedly objective and 
universally applicable theories.” Such assumptions would be limited and likely erroneous. 
The findings of linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers must be challenged in their 
dialogue with biblical interpretation. While the application of language theorists’ work has 
become more common in biblical interpretation of late—and with good reason, as will be 
presented below—Bauman’s caution about propinquity in analyses of this sort must be kept 
in the foreground.  
Much the same that can be said about speech can also be said, of course, about written 
descriptions of speech.
14
 Speech-act theory, while initially concerned with the “spoken 
                                                                                                                                                                            
conveyed by a host of elements: “the formal properties of discourse, larger units of speech events, frames, keys, 
participation structures, and the like… and, most importantly, by the interaction of such features” (64). 
10 Alessandro Duranti, Linguistic Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
11 Schegloff, indeed, quoting Gen. 22:1, suggests that the findings of conversational analysis extend to 
the Bible. Emanuel A. Schegloff, “Sequencing in Conversational Openings,” American Anthropologist Vol. 70, 
No. 6 (1968): 1075. 
12 Asnat Bartor, “The ‘Juridical Dialogue’: A Literary-Judicial Pattern,” Vetus Testamentum Vol. 53, 
No. 4 (2003): 453-454. 
13 Bauman and Briggs, “Poetics and Performance,” 60. 
14 See, for example,  Bartor, “Juridical Dialogue,” which discusses dialogue recorded in the Bible.  
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word,” has also been applied to written utterances that appear within literary works,15 and 
Searle himself suggested that “utterances within stories can be understood because they still 
carry the same function that they do in real life, albeit for the world of the narrative and not 
the real world.”16 Such written utterances (and, as the case may be, written discussions of 
utterances) retain the illocutionary and perlocutionary properties of their “real life” 
counterparts. They are simply transmitted and received through different media. As Pratt has 
argued, “literature is a context too, not the absence of one.”17  
 Since written sources can become the only sources for understanding ideas about 
historical speech and its reception, speech-act theory can, as Jerry Hwang recently argued in 
his 2010 dissertation on Deuteronomy, “link textual propositions to extra-textual institutions 
and readers of the text.”18 Andreas Wagner has also conducted an important study 
“Sprechakte und Sprechaktanalyse im Alten Testament,” which is a largely theoretical 
work,
19
 and these studies exemplify the extent to which broader discussions about speech 
have begun to find their way into biblical scholarship. Such works tend to differ from the 
present study, however, in their concern with direct speech in biblical narrative, as opposed 
to ideologies of speech or “language ideologies.”  
 Language ideologies can be understood as those attitudes, values, beliefs, and practices 
that relate to language in a culture, and the study of language ideologies emphasises any 
given language activity as an action rooted in its socio-cultural context. That there is scope 
for such study of activities through the biblical texts becomes clearest, perhaps, when we 
                                                        
15 See Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977), 69; See also Steven Thatcher Mann, “Run, David, Run! An Application of Speech Act 
Theory in a Literary Analysis of David’s Departure (2 Sam. 15:1-17:24)” (Ph.D. diss., Fuller Theological 
Seminary, 2011), 70. 
16 Mann, “Run, David, Run,” 70; Searle, Expression and Meaning, 64. 
17
 Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 94-5. 
18 Jerry Hwang, “The Rhetoric of Remembrance: An Exegetical and Theological Investigation into the 
‘Fathers’ in Deuteronomy” (Ph.D. diss., Wheaton College, 2009), 256. 
19 Andreas Wagner, Sprechakte und Sprechaktanalyse im Alten Testament: Untersuchungen im 
biblischen Hebraisch an der Nahtstelle zwischen Handlungsgebene und Grammatik, BZAW 253 (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1997). 
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consider the wisdom literature, which contains explicit descriptions of ancient Israel’s own 
language ideologies (as when Job 12:14, for instance, states that “fools multiply words”—
with the implication that one who is chatty or repetitive may be seen socially as a fool). 
Wittgenstein's conception of language as both word and world is also of interest in 
this context. Wittgenstein, like Austin, argued that we must understand reality through 
language, as composed of complex social practices, or “language games” (although he 
perhaps overemphasises language as the “key” to reality). Rejecting previous, Platonic 
approaches that concentrated on the logical independence of things, he argued instead that the 
systemic relationships between things are what invest them with social meaning.
20
 He also 
proposed that there is no purely private language and focused not on psychological process 
and individual cognition, but on the ways in which people describe and enact their reality in 
social circumstances.
21
 He emphasised, accordingly, the “multiplicity of meanings” found in 
everyday social activity—that language is a “form of life,” and that it does not describe 
“some essential hidden reality; it is inseparable from the necessarily social construction of 
that reality.”22 In Wittgenstein’s thought, since most systems are “language games,” then 
theology, philosophy, and so on, are systems with particularised forms of and rules about 
                                                        
20 Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference,” 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 3 (1990): 273. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations (New York: MacMillan, 1968), § 65. 
21 George and Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent,” 274. 
22 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradition in Social 
Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 240-48; J. Mendelson, “The Habermas-Gadamer 
Debate,” New German Critique 18 (1979): 44-55. George and Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent,” 273: 
“Accordingly, the meaning of a term/word/symbol could not be assumed to correspond to some essential and 
externally derived foundation or object, but was dependent upon the particular constitutive role it played in 
socio-linguistic systems or ‘language games.’ Language conceived—not as an exclusively descriptive medium 
but as a ‘form of life,’ a process intrinsic to human social activity—represents a significant alternative to 
mainstream social scientific thinking. To understand language in this sense is, in effect, to convert nouns into 
verbs. To ‘speak’ in this sense is to ‘do’: to engage in a speech act is to give meaning to the activities which 
make up social reality. Language thus no longer describes some essential hidden reality; it is inseparable from 
the necessarily social construction of that reality. In this context, the starting point for an investigation of reality 
is the relationship between the rules and conventions of specific ‘language games’ or ‘forms of life’ and their 
socio-historical and cultural meaning. … the study of language (broadly defined) and its rules of grammar 
become, simultaneously, an investigation of reality in the world.”  
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language, and it has been argued, indeed, that there is no “theology” as such in the Hebrew 
Bible because there is no “language game” to be found in it.23  
If we take Wittgenstein seriously, any investigation of Israelite language and speech is 
an investigation of how the Israelites authors perceived their reality (or realities), and it is 
striking that the Hebrew used in our texts seems itself to reflect a sophisticated approach to 
language, with many ways to describe speech and verbal expression and with speech-terms 
given meaning outside of the speech-specific context. For example, the word רבד, which itself 
is a noun derived from the verb “to speak,” is applied so broadly as to denote the general 
“thing” or “matter.” We might almost say that ancient Israelite “society,” at least as perceived 
by the scribal class, was a kind of complex language game in and of itself—with 
particularised forms of, and rules about language. At the very least, the scribal class highly 
valued and narrowly specified “proper” speech.  
Amongst many important contributions to Wittgenstein’s legacy, furthermore, Peter 
Winch’s understanding of “language games” deserves mention here, because he takes the 
concept to refer to “a complex web of activity connected by an adherence to particular rules 
of interpretation which, in different cultures, identified and directed ‘normal’ and/or ‘rational’ 
behavior.”24 Winch, in other words, moved conceptual investigations from the abstractness of 
“logical relations” to an examination of particulars: things that are actually said and done in 
the context of everyday situations. While it is quite impossible to know what was actually 
said and done in ancient Israel, of course, it is just such particulars that are present within the 
texts, betraying some of the details that make an investigation of the authors’ attitudes and 
structures more possible.  
                                                        
23 David H. Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities: Metaphor, Semantics, and Divine Imagery (Leiden: Brill, 
2001), 17. 
24 George and Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent,” 274; P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its 
Relation to Philosophy (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). 
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 Our access to those details is in part through direct advice and regulations about speech, 
such as those found most commonly in legal and didactic texts, but there is also information 
about speech to be found in aspects of literary convention, and scholars have often observed, 
most notably, the “primacy of dialogue” within biblical narrative: third-person narration 
commonly bridges dialogue in a sort of secondary function, with direct speech given a central 
role. It has been argued that this is because direct speech lends drama and authenticity to a 
text and enables the narrator to expose the speaker without, as Asnat Bartor has called it, “the 
imposition of authorial interpretation.”25 Additionally, according to Robert Alter, it allows the 
audience to evaluate the character of the speaker, as the direct speech presents “a summary of 
interior experience rather than a narrative realisation of it.”26 Similarly, beyond being an 
effective literary tool, the “primacy of dialogue” in biblical texts may also reflect the 
significance speech had in the author’s own experience for exposing and evaluating 
character. This theory is of especial importance to chapter 7’s discussion of dialogue in Job. 
This usage allows us to consider in our texts what Bourdieu conceptualised as hexis, 
borrowing the Aristotelian term but explaining it as the “individual disposition that joins 
desire (intention) with judgment (evaluation).”27 Hexis describes how one expresses one’s 
“relationship to the social world and to one’s proper place in it” by “the space and time one 
                                                        
25 Bartor, "Juridical Dialogue,” 451: “Third-person narration is secondary to direct speech to the extent 
that the former is frequently only a bridge between much larger units of the latter. The preference for direct 
speech apparently derives from three main factors: 1) Direct speech provides dramatic vividness, which 
increases the authenticity of the scene, as though it happened exactly as such; or as R. Dorson phrases it: ‘The 
tale becomes fresher, livelier, and clearer when natural conversation is introduced.’ 2) Direct speech enables the 
reader to trace a speaker’s character and his expressive style. According to R. Alter, since the biblical corpus 
was based upon literary conventions which dictated a homogeneous language and did not "allow" the figures to 
use personal "spoken" language, the distinctive character of each speaker was, first and foremost, reflected by 
the dialogue itself and by the way the utterances were expressed.  3) Direct speech is the chief instrument for 
revealing the varied relations of the characters to the actions in which they are implicated.” See also R. Alter, 
The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York, 1981), 63-74, 86-87; R. M. Dorson, “Oral Styles of American Folk 
Narrators,” in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in Language (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 27–51. 
26 Alter, Biblical Narrative, 85, 86-87. 
27William F. Hanks, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language,” Annual Review of Anthropology 
Vol. 34 (2005): 69; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinctions. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. by Richard 
Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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feels entitled to take from others.”28 Thus, how one speaks is an expression of “one’s own 
sense of social value”—for example, whether one speaks assertively, hastily, or timidly.29 
Hanks has described the function of Bourdieu’s hexis in speech, calling it “the guiding frame 
of reference that aligns intention with judgments of good and bad, appropriate and 
inappropriate. Speakers have hexis insofar as they enact through speech expressive intentions 
and the metalinguistic evaluations that guide both themselves and their understanding of 
others.”30 For example, today, if an American is longwinded or constantly interrupts others, it 
would be assumed that this person has a high sense of his or her own social value and 
considers his or her own statements and opinions more valuable than those of others.  
This work ultimately argues that the authors of the biblical texts ascribe hexis to their 
ancient Israelite audience. They depict speech as exceptionally demonstrative of one’s 
intentions and enacting one’s own judgments (of others) and expected judgements (from 
others, including YHWH). In other words, speech acts are made up of words (i.e. locutions), 
but are also acts in and of themselves (i.e. illocutions), which, in the case of Israelite texts, 
almost always are portrayed as perlocutions bringing about various effects. This is because of 
the speaker’s perceived hexis—that through speech they reveal (directly or indirectly) their 
evaluations, understandings, and intentions. 
Social Agreement 
 This brings us to the important point that language and communication involve 
agreement or conformity between those who are communicating. We can view this in terms 
of “justification conditions”:31 speakers use speech that embodies variable measures of 
justification (sometimes none at all) and assertion.
32
 In a given community, an individual will 
                                                        
28
 Bourdieu, Distinctions, 471. 
29 Id. 
30 Hanks, “Practices of Language,” 69. 
31 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 74. 
32 Id. at 87-88. 
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undergo scrutiny by others, who will associate that individual with certain justification 
conditions based on the individual's rule-following.
33
 Kripke provides the example of: 
a small child learning addition. It is obvious that his teacher will not accept just any 
response from the child. On the contrary, the child must fulfil various conditions if the 
teacher is to ascribe to him mastery of the concept of addition. … the child must 
produce, almost all the time, the “right” answer… The teacher judges that the child has 
given the same answer that he himself would give.
34
   
 
Kripke continues: "Those who deviate are incorrect and told (usually as children) that they 
have not grasped the concept of addition. One who is an incorrigible deviant in enough 
respects simply cannot participate in the life of the community and in communication.”35 To 
take a biblical example, the “fool” in Proverbs is one who is an incorrigible deviant in proper 
communication—communication that conforms with the specific rules the proverbs advise, 
that is, the specific speeches (or silences) that the various writers of the proverbs would seek 
to employ themselves.  
I have already mentioned Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a “game”, with 
certain roles to play and rules to follow, and that conception is also apt here, because for such 
a game, agreement is essential.
36
 Wittgenstein does not extend this agreement to include 
shared concepts or understanding (contra Frege
37
), but confines it simply to agreement about 
the rules. It is when a group of people follow the same rules, that they are able to perform 
meaningful social interactions, and Kripke again provides a useful example—this time of a 
grocer and a customer:  
The customer, when he deals with the grocer and asks for five apples, expects the 
grocer to count as he does, not according to some bizarre non-standard rule; and so, if 
his dealings with the grocer involve a computation, he expects the grocer’s responses to 
agree with his own. Indeed, he may entrust the computation to the grocer. Of course the 
                                                        
33 Id. at 89. “Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based, not on truth conditions, but 
on assertability conditions or justification conditions (a use of language properly has no independent 
justification other than the speaker’s inclination to speak thus on that occasion (e.g. saying that one is in pain)” 
(74). 
34 Id. at 89-90. 
35 Id. at 92. 
36 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 240. 
37 G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, ed. and trans. by M. Furth. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). 
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grocer may make mistakes in addition; he may even make dishonest computations. But 
as long as the customer attributes to him a grasp of the concept of addition, he expects 
that at least the grocer will not behave bizarrely… and one can even expect that, in 
many cases, he will come up with the same answer the customer would have given 
himself.
38
  
 
These rules of language, and indeed, therefore, of life, form the inherent measuring-sticks by 
which we interact and react in society. “Our entire lives depend on countless such 
interactions, and on the ‘game’ of attributing to others the mastery of certain concepts or 
rules, thereby showing that we expect them to behave as we do.”39 When an individual is 
often deviant, they are not entrusted and eventually excluded from interactions.
40
 Conformity, 
on a very basic level, is required for community membership. Every community has a 
particular “form of life,” that is, the types of responses upon which they agree, and how these 
responses are integrated with other actions.
41
 
Wisdom Texts 
In ancient Israel, it is principally in didactic texts that we find the most explicit 
account of these types of agreed-upon responses, to the extent that Proverbs is almost a book 
of rules for the language game. Israel’s wisdom texts are particularly useful for understanding 
the “rules and conventions that are understood to be in play when an utterance is made and 
received”.42 Wisdom literature directly discusses the ideals of speech, as perceived by its 
authors and redactors, and it advocates certain behaviors in imparting wisdom to others—
indeed, in talking to, or about others altogether. Qoheleth, for example, famously describes “a 
time to be silent and a time to speak,” part of a broader theme in wisdom literature: the 
power—and specifically the hazards—of speech.43 Job warns, “Words from the mouth of the 
wise are gracious, but fools are consumed by their own lips. At the beginning their words are 
                                                        
38
 Kripke, Private Language, 92. 
39 Id. at 93. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 96 (§§240-2). 
42 Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 86. 
43 Eccl. 3:7 
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folly; at the end they are wicked madness—and fools multiply words.”44 Ben Sira also warns 
his audience to be circumspect around those who are wealthier than they are: “Do not quarrel 
with a rich man, lest his resources outweigh yours; for gold has ruined many, and has 
perverted the minds of kings.”45 Qoheleth, again, sees much talk as unprofitable: “the more 
the words, the less the meaning, and how does that benefit anyone?”46 These examples each 
emphasise (1) the literate class’s perception of speech as of paramount significance in the 
ancient Israelite community and (2) the value of wisdom literature in drawing out these 
attitudes to speech.  
The traditional “wisdom” texts of the Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, Job, and Qoheleth, 
have varied origins and forms. For these texts, rich and complex in tradition and compilation, 
it would be difficult to pinpoint exact (or even approximate) dates of composition section by 
section, or proverb by proverb. 
47
 This much can be said with some confidence: the book of 
Proverbs contains material that seems to have been initially oral, along with material that 
seems to have been initially written.
48
As will be seen in chapter 2, writing and speaking were 
                                                        
44 Job 12:12-14 
45 Ben Sira 8:2; cf. 13:2. See Matthew J. Goff, The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom of 4QInstruction 
(STDJ 50, Leiden: Brill, 2003), 138. 
46 Eccl. 6:11; cf. 5:2-7 [5:1-6] 
47 This is something, however, that Katharine Dell, in her analysis of Proverbs, attempts to do, by 
distinguishing between what she terms the oral and written stages. This might be problematic, as it tends to 
equate oral stages with early dates and written stages with later. It also groups sections thematically, which is 
potentially concerning. She concludes that what she terms the “family/folk/tribal context” has a “more general 
ethical character and oral nature,” while the “more overtly educational context, with possible courtly/kingly 
links” has “more emphasis on the written stage of the material.” This may be a noteworthy trend, but it is also 
important to remember that “folk” does not equal “oral,” just as “educational” or “court” does not equal 
“written.” There seems to be evidence for both practices in both settings, and it might be simplistic to identify 
these forms of communication with one particular context. It is similarly so to date based on content or thematic 
emphasis, as (a) in a genre which is clearly grouped thematically in other attestations in the Near East, proverbs 
with similar themes but a wide variety of compositional dates and contexts may very well have been compiled 
together, and (b) the proverbs’ content is so universal in character that specific details about everyday life—
while important and illuminating as such—are not readily specific to a particular point in time in Israelite 
history. Katharine Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 192.  
48
 See Katharine Dell’s discussion on this subject. Id. See also James Crenshaw, who has also 
examined the relationship between orality and literacy with regard to wisdom literature, first addressing why 
“wisdom” was preserved, asserting that it was thought to be a powerful and positive shaping force in instruction: 
“The sages thought that their teachings were intrinsically good, and for that reason alone they were worth 
preserving and passing on to the next generation.” James L. Crenshaw, “Transmitting Prophecy Across 
Generations” in Writings and Speech in Israelite and Ancient Near Eastern Prophecy (Ehud Ben Zvi and 
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often companion, even coordinated, activities. Although the book of Proverbs is a complex 
compilation, variously transcribed and composed, it nevertheless seems to reflect social 
expectations to a greater extent than other biblical texts. 
This becomes clear when reading proverbs outside of the book of Proverbs. Certain 
narrative texts include proverbs in a way that suggests their common usage, and Carole R. 
Fontaine’s work has addressed “proverb performance,” analysing the placement of proverbs 
in biblical narrative.
49
 She concludes that the proverb is: 
a vital traditional wisdom which is operant in society at a variety of levels and not 
simply in the elitist bureaucracies of the court sages and scribes. The functional goal of 
such traditional wisdom is the restoration of order in society (according to that society’s 
construal of “order”) through the use of verbal behaviours rather than physically 
destructive ones.
50
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Michael H. Floyd, eds.; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000). He compares this practice to the 
preservation of prophetic oracles, suggesting that disciples may have kept records of prophetic texts because 
they wished to preserve their masters’ words, that temples and royal courts may have wished to preserve oracles 
because of their future relevancy, or that “perhaps these official organizations were simply in the business of 
preserving everything that came their way.” Wilson, “Current Issues,” 42-3. Crenshaw asserts that wisdom 
instruction was oral (based on the common injunction in the texts to “listen and learn”).  Wilson, “Current 
Issues,” 44. “…even as late as the Persian period people are enjoined to listen to instruction and to take 
teachings to heart; they are not exhorted to consult a written text.” Conversely, Davies “sees very little role for 
oral transmission” (Wilson, “Current Issues,” 44; citing Philip R. Davies, Scribes and Schools: The 
Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1998)), in the wisdom 
texts, while Wilson, like Dell, sees the truth as lying “in some combination of oral and written transmission.” 
Wilson, “Current Issues,” 44; Dell, The Book of Proverbs. 
49 Carole R. Fontaine, Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1982). 
50 Id. at vii-viii; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 35. Compare this theory to Bernard Jackson’s:  In his readings 
of the mishpatim of Exodus as “wisdom-laws”, Bernard Jackson sees courts as places originally conceived to 
apply divine wisdom rather than legal rules. Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, vii. Both Fontaine and Jackson, among 
others, see proverbs as a formulaic means of settling disputes. Fontaine, Traditional Sayings; Jackson, Wisdom-
laws, 35-36; Claudia V. Camp, “The Wise Women Of 2 Samuel: A Role Model For Women in Early Israel?” 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly Vol. 43 no. 1 (1981): 18.The oft-cited example is David’s response to Saul in 1 
Sam. 24, after he spares Saul:  
12 May the Lord judge between you and me. And may the Lord avenge the wrongs you have done to me, 
but my hand will not touch you. 13 As the old saying goes, “From evildoers come evil deeds,” so my 
hand will not touch you. 14 “Against whom has the king of Israel come out? Who are you pursuing? A 
dead dog? A flea? 15 May the Lord be our judge and decide between us. May he consider my cause and 
uphold it; may he vindicate me by delivering me from your hand. 
This old saying is cited as a non-inflammatory, impersonal judgment, a traditional rule or custom which serves 
to sum up the outcome of their conflict and, theoretically, bring it to its close, with David asserting his 
innocence of evildoing. 
 Jackson also comments on the use of another formula which he proposes has a similar function, 
“Proverbs 24:29 provides further evidence of the use of the ka 'asher formula in oral interaction, here 
accompanied by criticism of it: ‘Do not say, “I will do to him as he has done to me (ka 'asher asah li ken a 'aseh 
lo); I will pay the man back for what he has done.’” This may well be understood as a comment on the use of the 
formula in everyday social interaction, and again emphasises its informal and discretionary character.”    
Jackson, “Models,” 19-20. Whether this and examples like the one in 1 Sam. 24 are purely literary devices or 
not, however, is more difficult to say. Sandoval has argued, for example, that the proverbial speech of folk 
proverbs—which he asserts constitute the bulk of Proverbs—are to be understood as metaphorical: “They are 
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It seems to be that the wisdom texts of Proverbs and Qoheleth not only intimate ideas about 
speech, but also about societal goals.  
Ultimately, the “genre” of wisdom literature is particularly focused on speech 
practices in ancient Israel, as can be seen especially in the book of Proberbs. It is therefore a 
natural focal point of a study interested in those practices. At the same time, it is important to 
understand the reliability of those texts we understand as representative of this genre, and to 
understand in what ways we must be cautious in making historical claims based on texts in 
this genre. Accordingly, the conclusions that I draw are concerned primarily with the way 
language was perceived by the literate writers of these works and less so with actual 
historical practice. 
Conclusion 
In sum, social language is highly complex and multivalent, and, although it would be 
impossible to reify a comprehensive speech “system,” the written texts of ancient Israel can 
intimate the literate class’s expectations of its members and broader community. Linguistic 
anthropology sees language as a cultural product. Speech-act theory assists in connecting the 
written word with its authors and audience, and in understanding speech as an “act” with 
tangible effects. Wittgenstein, Winch, and Kripke suggest that speech is a complex societal 
system, and that society makes judgments based on how its members operate in—or out of—
compliance with that system. Agreement is an integral part of this societal system. Bourdieu 
offers the concept of hexis, and how individuals themselves enact their perceived social role 
                                                                                                                                                                            
regularly deployed in specific oral contexts to say something metaphorically about human life.”   Timothy J. 
Sandoval, “Revisiting the Prologue of Proverbs,” JBL Vol. 126, No. 3 (2007): 469. He continues to argue that 
understanding a proverb in its performative context is a “complicated interpretive act of construing symbolic 
relations between the statement uttered and the context in which it is spoken and which it is meant to illumine. 
… one must inquire after the figurative and literary-symbolic relations between any particular statement in 
Proverbs and the myriad other statements to be found in the literary context of the book” (470). This certainly 
seems to be at least one of their functions in the narrative examples—though it is perhaps too delimiting to 
identify this as the one and only function of such proverbial formulas. 
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in the way that they speak. Each of these concepts will be relied upon in some degree in the 
study that follows. 
Legal and wisdom texts are most helpful in determining a broad-spectrum idea of 
what “ideal speech” entailed and what certain speech-acts, under various circumstances and 
to various parties, indicated “legally,” socially, and aesthetically. Wisdom and legal texts are 
both the primary guiding sources for ethical behaviour in the Hebrew Bible and perhaps the 
most revealing sources for understanding the scribes’ perceptions of day-to-day community 
life. Wisdom describes a world of choices and ambiguities.
51
 It depicts the ideal character and 
behaviour of both the community and the individual. In much the same way, legal texts meet 
at this intersection as well, concerned with individuals’ actions and their potential effects 
(usually detrimental) on the wellbeing of the community. While wisdom and legal texts are 
the focus of this study, relevant texts throughout the corpus of the Bible are also referenced. 
Language is at its foundation a social activity, shaped by and shaping its users’ 
culture. Acts of communication are rooted in socio-cultural context, and the way language is 
described—or prescribed—is an indication of the biblical authors’ attitudes towards, values 
of, and beliefs in language practices. Language ideologies can be found in the biblical 
sources, which act as a sort of dialect of a language. The fact that language receives such 
direct attention throughout the wisdom texts seems to correspond to a class in which language 
and comportment held pride of place. Ultimately, the biblical sources demonstrate a 
continued interest in speech within the community and reflect the interests and ideas of 
Israel’s literate class, and it is the purpose of this dissertation to identify the rules and 
attitudes toward speech in ancient Israel as related to community perceptions.  
 
 
                                                        
51 William P. Brown, Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom literature of the Old 
Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 4. 
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Chapter 2: The Development of Writing in Ancient Israel 
 
In studying the roles of speech and writing in ancient Israel, we can attempt to fix two 
endpoints on a spectrum: those things identified as primarily spoken and those things 
identified as primarily written. Anciently, there was likely some overlapping, with many 
communicative actions both written and spoken. Those actions that don’t seem to overlap are 
of interest to this study, as they intimate role-specific features. The areas of overlap are also 
of interest to this study, and in particular this chapter, as they highlight the development of 
writing and its changing use in ancient Israelite society. 
Where most of the dissertation is concerned with the portrayal of communication in 
the biblical sources, this chapter looks to the historical development of writing in order to 
understand its developing roles in ancient Israelite society, particularly those roles distinct 
from oral communication. This will lead into an examination of literacy in ancient Israel, 
because understanding the act and prevalence of “reading” in ancient Israelite society also 
speaks to the role of writing in that community. Finally, this chapter will discuss the ancient 
scribal class and their approach to writing. Later, chapter 3 will build on these socio-historical 
discussions in an examination of communication in terms of the community and the divine.  
The Innovation of Writing 
Writing has been called “man’s most brilliant invention,”52 and in many respects, this 
opinion is not an overstatement. Writing is indeed an invention, and as such, it was innovated 
to address various needs. Carleton T. Hodge has noted that “preliterate peoples had all the 
associational abilities necessary for inventing and using writing, but lacked the incentive. As 
scholars, it is our job to identify stimuli that could have resulted in early writing systems.”53  
In Mesopotamia, these stimuli appear to have been, among other things, identification 
(i.e. for ownership) and record keeping (for complex economic and administrative dealings). 
                                                        
52 Leonard Cottrell, Reading the Past (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1971). 
53 Carleton T. Hodge, “Review of Wayne M. Senner, The Origins of Writing,” Anthropological 
Linguistics Vol. 31, No. 3 (1989): 303. 
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Others have argued that writing was innovated out of what might be called governmental 
needs—for administrative record-keeping, economic book-keeping, and international and 
domestic communication.
54
 Seth L. Sanders argues, on the other hand, that writing was co-
opted for political expansion and that it was political ambition or the creation of the state that 
catalysed the development of “history” writing.55 A more Marxist nuance of this view might 
suggest that writing emerged from economic needs, which then enabled political expansion. 
There is much more to the debate about the origins of writing, well beyond the scope of this 
work, that will not be addressed here. 
Whether writing emerged from, or enabled political expansion, however, the 
complexities of trade and administration came to benefit from and require fixing for various 
reasons: for accuracy, permanence, consensus, portability, and the recording of complex 
details. These properties of writing are discussed below. 
Permanence  
 Writing is a lasting, graphic representation of language. Its durability allowed it to 
transcend, to various extents, the spatial and temporal limitations of speech in the pre-modern 
world. There are several situations in the ancient world that might have required the relatively 
permanent medium of writing—indeed, this is writing’s defining characteristic. Such 
situations include various economic and legal commitments, most probably at first between 
members of different communities, as those in the same communities would have shared 
practices and expectations in place and not be able to avoid fulfilling said commitments or 
deny having made them. Additionally, permanence is a quality valued for ritual, religious, 
and political reasons. For example, monumental inscriptions proclaim their provenance – 
whether for boundaries, political expansion, communication with the gods, or otherwise to 
                                                        
54 On the relationship between state centralisation and writing, see Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing 
and the Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 87-126. 
55 Seth L. Sanders, “Writing and Early Iron Age Israel: Before National Scripts, Beyond Nations and 
States,” in Literate Culture and Tenth-Century Canaan: The Tel Zayit Abecedry in Context (ed. Ron E. Tappy 
and P. Kyle McCarter, Jr.; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2008), 98-100. 
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assert ownership – in a fashion necessarily durable, as permanent as possible. It is of course 
difficult to say which arose first: the method or the need. On the one hand, the advent of 
writing for other reasons might have, in creating the ability to record language relatively 
permanently, created, perhaps, new perceptions about needs and a new criterion of 
permanence: a restructuring not only of value constructs but also possibly of cognition.
56
  
 While much ink has been spilt debating the latter, the difficulty of the question, and 
arguments about it, demonstrate its ultimately impossible nature: the pre-literate ancient 
world left no intellectual records, making arguments about how the advent of writing affected 
cognition somewhat futile. Granted, one can make interesting and compelling arguments 
based on pre-literate material evidence, contra post-literate, but then again these categories of 
“pre-” and “post-” literate are fluid and unfixed. However, the existence of durable and large-
scale monuments well before the advent of writing suggests that permanence was already 
valued for such types of public markers. 
Consensus and Accountability 
 Because of this relative “permanence,” writing is largely immutable, and lends 
accountability to transactions of a legal or economic nature. Writing enabled the ratification 
of agreements and solidified or reified commitment. Issues of erasure, editing, or forging 
appear to have been concerning to various degrees across the geographic and temporal space 
of the ancient Near East. However, such acts reinforce the perception that “that which is 
written” is agreed upon and accepted. Because of its permanent nature, writing entailed 
consensus before chiseling (or painting, or wedge-imprinting, as it were), and commitment 
afterwards. 
 
 
                                                        
56 See, for example, David Diringer, Writing (London: Thames and Hudson, 1962), 16; Cottrell, 
Reading the Past, 6.  
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Accuracy 
 It has been noted in several studies of pre-literate communities that oral memory and 
transmission is quite fluid—or at least, that “accuracy” as such is often based on generational 
agreement rather than lasting and consistent records.
57
 This is all well and good when 
transactions are simple and local. However, as communities expand and trade increases, the 
need for accuracy is born. In counting, for example, tallies are an example of proto-writing 
that arose out of this need. Indeed, the risk of inaccuracy increases as the relevant quantity 
does: the higher the number, the more opportunities for mis-counting or losing one’s place. 
Again, there can be some haziness about whether this “need” was created by or itself 
prompted the advent of writing. Indeed, a Marxist view would hold that the economic 
expansion and its accompanying needs came first, but writing may well have arisen out of 
non-economic needs and then enabled and facilitated economic expansion. 
Complexity of Record 
 Writing enables the recording of complex legal, administrative, or economic details. In 
legal texts, for example, it is often assumed that it is writing that allows for the recording of 
consultable precedent. Bernard Jackson explains that “orality favours events rather than 
concepts or system… we can tolerate a complex story told orally, but not a complex legal 
document.”58 Writing also facilitated or enabled the support of the state, especially through 
the collection of taxes—it allowed the centralisation of administrative centres with the ability 
to communicate and collect taxes across a large geographical area.
59
 The centralisation of 
administrative centres required, in turn, innovations in a system of writing.  
                                                        
57 See for example Goody and Watt, “Consequences”; Laura Bohannan, “A Genealogical Charter”, 
Africa Vol. 22 No. 4, (1952): 301-315. 
58
 Bernard S. Jackson, “Models in Legal History: The Case of Biblical Law,” Journal of Law and 
Religion 18 (2002): 8. 
59 Later attestations include jar stamp impressions, see Oded Lipschits and David S. Vanderhooft, The 
Yehud Stamp Impressions: A Corpus of Inscribed Impressions from the Persian and Hellenistic Periods in 
Judah (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011). 
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Portability  
 While writing is permanent, or able to travel through time, it is also portable—or fixed 
to portable mediums, rather—that allow it to travel through space. In primarily oral 
communities, communication through space could only be achieved via messengers (see, for 
example, Prov. 22:21). Writing also enabled multiple copies of things to be made, to allow 
for simultaneous, long-distance communications. 
Public/Monumental/Religious 
 Similarly, writing as evidence of “ownership” was also important for entities beyond 
the individual: writing was used for sacred or monumental display, to mark boundaries or 
commemorate. Its use was a physical reminder of power, whether political or divine (or, quite 
often, both at once).  
Conclusions 
Many of the writing situations suggested above are not exclusive examples of the 
category to which they have been assigned, and instead combine at least one or more of the 
listed motivations. For example, in the situation of letter-writing, the innovation of writing 
allowed for a product that was consistently portable, permanent, and conveyed the sender’s 
precise message—where oral messengers were not reliably all three. Thus, writing arose out 
of important community needs, and it satisfied these needs by performing community 
functions, like identification, transactional accounting, and commemoration. 
Writing and Community Development 
There is evidence of writing in what might be termed “Israel” as early as the late 
second millennium BCE and early first millennium BCE. But the simple attestation of 
writing in its various forms says only so much about the role of writing in a society at large. 
To understand writing’s sociological function, as it were, one must recast their questions in 
terms of literacy and orality—to what extent was ancient Israelite society literate? That is, to 
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what extent was writing used in everyday life, by whom, and in what conditions? Did it 
encounter resistance or was it more or less quietly adopted? More broadly, what kind of 
impact does writing have on community participation? Many of these questions have been 
addressed in the study of other societies, both ancient and modern, with results that may have 
some bearing on our approach to ancient Israel. Discussions of literacy and orality in biblical 
studies are typically adduced to issues of composition and literature, but less so to 
understanding the significance of speech acts within a society.  
“Literacy” 
Importantly, it has long been argued that, from a cognitive perspective, reading and 
writing are separable skills.
60
 Learning to write is much more difficult than learning to read.
61
 
“The main function of a writing system is not to make writing as easy as possible but to make 
reading as easy as possible.”62 Thus we might use the term reading-literacy to refer to the 
ability to read, rather than read and write,
63
 and, indeed, in more recent history, we have 
records of high “reading-literacy” in societies that are primarily oral.64 But depending on 
one’s definition of the term “literacy,” they might classify such societies as not literate at all.  
Indeed, one cannot discuss literacy in ancient Israel without examining the definition of 
the term. After a cursory glance through the relevant literature, it might appear that there is 
                                                        
60 See T. C. Smout, “New Evidence on Popular Religion and Literacy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland,” 
Past and Present 97 (1982): 121; Macdonald, “Literacy,” 52. 
61 Martin Neef, Anneke Neijt, and Richard Sproat, “The Relation of Writing to Spoken Language,” 
(Linguistische Arbeiten no. 460; Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 2002).  
62 Neef, Neijt, and Sproat, “Writing.”  
63 We can have reading-writing-literacy, reading-literacy, and in some cases, even writing-literacy 
(typically attested in young children). Macdonald describes children learning to write before learning to read 
(know the alphabet etc.; see C. Chomsky, “Invented Spelling in the Open Classroom,” Word 27 (1971): 499-
518. This work discusses how they work out their own phonetic spellings, which are surprisingly consistent, see 
especially p. 505), but this demonstrates that writing and reading are not "two sides of the same coin" (Smout, 
“New Evidence,” 121). This has been shown since the 1960s (52). 
64 For example, in Sweden, at least from the seventeenth century onwards, reading-literacy was by all 
accounts nearly universal. This was prompted by a government campaign with the intent that everyone should 
be able to read the Bible for themselves. Reading for much of the population was performed once a week, on 
Sunday. The motive here was neither practical nor economic, but spiritual. However, the introduction of writing 
to a primarily oral society is often more complex and belaboured than this Swedish campaign might suggest. 
Egil Johansson, Alphabeta Varia: Orality, Reading and Writing in the History of Literacy (ed. D. Lindmark; 
Umea: Umea University Press, 1998), 121.  
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little consensus among ancient Near Eastern scholars on the levels of literacy in the ancient 
Near East. However, their disagreements seem to be mostly based on semantics, with the 
assertion that a society is “literate” championed or disparaged depending on how one defines 
that term, and less with an actual disagreement about the proposed “actual” state of affairs.   
M. C. A. Macdonald, in his recent discussion of ancient Near Eastern literacy, defined a 
literate society as one that requires reading and writing to function “in certain vital aspects, 
such as the bureaucracy, economic and commercial activities, or religious life. Thus, in a 
sense, a society can be literate, because it uses the written word in some of its vital functions, 
even when the vast majority of its members cannot read or write.”65 He contrasts this with an 
oral society, where “literacy is not essential to any of its activities, and memory and oral 
communication perform the functions which reading and writing have within a literate 
society.”66 Under this line of reasoning, we can refer to societies as primarily literate or 
primarily oral, and this may not necessarily correspond to high or low rates of literacy in the 
population at large.  
Up to this point, however, most scholars have used these descriptions synonymously 
with literacy rates. Carleton T. Hodge has argued, for example, that ancient Mesopotamia 
was not a literate society because most of its citizens could not read and write, regardless of 
whether any class of Mesopotamians read or wrote to perform essential societal functions.
67
  
                                                        
65 Macdonald, “Literacy in an Oral Environment,” 49. 
66 Macdonald, “Literacy in an Oral Environment,” 49. “There are, of course, gradations between these 
two extremes and, just as it is possible to have large numbers of illiterates in a literate society, so, perhaps 
surprisingly, it is possible to have many people who can read and/or write in an oral society, without this 
changing its fundamentally oral nature.” 
67 He refuted certain claims (especially those of Frank Moore Cross, “The Invention and Development 
of the Alphabet,” pages 77-90 in The Origins of Writing (ed. Wayne M. Senner; Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989) that the advent of the seemingly simpler alphabetic script brought with it a surge of 
higher literacy. It is problematic to correlate literacy rates with script type. Hodge, “Review,” 302-306. He 
argues, “Although it is true that the alphabet permitted an increase in literacy, the study of history shows that 
widespread literacy was slow to come and is a recent phenomenon. Furthermore, the far more cumbersome 
Sumero-Akkadian and Chinese systems were used by dynamic societies over wide areas. The Chinese system, 
moreover, is still used by an enormous percentage of the world’s population, with a commendable literacy rate. 
One should also note the importance of professional scribes in alphabet-using areas, even today in some 
cultures.” 
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 Christopher Rollston has also argued that literacy levels were low in ancient Israel, 
though his definition of literacy is quite demanding.
68
 He defines literacy for the southern 
Levant during antiquity as “the ability to write and read, using and understanding a standard 
script, a standard orthography, a standard numeric system, conventional formatting and 
terminology, and with minimal errors of composition or comprehension.”69 He is disinclined 
to argue for non-elite literacy in ancient Israel, and makes the important note that it is 
difficult to extrapolate data about literacy for Israelite society at large based on little evidence 
(i.e. the Lachish ostraca).
70
  
Walter Ong has proposed an alternative definition of literacy, describing the 
phenomenon of “residual orality.”71 This, he argues, is an “equilibrium state,” in which 
writing and mass illiteracy coexist.
72
 It is the persistence of oral speech acts after the 
introduction of writing: exposure to writing without the full adoption of it.
73
 For example, in 
Egypt and Mesopotamia, writing and literacy appear to have been limited to a specific scribal 
or priestly class, the literati, who had regimented structures in place for training and 
dissemination/transmission.
74
 Most ancient Near Eastern scholars consider the rest of the 
                                                        
68 Christopher Rollston, Writing and Literacy in the World of Ancient Israel: Epigraphic Evidence from 
the Iron Age (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 90. 
69 Id. at 127. He would further “affirm that the capacity to scrawl one’s name on a contract, but without 
the ability to write or read or anything else is not literacy, not even some sort of ‘functional literacy.’ Rather, 
those with this level of eptitude should be classed as illiterate. However, I would also argue that there some in 
ancient Israel who should be classed as semi-literates. That is, there were ostensibly those who were capable of 
reading the most remedial of texts with at least some modest level of comprehension and often the ability to pen 
some of the most common and simplest of words. Naturally, I would also posit that there was much variation 
within each of these categories, but precise penetration into the nature of such variation is not something that the 
date (ancient or modern) can accomplish” (128-29). Rollston doesn’t discount a relationship between writing 
systems and literacy rates, but he views it as only one of many variables—and “not even the most determinative 
variable. Ultimately, writing systems and literacy rates are related but independent variables” (128). Rollston 
argues for what he terms “the literacy of a broader officialdom (i.e. not just scribes)” to account for the Lachish 
letters sent between military and political officers (129). 
70 Id. at 130. 
71 Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1982), 113. 
72 Id. at 92-93. 
73
 Id., McLuhan, Gutenberg Galaxy, 21. 
74 In these systems, training was often in a classical corpus written in archaic languages. In ancient 
Israel and Judah, Weeks argues that the objective was education, rather than practical concerns like trade or 
diplomacy—though their training undoubtedly enabled them to complete certain practical tasks (Weeks, 
“Literacy, Orality, and Literature”). As Stuart Weeks has argued, “Israel and Judah certainly had literate scribes 
and priests, moreover, and a good proportion of the literary and epigraphic material which has survived seems to 
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populace to be illiterate.
75
 But even with an illiterate general populace, many ancient Near 
Eastern societies, including ancient Israel, appear to have been residually oral, with the 
population at large at least exposed to writing if not adopting it.
76
 
Demsky also defines literacy quite broadly, understanding it as a spectrum of ability 
beginning with recognising individual letters of the alphabet. He suggests that even this 
minimal skill enables one to participate in alphabetic communication—albeit very 
rudimentarily.
77
 He shifts the emphasis from attempting to quantify literacy to understanding 
how the attestation of literacy, in whatever approximate level, reveals certain features about 
ancient Israelite society. He focuses on the social, political, geographic, and other features 
that allowed the potential for literacy to exist beyond and outside a limited scribal class.  
Demsky challenges the value of comparative studies on ancient literacy, as each ancient 
society exhibited and operated under different features. At the same time, however, Demsky 
does contrast the elite, insular literati of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia with ancient Israel. 
The former involved long-term training and produced texts that were by and large not only 
inaccessible to the illiterate on a technical level—that is, not readable to them—but they 
would also have been exclusive in terms of content (e.g., lexical lists, omens, foundation 
                                                                                                                                                                            
correspond to their interests. With little direct information on many aspects of the issue, however, we have to be 
aware of the substantial differences which limit the usefulness of analogy as a tool here” (466). 
75 In Neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions, it has been argued, the potential audience was not “sufficiently 
literate to respond to the language” (Megan Cifarelli, “Enmity, Alienation, and Assyrianization: The Role of 
Cultural Difference in the Visual and Verbal Expression of Assyrian Ideology in the Reign of Ashurnasirpal II 
(883-859 B.C.)” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995), 38.) 
76 As Weeks has pointed out, literacy in ancient Israel “may have been determined more by economic 
convenience and social expectation than by membership of any single profession.” Weeks, “Literacy, Orality, 
and Literature,” 469, citing Daniel Boyarin on “reading” as “reading out” or aloud ("Placing Reading: Ancient 
Israel and Medieval Europe," pages 10-37 in The Ethnography of Reading (ed. Jonathan Boyarin, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993). He does not endorse high popular literacy rates. Weeks, “Literacy, 
Orality, and Literature,” 465. However, it is, as Weeks has argued, “rarely assumed or asserted any more that 
monarchic Israel enjoyed high levels of popular literacy.” He continues, “It has become more tenable these days 
to start with the assumption that in Israel, as elsewhere, literacy (even in the broadest sense) was probably 
limited to quite a small proportion of the population, and that there must have been a substantial number of 
Israelites, perhaps even a vast majority, whose culture remained essentially oral” (465). 
77 Aaron Demsky, Literacy in Ancient Israel (The Biblical Encyclopaedia Library Vol. 28, Jerusalem: 
Bialik Institute, 2012), 1-60. 
26 
 
inscriptions, and texts written for the gods). He sees ancient Israel’s literati as more 
inclusive.
78
  
In a more distant comparison, MacDonald has used the model of high “reading-
literacy” rates in seventeenth-century Sweden to suggest the possibility of high reading-
literacy rates in ancient Israel.
79
 This theory emphasises variability in literacy skills in the 
context of reading. There might also be some support within the biblical texts themselves for 
extending this concept to writing. Writing is described with gradations of skill—with some 
things, on the one hand, seen as so facile that a child could write them (also implying the 
education of children; see Isa. 10:19) and, on the other hand, complex belles lettres (see the 
Psalms, i.e. 45:1; see also Isa. 38:9 and the elaborate composition of Hezekiah: “a ‘writing’ 
of Hezekiah”). These depictions of variations in skill might be an indication of various levels 
of literacy in ancient Israel. Indeed, it appears to have been a variously literate and oral 
society in MacDonald’s sense, with many vital societal functions performed through writing 
and widespread reading-literacy at least a plausible phenomenon.   
Finally, as Schaper has pointed out, the attribution of “record-keeper” to the divine 
suggests that writing was a well-known activity: “a high degree of literacy in (some strata of) 
society made such a literary ascription of writing to God possible.”80 He continues,  
One needs a fairly advanced degree of bureaucratisation in a society in order for the 
concept of a book-keeper's ledger to be ascribed to the divine realm. … The cultures 
that used the imagery of God or gods acting as scribe(s)or book-keeper(s) have one 
thing in common: highly literate elites and efficient administrative systems. Regardless 
of the degree of literacy in the general population, writing—and, more specifically, 
book keeping—was at the core of their political and administrative systems.81 
 
                                                        
78 In his examination of the social dynamics of ancient Israel, Demsky marks a number of features that 
contribute to his theory of its unique literacy culture. He considers the Canaanite alphabet a significant, unique 
factor, as well as what he considers the total overhaul of political and social order in Israel and its immediate 
neighbours, with the rise of localised ethnic polities without restricted scribal classes. 
79
 This is possible, as absence of evidence (none really to speak of as far as reading goes) is not 
evidence of absence—though it seems more unlikely. MacDonald has used this “reading-literacy” as a model 
for ancient Israel. 
80 Joachim Schaper, “Exilic and Post-Exilic Prophecy and the Orality/Literacy Problem,” Vetus 
Testamentum, Vol. 55 No. 3 (2005): 327; Dan. 12:1 and Ps. 139:16; Isa. 64:6 and Mal. 3:16 
81 Id. at 328-29. 
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While it might be hasty to assume that the attribution of writing to a society’s god(s) implies 
that it was literate, even in the most limited sense, (i.e. ignoring the possibility of cultural 
diffusion without technological diffusion—that is, a society which has yet to adopt 
widespread record-keeping practices borrowing the idea of a record-keeping God from a 
literate society), Schaper’s comments are well taken, given the material evidence discussed 
previously and additional references to writing in ancient Israelite texts. Here, Schaper comes 
to similar conclusions that MacDonald, Demsky, and Rollston did: a society can be 
considered “literate” if many of its vital functions are accomplished through writing—
regardless of the literacy of the population at large, or the oral nature of non-“vital” tasks.  
Writing and Authority  
 
As Ong’s concept of residual orality explained, even in a “literate” society, many 
communications may remain oral. In the ancient Israelite context, where writing required 
specific materials and a significant training- and time-commitment, this makes sense 
pragmatically. However, there may have also been ideological reasons for maintaining the 
orality of certain functions and, likewise, ideological reasons for making certain 
communications written. Additionally, writing may have, in turn, led to the creation of 
certain ideologies—political, as Sanders suggested,82 and theological. One fundamental 
question related to these ideologies is worth exploration: what was the relationship between 
writing and perceived authority? 
In ancient Israelite sources, writing seems to have lent a sense of divine authority, as 
well as a role in creating and forwarding certain theological ideas: writing likely engendered 
or at least influenced the concept of “record keepers” in the divine sphere.83 Divine record-
                                                        
82
 See note 55, supra, and notes 89-92, infra, and accompanying text. 
83 Mal. 3:16 relates, “Then those who feared the Lord talked with each other, and the Lord listened and 
heard. A scroll of remembrance was written in his presence concerning those who feared the Lord and honoured 
his name.” Jeremiah 17:13: “Lord, you are the hope of Israel; all who forsake you will be put to shame. Those 
who turn away from you will be written in the dust because they have forsaken the Lord, the spring of living 
water.” 
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keeping could certainly have been an oral activity, but the biblical texts specifically describe 
it as a written one (see Ex. 32:32-33; Mal. 3:16, Dan. 12:1). This relationship between writing 
and divine authority will be further explored in chapter 3. The present chapter will discuss 
how writing became a public tool for “official” communications. 
While the importance and political authority of writing is especially clear in later 
periods in the Levant, such as during the early development of Judaism, this was not a sudden 
innovation. Instead, it was grounded in earlier, pre-exilic traditions. For example, Josiah’s 
finding of the Book of the Law described in 2 Kgs. 22-23 has been convincingly 
demonstrated to be a pre-exilic tradition,
84
 and it echoes the practice of other ancient Near 
Eastern rulers to use divine oracles as justification for reform. Only a written communication 
could be lost and then found—not so with an oral communication. Despite the lapse of time, 
the written book was still authoritative, though this authority also involved the oral 
ratification of the king in a public proclamation. But its foundation in something written lent 
authority. 
Still, though it had perhaps become so by the time of Josiah, writing was not always a 
public form of communication in the Levant. Although writing in the region certainly pre-
dates the Israelites,
85
 it is not until the ninth and eighth centuries BCE, after Neo-Assyrian 
conquests in the region, that we have evidence of writing used as a source of authority.
86
 
                                                        
84 See, for example, Jonathon Ben Dov, “Writing as Oracle and as Law: New Contexts for the Book-
Find of King Josiah,” Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 127, No. 2 (2008): 236. He concludes: “In summary, 
the presence of pre-Dtr prose in 2 Kgs. 22-23 permits us to conclude that the primary function of Josiah’s book 
was the transmission of a divine oracle. This is supported by reports on prophecies both within and without the 
Hebrew Bible. In fact, the Deuteronomists emphasised the new identity they attributed to Josiah's book as a 
manifestation of their conception of Deuteronomy itself.” 
85 In the early Iron-Age Levant, the Gezer calendar and the recently discovered Tel Zayit Abecedary 
are the earliest attestations of proto-Hebrew, dating from the 10th century. The Gezer calendar records an 
almanac of sorts, and may very well have been some sort of votive piece. The Tel Zayit abecedary was found in 
situ as part of a wall. Its importance is primarily palaeographical, as it showcases a sort of transition from the 
Phoenician to Paleo-Hebrew script. It suggests less in terms of the role of writing in this period, but affirms that 
writing was at least semi-present in this Canaanite city-state by the end of the 10th century. See James Crenshaw, 
Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence (New York: Doubleday Dell, 1998), 106; Stuart 
Weeks, Early Israelite Wisdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 140-141. 
86 Nadav Na’aman, Ancient Israel’s History and Historiography: The First Temple Period (Winona 
Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2006). 
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Nadav Na’aman has noted that within a generation of Shalmaneser III’s inscribed border 
monuments in Phoenicia and Israel in the early ninth century, similar inscriptions appeared in 
local Levantine cities and kingdoms.
87
 This seems to have been at least one pathway by 
which writing came to be used as a public form of communication, though it must be 
described as, at best, a staggered one, complicatedly tied up in the gradual unification of 
those Canaanite city-states of the Levant that came to form some sort of united kingdom by 
the eighth century.
88
  
Sanders, on the other hand, interprets the evidence with a far more political bent: he 
argues that “writing was recruited by an Israelite state to establish itself, in order to argue 
publicly that it existed.”89 His hypothesis is that written texts circulated throughout Iron Age 
Levant “through the process of QRa ‘summoning/reading/proclaiming’, represented 
repeatedly in the Bible and West-Semitic inscriptions as an inherently public and political 
act.”90 As will be seen, both political and religious writings were publicly proclaimed—
sometimes with little distinction between the two, as in Josiah’s case.  
All of this would have facilitated the formation of a “writing culture,” a specialised 
occupational class that composed and compiled the texts of the Hebrew Bible. However, 
there is not substantial evidence to suggest that it changed the mostly oral nature of ancient 
Israelite society, regardless of whatever the literacy rate in that society might have been. 
Additionally, it is important to note that at the same time that writing began to be used as an 
“official” form of communication, it continued to be used in non-authoritative settings.91 
                                                        
87 Id. 
88 Even this “unification” was not well defined, and many cities, especially those on the general 
periphery in Judea, attest a strong cultural back and forth in the archaeological remains throughout the Iron Age 
(suggesting variously Canaanite and Judean majorities). 
89 Sanders, “Writing and Early Iron Age Israel,” 106. 
90
 Id.  
91 In some situations, writing did not exclusively replace speech, but it seems to have been strongly 
preferred. For example, in administrative and legal tasks, writing was an important tool. This function is 
mentioned throughout the biblical texts, in a variety of situations that show how writing was used 
administratively. 1 Kgs. 21:11 describes the fealty of elders and nobles to Jezebel’s letters of instruction. (1 Kgs. 
21:11: “So the elders and nobles who lived in Naboth’s city did as Jezebel directed in the letters she had written 
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Private entrepreneurs and artisans, for example, practiced bookkeeping.
92
 With the 
development of writing and its adoption—however gradual—as a tool for public 
proclamation, it appears that the people of the Levant began to define or refine their concepts 
of participation and community.  
Written Literature Independent from Oral Literature 
 Finally, while the relationship between writing and speech is fundamentally 
intertwined, both forms of communication can also be used independently from one another. 
In literate societies, writing can supersede certain functions of communication. The historical 
trend has been to view the relationship between oral traditions (i.e. the Pentateuchal 
narratives) and writing as exclusively diachronic, with oral transmission culminating in a 
written form. Stuart Weeks recently challenged the assumption that the biblical texts were 
oral traditions that were written down. While not insisting that this is not the case, he makes 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to them.”) When Cyrus helped the Exiles to return to Jerusalem, writing is described as an important—and 
additional—step in his proclamation.  (2 Chr. 36:22: “In the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, in order to fulfill 
the word of the Lord spoken by Jeremiah, the Lord moved the heart of Cyrus king of Persia to make a 
proclamation throughout his realm and also to put it in writing”; Ezra 1:1: “In the first year of Cyrus king of 
Persia, in order to fulfill the word of the Lord spoken by Jeremiah, the Lord moved the heart of Cyrus king of 
Persia to make a proclamation throughout his realm and also to put it in writing.”) This suggests that the 
proclamation was made in more than one medium, or that to “put something in writing” connoted more than 
simply the physical process of recording communication. The book of Ezra describes the practice of diplomatic 
letter-writing (Ezra 4:7, 5:10), and a matter of dispute is decided by consulting the royal archives of Babylon, to 
determine whether or not Cyrus had made the initial decree to the exiles (Ezra 4-6). Similar practices are 
described in the Persian period (Esther 1:19, 3:12, 8:8; 9:25, 32).  (Dan. 6:8: “Now, Your Majesty, issue the 
decree and put it in writing so that it cannot be altered—in accordance with the law of the Medes and Persians, 
which cannot be repealed.” Dan. 6:9: “So King Darius put the decree in writing.” Dan. 6:13: “Then they said to 
the king, ‘Daniel, who is one of the exiles from Judah, pays no attention to you, Your Majesty, or to the decree 
you put in writing. He still prays three times a day.’”) Nehemiah also describes writing down genealogical 
records (Neh. 7). In each of these (most of them admittedly later) administrative settings, writing seems to be 
preferred to speech. This is likely due to practical purposes: the need to communicate either across time or 
space. In the case of the consultation of Babylon’s records, writing is consulted as evidence in a case—the 
written records are trusted as official verification in a legal dispute of one party’s (Ezra’s) claim.  
Writing also appears to have had a function as “official” communication in legal settings. Deut. 24:1 
and 24:3 discuss writing a certificate of divorce. Nehemiah is accused of rebellion against Artaxerxes by an 
“unsealed letter,” and describes messengers being sent back and forth between correspondents and even resent 
to redeliver a message (Neh. 6). Nehemiah also describes a “binding agreement” that the people make by putting 
it in writing with the priestly leaders’ seals (9:38). In Job’s responses to his friends’ relentless accusations, he 
expresses a wish to inscribe his response. He is so certain of his innocence that he wants to write it down—
making it more public and permanent—and, perhaps, more legally tenderable (19:23). He refers to this writing 
in such a way that it would then be irrefutable, or that his innocence would then be official. In this respect, it 
will be seen that although speech may have been remarkably sufficient legally – especially compared to today’s 
standards – writing was similarly trusted, perhaps even more so because of its temporal permanence.  
92 Sanders, “Writing and Early Iron Age Israel,” 106. 
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the important point that just because a story is circulated orally does not mean its written 
version was simply copied or was not an original composition of its own. Additionally, just 
because a text has certain literary features does not mean that it was originally, or ever, oral. 
Demsky, like Weeks, is more partial to understanding the relationship between oral traditions 
and writing as more independent than interdependent.  
The written form of a story may in many cases be the only form of a story, and many 
stories may have existed in both written and oral forms. It does not immediately follow, 
however, that the oral versions were written down, or that the written versions were 
transcriptions of the oral versions. Instead, many of these stories may have been original, 
written compositions, irrespective of concurrent or even previous oral traditions/versions. It is 
difficult to make any sort of distinction between composers and transmitters of the Hebrew 
Bible, as even written versions of oral stories were to varying extents “original” 
compositions.
93
 
Another consideration, however, is the term “story.” Many texts in the Bible are not 
narratives but instead genres that do not really have oral counterparts, that lend themselves 
less easily to the oral arena. For example, technical legal lists, like those found in parts of 
Exodus and Numbers, are not conducive to an oral setting. The musings of Ecclesiastes also 
seem to be the product of personal reflection—recorded through writing—rather than public 
oral composition and transmission. These texts especially seem to have been originally 
conceived and propagated as written works. 
The texts of the Bible, instead of being understood as oral stories fixed with the 
“advent” of writing, are perhaps better understood as works of literature: compositions. Oral 
transmission and written transmission serve different, though sometimes overlapping, 
functions, and one should not assume a priori that the biblical texts were the product of oral 
                                                        
93 Michael Fishbane, Biblical Hermeneutics, 48; see also Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World. 
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traditions, long transmitted, finally fixed in writing. It is impossible to recreate any oral 
stories based on the written record; similarly, the form of the written records inspired by oral 
traditions may have been a matter of some debate among the ancient Israelites.
94
 
It is in this way that previous “certainties” about the form of the biblical text – that 
they were oral traditions passed down and finally recorded – must be re-evaluated. Oral and 
written communication serve fundamentally different functions, and while these functions 
overlap more frequently in very literate societies, it is likely that they remain quite distinct in 
less literate ones.  
The strongest argument against this might be the existence of multiple versions of a 
text. Some have argued that the existence of multiple versions of a text supports a theory of 
more overlap in ancient Israelite written and oral communication. Niditch points out that even 
works that seem to be originally written compositions are influenced by what she terms an 
“oral” mindset. For example, the fact that Chronicles is clearly based on Samuel-Kings but 
does not replace it is, she argues, grounded in the tendency one sees in primarily oral 
societies to support multiple versions of narratives.  
But an alternate explanation for this duplicity in texts may be the ancient Israelite’s 
concept of truth, as will be discussed further in chapter 4.
95
 For the ancient Israelites, truth 
may not have been strict, word-for-word exactness, which seems to arise from a literate 
mind-set, but rather, it entailed fidelity to meaning.
96
 David M. Carr has argued that in 
ancient Near Eastern education, texts were “faithful copies” if the meaning was unchanged, 
even if the transmitter used some license in creating a unique transmission—or, by our terms, 
a new composition. Ancient perspective, according to Carr, would not view such an 
                                                        
94 See note 172, infra, and accompanying text. 
95 The extent to which these truth conceptions were influenced by the society’s use of oral 
communication is difficult to know, but it seems clear, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, that the two are 
related. 
96 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 49. 
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individualisation as a change per se, so long as the “ongoing traditional culture” was 
maintained.
97
  
This alternative approach suggests that the authors of these texts, some kind of class 
of illuminati, had a more sophisticated relationship with writing than we may credit to them.  
While some texts in the bible were very probably oral traditions before they were written 
ones, others may not have been the setting down of oral story to scroll. Instead, they very 
well may have been original compositions. In this way, “written literature” itself could be a 
type of genre. Understanding this casts the depiction of writing in the biblical text in a more 
nuanced light, as will be discussed in chapter 3. 
Conclusion 
 Thus, throughout the periods relevant to the texts at issue in this study, writing 
developed at least in part out of community needs and likely had at least a minimal impact on 
community structure or practice. While it is difficult to state with certainty the level of 
literacy in ancient Israel, it is clear that there was at least some reading-writing literate class, 
and there are some textual suggestions for wider reading-literacy—though not strong material 
evidence at this point.  
 An understanding of orality and literacy in ancient Israel is important for determining to 
what extent verbal and written communications were “official” and authoritative. While 
writing may have had a limited presence in the Levant prior to the ninth century, it was at that 
point that it began to be used in a more widespread, unified, and, ostensibly, unifying fashion. 
Writing was used to define the authority of the Israelite state, and seems to have continued to 
carry a sense of authority, though it was used in both “official” and “non-official” contexts in 
the community. It was also used in many theological and ritual contexts. While writing 
carried this sense of authority, however, it does not appear to have been a zero sum game: 
                                                        
97 Id. at 49-50. 
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certain oral communications, as will be seen, were similarly authoritative—if not more so. 
Writing could be its own composition, and oral and written stories or traditions likely 
coexisted. This understanding foregrounds a more detailed inquiry into writing as depicted in 
the biblical texts. 
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Chapter 3: God, Community, and Writing 
 As a unique tool of communication, writing is portrayed as having important functions 
in the ancient Israelite community, particularly in what might be termed the divine or 
religious sphere. Writing is not described as simply an intermediary tool, with beginning and 
ending points of vocalisation. Its use is also portrayed in functions independent of speech: in 
ritual settings and in divine communication, where the communication was not “spoken” 
from the divine to YHWH's prophets, but instead written. Importantly, however, writing is 
not depicted as used for communication to the divine. 
 These practices support an ancient perception of writing as more limited than the all-
purpose practice that it became in later societies, and although this may be a function of 
technology as much as anything else, those things which the scribal class portrayed as 
reserved for writing suggest much about how they perceived the divine sphere and their 
community’s relationship with that sphere. 
Writing in the Biblical Texts 
Writing in the biblical texts is described in conjunction with a number of practices, 
including prophecy, legal accusations, and administration. There are some references in the 
texts of the Bible to other writings—whether to other texts that also became part of the Bible, 
other parts of the same book, or other texts that were not incorporated into the Bible (inter-, 
intra-, and extra- textual references).
98
 In the books of Kings and Chronicles, much reference 
is made to (what became) extra-biblical written sources. Here, the intent seems to be brevity: 
while the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler are brief in their descriptions of various kings’ 
reigns, more details can be found in other sources, to which they direct their readers with the 
                                                        
98 Cross-referencing: Josh. 10:13, 2 Sam. 1:18, 1 Kgs. 11:41, 14:19, 14:29; 15:7, 23, 31; 16:5, 14, 20, 
27; 22:39, 45; 2 Kgs. 1:18; 8:23; 10:34; 13:8, 12; 14:15, 18, 28; 15:6, 11, 15, 21, 26, 31, 36; 16:19; 20:20; 
21:17, 25; 23:28; 24:5; 1 Chr. 29:29; 2 Chr. 9:29, 12:15, 13:22, 16:11, 20:34, 24:27, 25:26, 27:27, 28:26, 32:32, 
33:18, 33:19, 35:25, 27; 36:8,  (the “records of the seers”), Esther 10:2. 
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appeal, “are they not written in,” for example, “the book of the annals of Solomon?”99 This is 
less a citation of authority than a rhetorical reference to more information.
100
  
While one might suspect that references to the Law of Moses throughout the biblical 
texts are similarly made, they appear to be for mostly different reasons. The Chronicler cites 
other books as sources, much as an author today might refer their reader to a bibliography for 
further relevant reading. The Law of Moses, on the other hand, is cited as a source in a 
different sense, to lend authority, credibility, and exactness. Thus, writing is often recounted 
in conjunction with traditional instruction: evaluating behaviours or histories “according to 
what was written” (e.g., 2 Chr. 30:5, 18; 34:21), that is, whether they are in accord with what 
was written.  
Importantly, such behaviour is only rarely evaluated according to “custom” (with 
phrases like “which thing ought not to be done” in Gen. 34:7); rather, scribes almost 
uniformly compare and assess actions or characters based on written standards.
101
 In their 
evaluations, they condemn those who disobey what is “written,” not what is “commanded”—
suggesting that commandments’ very writtenness is an inherent or essential component, or 
that the categories of writing and commandments overlap: i.e. if it is a commandment, it is 
likely that it must be written. 
                                                        
99 1 Kgs. 11:41 
100 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 56: “While the numerous citations in Kings might suggest 
that this author was more interested in documentary sources than the vast majority of classical historians, he was 
not necessarily exceptional in his treatment of this material. He may have used this material for information 
about the past, but his lack of critical engagement with these texts (though typical of biblical methods in 
general) is reminiscent of classical approaches. In fact, the way in which he cites these documents, often in the 
form of a rhetorical question, and without explicit link between the account and the source cited for it, bears 
resemblance to the use of inscriptions in classical historiography as a confirmatory device.” Person argues that 
“the authors/redactors know of a connection between their own text and a source text based on their memory of 
the meanings represented by the source text; therefore, a reference to the source text can simply be a reference 
to the memory of the meaning taken from that source text rather than an indication that the author double-
checked the written source text for the sake of accuracy according to our own highly literate standards.”  
101 2 Chr. 34:21 
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 It appears that writing was seen as providing knowledge and disclosure. Full 
knowledge and disclosure of the law increases expectations and reduces “wiggle room.”102 
Indeed, Ezekiel provides such a rationale when directing his audience to write: “write these 
down before them so that they [the people of Israel] may be faithful to its design and follow 
all its regulations” (43:11). He uses writing as an analogy for exactness103 and to demand 
accountability from not only the present but also future generations.
104
 Indeed, the traditional 
provenance of the Law of Moses is a pair of written tablets, communicated to the people 
through an enduring, exacting medium.  
The Law of Moses was presented to the people as authoritative precisely because of 
its written nature. While the accounts of Moses receiving and relaying the Decalogue are 
clearly composite, both of these disparate sources maintain that the commandments were 
transmitted from the divine sphere to the human via writing, whether written by God or by 
Moses.
105
 The writtenness of the law in Deuteronomy, as well as in these prophetic texts, 
bears out as important and authoritative in its function as a witness against the people:  
After Moses finished writing in a book the words of this law from beginning to end, he 
gave this command to the Levites who carried the ark of the covenant of the 
Lord: “Take this Book of the Law and place it beside the ark of the covenant of the 
Lord your God. There it will remain as a witness against you. . . . Assemble before me 
all the elders of your tribes and all your officials, so that I can speak these words in 
their hearing and call the heavens and the earth to testify against them. (Deut. 31:24). 
 
                                                        
102 Numerous admonitions cite “as written in the Law of Moses” (1 Kgs. 2:3; 2 Kgs. 14:6; 2 Kgs. 
22:13, 16; 23:3, 21, 24; 1 Chr. 16:40; 2 Chr. 23:18, 25:4, 31:2, 34:31, 35:4, 35:12, 35:26; Ezra 3:2,4; Ezra 6:18; 
Neh. 8:15, 10:34, 36) for authority but also for exactness. 
103 See for example Josh. 10:13; 8:34; 23:6; and 2 Sam. 1:18. 
104 See 2 Kgs. 22:13, 2 Chr. 34:21, Isa. 30:8; In Deut. 17:18, the king is told to write for himself a copy 
of the law and read it, so that he remains humble and exactly obedient. Nehemiah and his followers 
reestablished the Law in a sort of re-orthodoxy by closely reading what was “written in the Law” and adhering 
to it quite literally/adhering to their interpretation of it (Neh. 8:14, 13:1). The sentiment of preserving things in 
writing for posterity is also expressed by the Psalmist and in Proverbs.Ps. 102:18 “Let this be written for a 
future generation, that a people not yet created may praise the Lord”; Prov. 22:20 “Have I not written thirty 
sayings for you, sayings of counsel and knowledge.” 
105 Ex. 24:12, 31:18, 32:15-16, 32:19, and 34:1-4 explicitly maintain that God writes on the tablets; Ex. 
34:28 states however that it is Moses who writes on the new tablets, though it has been argued to be a 
complication brought on by redactors trying “to harmonise the new tablets of 34:1-4 with the presentation of the 
covenant in 34:10-27” Craig Evan Anderson, “The Tablets of Testimony and a Reversal of Outcome in the 
Golden Calf Episode,” Hebrew Studies Vol. 50 (2009): 41. 
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The Book, the heavens, and the earth are called on as witnesses to the communication of the 
Law to the people of Israel. Similarly, writing is used to witness vows in several ancient Near 
Eastern contexts.
106
  
The writing of the Decalogue may also have a ritual function. Writing seems to be 
described as both means and end in various ritual settings. In Num. 5, for example, writing 
has a ritual function to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused woman (5:23). In other 
examples, writing is used to formalise religious condemnation or salvation.
107
 This is 
typically associated with record-keeping: writing or erasing individuals’ names in divine 
records as a formalisation of divine judgment.
108
  In so doing, the individual’s status is 
ritualised.
109
 This seems to be the case in Deut. 6:9 and 11:20 (writing of the Law on 
doorframes and gates) and 27:3, 8 (writing of the Law on the stones of the Mount Ebal 
altar).
110
 The writing of the law acts as an important witness to the communication of the Law 
and might also serve as a sort of ritual receipt or ritualise the people’s status as a covenant 
people. 
This is not to say, however, that oral actions were not authoritative or did not also 
contribute to the Law’s authority. Person argues that both the Deuteronomistic History and 
                                                        
106While it cannot be said conclusively that the invocations of any particular group were exclusively 
“written,” the vow-texts of these peoples indicate a sort of making of the vow in its composition: a votive 
receipt of sorts. These vow-texts do not indicate any verbal counterpart, nor do they intimate any sense of 
vocalic dialogue. In William Hallo’s study of the neo-Sumerian “letter prayer,” which was inscribed onto a 
votive object and placed into a deposit near the statue of the deity in a temple, he describes them as “taking the 
place of the suppliant, and relieving him of the need to proffer his prayer in his own person, orally and 
perpetually.” William W. Hallo, “Individual Prayer in Sumerian: The Continuity of a Tradition,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society Vol. 88, No. 1 (1968): 75.  
107 Mal. 3:16 relates, “Then those who feared the Lord talked with each other, and the Lord listened and 
heard. A scroll of remembrance was written in his presence concerning those who feared the Lord and honoured 
his name.” Jeremiah 17:13 states, “Lord, you are the hope of Israel; all who forsake you will be put to shame. 
Those who turn away from you will be written in the dust because they have forsaken the Lord, the spring of 
living water.” 
108 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 329: “So far we have been looking at examples of writing restricted to 
the divine sphere. They all had to do with record-keeping. The purpose of writing in the divine sphere is to keep 
control of human actions, to make the information thus gathered last, and to prepare divine judgement of human 
beings.” 
109 Ex. 32:32-33; Isa. 4:3, 65:6; Mal. 3:16, Dan. 12:1; Pss. 69:28 and 139:16 
110 This might be similar to the Gezer tablet or incantation tablets: because of the difficulty of 
composition on tablets as opposed to wood or clay, Gezer might have votive or magical function. See Weeks, 
Early Israelite Wisdom, 140-41; Crenshaw, Education, 105-106. This might also be highlighted in 2 Chr. 34:24, 
which discusses curses.  
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the books of Chronicles “necessarily share an understanding of the law that requires the 
interplay between the oral and the written.”111 Although the texts consistently depict the Ten 
Commandments as given to Moses via writing, oral actions nevertheless play a counterpart 
role in the narrative.  
For example, Raymond F. Person’s interpretation of 2 Chr. 5:10 and 33:8 suggests 
that there was also verbal communication during this event in the formation of a covenant.
112
 
When the Ten Commandments are communicated to the Israelites, they receive them first as 
written tablets, but are “asked to put them upon their hearts ([Deut.] 6:6), to repeat them to 
their children (6:7) and to meditate upon them day in, day out.”113 To that end, the people are 
told to “write” these words on entrances to public and private spaces (“and you shall write 
them on the doorposts of your houses and on your gates” (Deut. 6:9)).114  
The book of Deuteronomy also emphasises that it is relaying the words that Moses 
spoke.
115
 If we look at other prophecies in ancient Israelite texts, many seem to mirror this 
pattern of written communication that is then transformed into oral. Schaper notes that both 
Ezekiel and Zechariah are first given the written word from God (in the form of an eaten 
scroll, in Ezekiel’s case [2:8-3:3] and a flying scroll, in Zechariah’s [5:1-4]), which is then 
oralised.
116
 Schaper has emphasised the use of writing as “the basis for a re-transformation of 
the written word into the oral,”117 and has argued that it “provided the foundation for a new 
                                                        
111 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 56. 
112 Person refers to the making of the covenant at Horeb as recorded in 2 Chr. 5:10. Citing this verse as 
describing an “oral” communication is indirect at best. 
113 Schaper, “Literacy/Orality,” 332; see also Georg Fischer and Norbert Lohfink, “‘Diese Worte sollst 
du summen’: Dtn wedibbarta bam—ein verlorener Schlussel zur meditativen Kultur in Israel,” in Studien zum 
Deuteronomium und zur deuteronomistischen Literatur (ed. N. Lohfink; 5 vols.; SBAB 20; Stuttgart: 
Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1995), 3:181-203. Lohfink and Fischer have noted the practice of meditation on 
religious works in ancient Israelite culture—internalising and contemplating texts, through what they interpret 
as a sort of recitation (marked by the use of b+rbd). 
114
 Though it is preceded by some symbolic injunctions (i.e. to “write them in hearts”) there is no 
reason to assume that the injunction to write them on doorframes and gates was not a literal one. Perhaps even 
an echo of the Passover and the protection of sacrificial blood on doorposts (Ex. 12). 
115 See Jean-Pierre Sonnet, The Book Within the Book: Writing in Deuteronomy (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
116 Schaper, “Literacy/Orality,” 331. 
117 Id. at 332. 
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relation between the written and the oral.”118 Many books of prophecy are portrayed as the 
writing of divine oracles, received first through divine visions and then written down, to be 
reoralised by the prophet or his messengers (see especially Jer. 34). 
For all of his discussion of the “oral-literate continuum,” when Schaper describes 
ancient Israel as a literate society, he seems to do so at the expense of certain features of oral 
societies. He pits writing against “memorising, reciting, meditating, and teaching”119—when 
in reality writing was likely involved in all of these activities from the earliest Israelite 
periods, not just as an innovated use first traceable in the prophetic texts.
120
  
Throughout the biblical texts, writing is depicted as an integral part of recitation and 
teaching. In Deut. 17:18, for example, the king is instructed to write a copy of the law in 
order to meditate upon it and learn it. This relationship between spoken and written word is 
not only seen in the Deuteronomic texts, but also in later prophets: Schaper notes certain 
cases in Jeremiah where the divinely instigated text “is to be read aloud in public places” 
(Jeremiah 36 10, 15; 51:61-62).
121
 This is also suggested in passages like Habbakuk 2:2: 
“Write down the revelation and make it plain on tablets so that a herald may run with it.” 
Ezekiel and Zechariah similarly transform writing to speech.  
As Raymond F. Person has demonstrated, writing in the Deuteronomistic texts is 
closely related to the spoken word: 
In the book of Deuteronomy the oral and written characteristics of the Torah are not in 
opposition to each other but clearly work together to ensure the proper internalisation of 
God’s law. The close connection between the spoken law and the written law continues 
in the book of Joshua. … (1:7-8). Although it is written, the law is also something that 
came from Moses’ mouth and should not depart out of the mouths of the Israelites. The 
Israelites must meditate on the law continuously. In order to facilitate this meditation, 
                                                        
118
 Id. 
119 Id. at 332-333. 
120 Id. at 333-34: “The rise of writing transformed the prevalent concept of revelation and of the nature 
of prophecy. Prophets in this period, some of whom came from priestly families (cf. Jer. 1:1; Ezek. 1:3; Zech. 
1:1 [cf. Neh. 12: 4, 16]) . . . had a ‘scribal’ worldview.” 
121 Schaper, “Literacy/Orality,” 330. 
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Joshua writes the law on stone… (8:32, 34-35). The writing of the law is accompanied 
by its public recitation.
122
 
 
This chapter will next examine public recitation, or public reading, first in pre-exilic and then 
post-exilic settings.  
Pre-Exilic Writing and Public Reading 
As discussed, in each passage describing the communication of the Law, the “writing” 
of the text is depicted as an important step. An additional component is its public recitation. 
When considering reading in the ancient world, it is important that one bear in mind that 
“reading” was often not a silent activity, but words were read aloud.123 Speech and reading do 
not seem to have been markedly different. Public reading of such writings, as opposed to 
simply public extemporaneous speaking or private reading, seems to have been a significant 
community act, and the underlying writings seem to have lent more authority to their 
proclaimers. This is especially clear in the description of Josiah’s public reading in 2 Kgs. 
23.Whatever the historical realities, Josiah is portrayed as reading the law.  
Ben Dov suggests that Josiah “re-enacted the type of public reading stipulated in 
Deut. 31:11-13,”124 and this idea can be fruitfully explored. Deut. 31:11-13 and Ex. 24:7 both 
detail the public reading of the Mosaic Law, which is the first sort of public reading described 
in ancient Israelite texts, and a prototype for the practice in early Judaism. The tradition 
steadfastly maintains that this first public proclamation
125
 was inspired by a divinely written 
manifesto—its oral proclamation was a secondary development. The way that this public 
reading is remembered, commemorated, even venerated and re-enacted, in ancient Israelite 
                                                        
122 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 53-54. 
123 MacDonald, “Literacy in an Oral Environment,” 68-69. As MacDonald points out: “the recognition 
of a word is aural not visual. In this method of reading there is a direct link between sound and sign and it is 
unlikely that non-phonetic, historical or conventional spellings would develop. This has important consequences 
for our interpretation of scripts used in similar circumstances in antiquity” (68-69). 
124 Ben Dov, “Writing as Oracle and Law,” 236. He argues that the Deuteronomists “orchestrated the 
implementation of a public assembly along the lines of Deut. 29-30 and Josh. 23:2; 24:1b, insinuating that 
Josiah reenacted the type of public reading stipulated in Deut. 31:11-13.” 
125 Might public reading have predated Moses’ giving of the Law to the Children of Israel? If so, no 
records suggest otherwise.  
42 
 
and early Jewish texts marks its status as the first public reading important—it defines public 
reading as foundationally connected to not only divine communication but divinely-inspired 
writing.  
 Indeed, when Josiah is described as discovering a “Book of Law” or book of covenant 
and reading it to the gathered people, it is an echo of Moses’ initial public reading and readily 
identifiable as a divine document. Josiah’s reading of the divine word contributes credibility 
and authority to his reign—or, at the very least, is used by the Deuteronomistic Historians to 
do so. As Ben-Dov has demonstrated, Josiah “did not conceive of the book as a substitute for 
the temple.”126 “The book” did not suddenly emerge as an important religious vehicle with 
the destruction of the temple and subsequent exile—as a sort of replacement for ritual 
activity.
127
 Instead, it can be seen to have had important ritual functions in and of itself, as an 
accompaniment to or a component of ritual acts. This practice is depicted in events crucial to 
Israelite identity: in its beginnings as a chosen people, and in its beginnings as a state. The 
concept of public reading or recitation seems to be tied up with the concept of divine writing, 
                                                        
126 Ben Dov, “Writing as Oracle and Law,” 238. See also Karel van der Toorn, “The Iconic Book: 
Analogies between the Babylonian Cult of Images and the Veneration of the Torah,” pages 229-48 in The Image 
and theBook: Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. 
Karel van der Toorn; Leuven: Peeters, 1997); Michael Fishbane, The Garments of Torah: Essays in Biblical 
Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
127 Importantly, the passages describing Josiah’s discovery of the book note “two different 
manifestations of piety: ritual and textual” (Ben Dov, “Writing as Oracle and Law,” 236). Referring to 2 Kgs. 
23:21-23, he remarks: “Along with the cultic feast of the Passover, Josiah also commissioned a public assembly 
in which he read the text of the JTT in a verbal-textual act. This was naturally performed as part of a larger 
covenant ceremony in the temple court, and as such it was an act rooted in a cultic background.” Ben-Dov’s 
conclusions about the book of Josiah are here quite relevant: “Josiah did not conceive of the book as a substitute 
for the temple. This idea appears neither in the original pre-Dtr narrative nor in the Dtr framework. He did, 
however, elevate the book to the level of a significant religious object and thus laid the foundations for the 
religion of the Book. Although this kind of religion emerged from the background of ancient Near Eastern cults, 
it gradually developed into the unique kind of literate spirituality that is typical of later Judaism. Books, scrolls, 
and tablets—any kind of writing material, in effect—are a tabula rasa, subject to various manipulations in the 
realm of religion. Josiah’s book find occurred in a significant period, one that is justifiably considered a turning 
point in Israelite religion. The traditional Jerusalemite religion was based on a divinely ordained monarch who 
enjoyed the support of a band of prophets and diviners—very similar to other royal ideologies in the ancient 
world. In Josiah’s time, and under the influence of Deuteronomy, this gradually gave place to a more restrained, 
somewhat elitist religion, in which the book played an important part. A new conception of the book was 
fashioned by Deuteronomic circles to fit this kind of religion, in which old conceptions from various religious 
streams were combined and adapted. This conception, in turn, had considerable influence on the production of 
prophetic books during the Second Temple period” (238-39). 
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suggesting that certain types of communication were considered not only exclusive to 
writing, but would have been impossible or were not performed before the advent of writing.  
The Josiah passage suggests that writing lent authority to Josiah’s reign. Those 
performing the public reading or recitation are described as endowed with divine authority. In 
the context of the biblical texts, the Decalogue could not be portrayed as an authoritative 
divine composition if it was not written. By all (written) accounts, writing was an important 
witnessing function, especially when the divine-human communication was instigated by the 
divine (i.e. the communication of the Law or prophetic warnings). Thus, regardless of 
whether initially written, such communications always seem to be eventually written (though, 
of course, this is necessarily a tautological assertion).  
These divine-to-human interactions can be contrasted with human-to-divine 
communications. The latter are depicted in ancient Israelite texts as vocal, not written. 
Writing seems to have been extremely significant in a “top-down” sense—in the theological 
hierarchy of sorts that can be said to have existed, which consisted of, at most, God → 
prophet → spokesman → audience (as in the case of, e.g., God → Moses → Aaron → 
Pharaoh/Israelites). If writing occurred, it was unidirectional, from higher in the hierarchy to 
lower in the hierarchy. That is, referring to the same example, God gave judgment to Moses 
in writing. Yet Moses is not described as speaking directly to the people. He had a 
spokesman. He received the writing and transmitted it to the spokesman, who communicated 
it to the people. Moses specifically describes himself as a poor speaker (Ex. 6:12), but is 
nevertheless a mighty prophet in the traditional texts because of his reception of the written 
word. Indeed, as Person has noted “All of the major characters in the book of Deuteronomy 
are portrayed as scribes of the law. … [T]he people are commanded to write the law on their 
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doorposts and gates (6:9;11:20). All of these forms of writing are closely related to the 
spoken word.”128  
 This unidirectionality of written communication is perhaps most directly attributed to 
theological conceptions. Theological writing addressed to or describing YHWH might have 
been construed as “misusing” God’s name, as prohibited by the second and third 
commandments (Ex. 20:4-7). While both writing and speech occurred in a variety of 
alternating or concurrent patterns down the line (→), writing has yet to be seen as a means of 
communication up the line in ancient Israel (←), addressed to God. The former relationship is 
seen in the Deuteronomic texts as well as in later prophets (e.g., Jeremiah and Baruch).  
Ultimately, public recitation in pre-exilic Israel seems to have served at least two 
functions: (1) to re-enact the giving of the law to promote the community identity as a 
unified, covenant people and (2) to put all members of the community on notice of the 
written witness. That many things were written only to be reoralised emphasises not the 
illiteracy of the general population but the importance of utterance and oral performance for 
community identity and accountability. 
Post-Exilic Writing and Public Reading 
Along with written divine communication that is copied and transmitted both in 
writing and speech, there are records of oral divine communications that are, in turn, written 
by humans. This seems to be most prevalent in exilic and post-exilic prophetic literature. For 
example, the book of Jeremiah describes Jeremiah and Baruch writing down divine 
communications (see, for example, Jeremiah 36:2,4,18, 32; 51:60). The exact manner in 
which these divine communications come about is not described, simply passively stated as 
“this word came to Jeremiah from the Lord” (36:2) and he is instructed to write it down. Part 
of this seems to be for communicative practicality (transmission to others over time and 
                                                        
128 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 53. 
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space), but it is, also, again, to ensure that its audience is duly warned and the measure 
against which they will be judged is documented. This is made especially clear in Jeremiah 
and Baruch’s delivery of the scroll to Jehoikaim (Jer. 36, 51).  
Other passages discuss public inscriptions (i.e. Jer. 51:61-62).
129
 Each of the prophetic 
texts (most conservatively dated to the late pre-exilic period, but likely post-exilic) depicts 
the prophets as compelled to display their divine revelations publicly (see, for example, Ezek. 
3:1-3, Jer. 36:1-8, 27-32; 51:60-64; and Hab. 2:2).
130
 The reoralisation of these inscriptions 
might have been additionally important to the prophetic presentation,
131
 but foremost, the 
                                                        
129 Schaper has noted parallels of this practice in neo-Assyrian materials in “Literacy/Orality,” 330: 
“Such passages are reminiscent of neo-Assyrian prophecies and how they were put in writing and displayed in 
Esarra, the Temple of Assur in the city of Assur. Among the Assyrian sources that come to mind is the oracle 
ascribed to Assur and documented in SAA 9 3.3. Thus SAA 9 3.3: ii 26-32: ‘This is the [oracle of] well-being 
(placed) before the Image. This covenant tablet of Assur enters the king’s presence on a cushion. Fragrant oil is 
sprinkled, sacrifices are made, incense is burnt, and they read it out in the kin’s presence.’ A similar passage is 
found in SAA 9 3.2: ii 8-9. Both passages refer to the practice of producing a written record of the prophetic 
oracle and placing it in front of the statue of the ‘Lord of the Pen’, as in the latter text, or Asvur, as in the 
former. With reference to SAA 9 3.3: ii26-32, Parpola points out the interesting parallels found in Ex. 24:7 and 
2 Kgs. 22:10-33 and concludes, on the basis of SAA 9 3.3: ii 26-32 and of oracles 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4, that ‘the 
oracles were embedded in the coronation ceremonies of Esarhaddon and probably were all publicly delivered by 
the prophet La-dagil-ili.’”  
130 This is likely only partly, if at all, similar to public inscriptions elsewhere in the ancient Near East, 
where, it has been argued, the highly complex inscriptions were used to intimidate the lay, illiterate audience. 
These were coupled with graphic reliefs reinforcing this message. Demsky, "Extent,” 350-51. In a culture 
characterised by the complexities of cuneiform writing, the case was different. Cf. Peter Machinist, “Assyrians 
on Assyria in the First Millennium B.C.,” pages 77-104 in Anfange politischen Denkens in der Antike (Schriften 
des Historischen Kollegs,  Kolloquien 24) (K. Raaflaub, ed., Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 101. Because of the 
relative simplicity of alphabetic scripts, the gap between the fully literate and the majority of the population in 
Judah cannot have been as wide as that in societies using cuneiform. This is why the uses of writing in prophetic 
sign actions and similar activities are examples of a “bridging process” in the sense envisaged by Demsky, a 
process which built on at least a vestigial knowledge of writing even amongst the mass of the population. In 
ancient Israel, on the other hand, it has been suggested that these prophetic presentations were “making use of 
the not inconsiderable literacy achieved even by non-professional members of the populace.” Schaper, 
“Literacy/Orality,” 335. This may be an overstatement of the general literacy of the Israelite population, but, as 
MacDonald demonstrated, the acquisition of reading literacy is a different skill than that of reading-writing 
literacy, and one that is impossible for us to measure now.  
 131 It cannot be said conclusively that prophetic communications were meant to be oral or written. For 
example, while conceding that our study of ancient Near Eastern prophecy is based exclusively on written texts, 
Karel van der Toorn asserts that “prophets were originally orators rather than writers. Prophecy as a literary 
genre—the only form under which ancient prophecy is accessible to us—represents a secondary development.” 
Van der Toorn, “From the Mouth of the Prophet: The Literary Fixation of Jeremiah’s Prophecies in the Context 
of the Ancient Near East,” in Inspired Speech, 191. See also Wilson, “Current Issues,” 44, which also argues 
that, “while oral transmission of oracles is likely in the pre-exilic period and perhaps even into the Persian 
period, there is no evidence to suggest that some writing of prophetic oracles could not have taken place in the 
pre-exilic period apart from the royal court or temple, particularly in the neighborhood of Jerusalem.” Van der 
Toorn sees the function of preservation as either “transmission in place or transmission in time”—sending a 
prophecy to an audience located elsewhere physically or temporally. Van der Toorn, “From the Mouth,” 191-92. 
In a case study of Jeremiah, he continues, “the only times Jeremiah actually wrote his message—or had Baruch 
write it down from dictation—he did so in lieu of an oral delivery. When circumstances prevented him from 
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inscriptions again seem to be for documentative purposes: to “render [the divine word] 
immutable.”132 In Isa. 30:8, for example, the authors refer to publicly inscribing a revelation 
without an accompanying injunction to “read” it, emphasising again writing as a means of 
witnessing rather than simply a vehicle for reoralisation.  
The concept of immutability is an important one. With oral presentations, there is 
possibility for embellishment, elaboration, or omission of parts of the written text. 
Throughout the Hebrew Bible, authors instruct their audience not to “add or take away” from 
the text; that, while orally this may have been an important tool, to, for example, personalise 
standard liturgies – and even where other genres of writing tolerated expansion or editing – 
prophecies had warning and legitimising purposes meant to stay fully intact.  
Such injunctions to keep the message intact refer not to the later concept of written 
“canon,” but to ensure the immutability of what God has inspired or written.133 As Schaper 
has argued: 
The association with any notion of canon ... marks a post biblical development. The 
formula actually has a long pre-history in the ancient Near East, where it originally 
sought to prevent royal inscriptions, including law collections and treaties (cf. 1Macc. 
8:30), from being altered. In other contexts, it affirmed the adequacy of wisdom 
instruction. Only subsequently was it taken over by Deuteronomy’s Israelite authors 
and applied to the Mosaic Torah. The formula makes it clear that its intent is to 
preclude both literary and doctrinal innovation by safeguarding the textual status 
quo.
134
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
addressing his audience in person, he resorted to the means of written communication. Jeremiah was a spiritual 
leader, an advisor to the king, a priest whose intercessory prayer was credited with special efficacy—but he was 
no literary author. On the few occasions when he wrote he had no intuition of laying down his message for 
future generations, but of getting the attention of a contemporary audience which he could not reach otherwise.” 
Id. at 201. Wilson also sees prophecy as foremost an oral exercise—an act significant in its pronouncement and 
hearing. However, both van der Toorn and Wilson’s assertions rest heavily on assertions in the texts themselves. 
With nothing else to go on, however, and the absence of any contradictory material evidence, this may be a 
somewhat legitimate theory, but it cannot pass muster as a blanket assertion. As the well-known saying goes, the 
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. So here, while prophecy may very well have been primarily 
oral, it may also have been primarily written, and just a much smaller enterprise than postulated. Additionally, 
one might easily cite Amos as an example of prophetic “literature”—adopting the prophetic form as an original 
composition rather than a revelatory piece. In any case, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the primacy 
of either oral or written prophecy in terms of its dissemination to third parties—that is, beyond its initial 
transmission from deity to the prophetic recipient. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 336. 
134 Id. 
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Niditch places these passages in later periods, emphasising that the literate mentality is more 
present in Ezra-Nehemiah, 1-2 Chronicles, and Esther, which “validate scenes and statements 
by an appeal to written sources.”135 But the “literate mentality,” as she calls it, is not limited 
to later traditions, as demonstrated by the Deuteronomic History, which uses writing for self-
validation.   
 Writing was also able to “freeze” liturgical form for use on an ad hoc basis. For 
example, John Hilber argues that Ps. 2 “must have been construed as a fresh oracle able to 
renew divine legitimation of kingship.”136 Hilber additionally refers to Pss. 50, 81, and 95 as 
potentially used in renewal festivals and Ps. 132 in some sort of ark festival. He continues: 
“[p]rophetic lament liturgies could be archived for appropriate use during difficult times in 
the life of the community or an individual (cf. Pss. 12; 60; 91).”137 Similarly, repeat oral 
performance of prophecies are described in the book of Jeremiah (see, for example, ch. 36). 
Finally, it is important to be circumspect in our conclusions about writing and 
authority. Schaper argues: “If an author paints God as a book-keeper, he or she obviously 
thinks that written records are more authoritative than oral memorisation. Oral record-
keeping is thus considered less durable and less reliable than book-keeping.”138 However, to 
conclude that writing is “more authoritative” than speaking is perhaps a misevaluation. 
Instead of evaluating in terms of “less durable and therefore less reliable,” it seems more 
appropriate to interpret in terms of different abilities and roles or functions. As will be seen, 
oral record-keeping is not fully superseded by written record-keeping. Indeed, in many cases 
it is depicted as being as authoritative as writing.  
                                                        
135 S. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word: Ancient Israelite Literature (Library of Ancient Israel; 
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 97-98. 
136
 John W. Hilber, “Cultic Prophecy in Assyria and in the Psalms,” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 127, No. 1 (2007): 37. He compares this to the Assyrian SAA 9 3, “which Parpola… proposed was 
performed live by the prophet at the enthronement ceremony.”  
137 Hilber, “Cultic Prophecy,” 37. He continues: “Assyrian cult prophets appear to have been on call for 
such occasions, and perhaps archived oracles served as exemplars for such service.” 
138 Schaper, “Literacy/Orality,” 328. 
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Instead, we might look to theological reasons for the divine communicating and 
recording through writing. While in many cases the divine has “thoughts” and “words,” 
“speaking” may have been too corporeal an attribute for later redactors. Writing allowed 
some distance between the divine and human, a more attractive form of communication for 
the theological concept of incorporealism. While authoritative for divine communication, that 
might be due to the divine source as much as the written medium, and have more to do with 
later theological concepts. Ultimately, writing seems to have served a witnessing and 
identity-building function as much as an authoritative record-keeping function. 
Conclusion 
 Therefore, writing is portrayed as having unique roles both together with and distinct 
from those of spoken language; specifically, the biblical sources depict writing’s primary use 
in ancient Israelite theological and administrative communication. It is consistently portrayed 
as the vehicle for the receipt of divine communication by YHWH’s prophets. Additionally, 
although writing and speaking are closely related, writing was not simply the transfer of 
spoken word or tradition into script. The texts depict specifically written functions in ritual, 
prophecy, and theology.  
Writing and public reading are emphasized as important acts of religious “notice,” in 
order to witness the receipt of the Law by the community. Indeed, public reading of divine 
writings as a community act is depicted with more frequency and deference than simply 
public extemporaneous speaking or public “prophesying.” But even in the absence of 
recitation, the transcribing of the divine word is depicted as the crucial step. This seems to be 
due to the perception that it rendered the word immutable.  
Notably, writing does not appear to have been adopted for communication to the 
divine, which will be discussed in chapter 6’s review of the ancient Israelite scribes’ 
perceptions of God, community, and speech. In ancient Israel, writing’s role in the 
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community was not as comprehensive as that of speech, and even if this was a function of 
technological limitations, those things that Israelites reserved exclusively for writing suggest 
much about the things that the ancient Israelite literary class society valued: fidelity to “the 
Law,” finality in judgment, and a God whose communication was piecemeal but permanent. 
The written law was limited, static, and predictable, which was desirable for community 
control and unification. 
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Chapter 4: The Relationship between Speech, Writing, the Community, and “Truth” 
 
The specifics of everyday speech in ancient Israel are of course lost to us, but many 
biblical sources maintain the significance of certain speech-acts. Speech is depicted as a 
double-edged sword, a powerful tool for both advancement and ruin. For example, a lawsuit 
was usually supported solely by sworn testimony, and the accused’s life could be destroyed 
or saved based on the speech of a witness. A person who spoke well could advance and be 
trusted by powerful people, while “fools,” or those who spoke hastily or falsely, were not 
(Prov. 16:13; 22:11; Ecc. 10:20). In the biblical texts, speech is practiced by the divine and 
the mortal, the male and the female, the poor and the wealthy, the foolish and the wise—
though it is depicted in different lights and with different frequencies when performed by 
(and perhaps depending on) different parties.
139
 
 The very orality of certain communications seems to be significant to the authors of the 
biblical sources, even in periods of more widespread literacy. The scribal class depicts 
juridical accusations, testimonies, and confessions as acts of speech, not writing. They also 
describe public recitations of prophecy. These depictions suggest that the ancient Israelite 
scribes understood speech as the means by which individuals were evaluated by the 
community and by God.  
 One of the most fundamental values of speech, at least by today’s standards, is “truth,” 
or how our perceptions or statements compare to “reality.” In this chapter, I discuss the 
relationship between speech, writing, and the community, and how these related to what 
might be termed “truth” or “reality” in ancient Israel. This is done first via a historical 
consideration of the actual transmissions of the texts – how speech or writing was transmitted 
                                                        
139 For example, while some women’s speech is recounted in the biblical texts, it occurs with much less 
frequency than men’s speech does. While some might be tempted to extrapolate this as a reflection of similarly 
gendered speech in ancient Near Eastern people’s everyday lives, this might very well be a mistake. The biblical 
texts were highly specific in authorship and audience, and were not intended to represent to any future 
generation the “reality” of everyday living in the authors’ communities. 
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to the other – and then via a more philosophical or literary inquiry: how those transmissions 
affected the “truth” of the communication.  
 Where much of the dissertation is concerned with the portrayal of speech in the text 
rather than actual historical practice, this chapter considers both questions. As writing is the 
only medium through which ancient speech is preserved, understanding the relationship 
between orality and writing is essential to this discussion. This section will attempt to address 
the relationship between the text and orality—and the extent to which the text can be relied 
upon to understand speech concepts. To this end, I will review relevant literature and 
theoretical approaches, outlining my own approach as (mostly) synchronic.  
The Reliability of Written Texts as Resources for Understanding “Speech”  
 To begin, we will examine the reliability of texts as sources for understanding speech, 
by exploring studies on literacy, orality, and the relationships between the two and 
consciousness. Several studies affirm that strategies associated with orality can be found in 
writing
140—though it might be overoptimistic to attempt to reconstruct such strategies relying 
solely on such writing. Indeed, the written form of that language can be considered a separate 
system of that language, as it has its own conventions, rules, and signals: a dialect of sorts.
141
 
Of course, “different conditions of production as well as different intended uses foster the 
creation of different kinds of language.”142 Some, notably Halliday and Beaman, have found 
that spoken language can be more complex than written language.
143
 
                                                        
140 Wallace Chafe and Deborah Tannen, “The Relation Between Written and Spoken Language,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 16 (1987): 391, 394 for discussion of those studies that: “investigate the 
influence of speaking on writing or reading,” “[show] that strategies associated with writing could be found in 
spoken language” and “[suggest] that certain ways of speaking could be a preparation for expository writing, 
and that strategies associated with orality could be found in writing.” 
141 Id. at 387. 
142 Id. at 390. See also 395: “Describing these and other genres suggests parameters by which 
discourse takes its form: formal vs informal, monologic vs interactive, public vs private, and the range of 
patterns associated with discourse of a recognizable type. . . Tannen sees different patterns of similar linguistic 
resources (for example, repetition, narrative, constructed dialog, details, and imagery) as means of drawing on 
and creating differing degrees of interpersonal involvement.” 
143 M. A. K. Halliday, “Differences between Spoken and Written Language: Some Implications for 
Literacy Teaching,” Pages 37-52 in Glenda Page, John Elkins and Barrie O'Conner (Eds.) Communication 
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 In biblical scholarship, much attention has already been given to the relationship 
between “orality,” “literacy,” and society in the ancient Israelite world, with several 
monographs also devoted to the study of one or the other communicative aspects. Interest in 
orality and literacy in biblical studies is usually traced to H. Gunkel and his Formgeschichte 
approach.
144
 More recent studies are concerned with, as Schaper put it, “the significance of 
orality and literacy for our understanding of the development of the YHWH religion and the 
Israelite and Judaean societies in which it was rooted.”145 Importantly, Niditch has questioned 
the “romantic notion” of an evolutionary model of literacy—“an oral period in the history of 
Israel followed by the time of literacy in which Israelite literature becomes written,”146 and in 
which orality appears early, prebiblical, and unsophisticated.
147
 She argues instead that an 
“oral literate continuum”148 existed rather than “a dichotomy between orality and literacy”149 
throughout the biblical period. It must be stressed that if we do understand orality and literacy 
as ends of a continuum, however, we maintain a sort of dichotomy between them. Niditch’s 
conceptualisation nevertheless well illustrates the fluidity of communication in this regard, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Through Reading: Proceediongs of the Fourth Australian Reading Conference (Adelaid, S.A.: Australian 
Reading Association, 1979). In this work, Halliday found that spoken language had complex sentence structure, 
i.e. more clauses, but “low lexical density,” that is, few high content words per clause. Written language, on the 
other hand, had simpler sentence structures with high lexical density. Beaman extended and refined these 
conclusions in her 1984 work, stating that “differences in syntactic complexity between the spoken and written 
modalities which previous studies have found often turn out to result from differences in the formality and 
purpose or register of the discourse rather than true differences between spoken and written language.” K. 
Beaman, “Coordination and Subordination Revisited: Syntactic Complexity in Spoken and Written Narrative 
Discourse,” Pages 45-80 in Tannen D. and Freedle R. (Eds), Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse 
(1980). See Chafe and Tannen, “Written and Spoken Language,” 388-89. A number of scholars have argued that 
writing is not a “neutral” technology. See Chafe and Tannen, “Written and Spoken Language,” 392. For 
example, Florian Coulmas has made the compelling argument that different writing systems have different 
effects on language, and affect the “relative distance” between a language’s spoken and written counterparts. 
Coulmas’ attempt to evaluate how writing a language affects its development finds ultimately no conclusions. 
Florian Coulmas, Writing Systems: An Introduction to Their Linguistic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 35. 
144 See, for example, Hermann Gunkel, Genesis übersetzt and erklärt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1901). 
145 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 324.  
146 Niditch, Oral World, 134. 
147 Id. at 2. 
148 Id. at 134. 
149 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 325. 
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disallowing a rigid “development” and instead emphasising a coexistence variably more or 
less oral or written. 
 George E. Mendenhall asserted that an illiterate society is by no means unsophisticated 
or primitive, arguing that exclusively oral record-keeping in and of itself does not preclude 
rich, literary works. In a consideration of the theoretical Amorite epic, he argues that many 
cultures may not produce written documentation, but nevertheless have rich traditions of 
folklore and poetry: “From the Greek Islands to Yemen there have been recent reports of 
local peoples’ capability to produce, without prior preparation, highly complex poetic 
compositions appropriate to festive occasions. The western obsession that only literacy 
permits higher aspects of culture is simply the result of ignorance, and sometimes invincible 
ignorance.”150 Oral communication, then, should not by virtue of its medium be disassociated 
with any aspects of a culture—be they administrative, intellectual, or literary. 
 At the same time, Patricia G. Kirkpatrick’s work on the Old Testament and folklore 
emphasises that, regardless of the sophistication of such oral traditions, oral compositions are 
most often changed over time:  
memorisation is no longer seen as the key to a culture’s oral narrative transmission. 
…oral tradition, far from preserving the sources of its past (whether they be 
entertainment or historical recollection, or both) constantly reinterprets that past in the 
light of the present. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of tradition is not that it conserves the 
past but rather that it is constantly evolving in such a way as to incorporate the changes 
of different historical periods and circumstances. The written transcription of presumed 
oral tales will inform us more, therefore, about the period in which those tales were 
transcribed than about the period in which they were presumed to have been 
composed.
151
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
                                                        
150 George E. Mendenhall, “The Amorite Heritage in the West,” in Inspired Speech: Prophecy in the 
Ancient Near East. JSOTSup 378 (J. Kaltner and L. Stulman, eds. London: T & T Clark, 2004), 16. 
151 Patricia G. Kirkpatrick, The Old Testament and Folklore Study (JSOTSupp 62, Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1988.), 117: “We now know that it is not necessarily the case that story-tellers in oral societies 
memorise their tales. Instead it is now appreciated that they are capable of retaining fairly lengthy oral 
compositions aided by epithets, formulaic phrases and patterns. Each performance of the same composition 
contains both stable and creative elements, however. The most recent folklore research has shown, furthermore, 
that even the presence of epithets or formulaic phrases in a written text is no sure touchstone of its orality. Like 
repetition these features can also be part of written techniques.”  
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Based on similar reasoning, Martti Nissinen has argued that the actual words the prophets 
spoke and to which prophetic literature refers are “impossible to find.” 152 He proposes that 
the “development from oral performance to written record happened under material 
restrictions and linguistic constraints, and the path from the prophet to the recipient may have 
been a complicated one.”153 This is typically the attitude of synchronic approaches to the 
biblical texts, and one that this study, by and large, adopts.
154 
This understanding is based on 
the increasing complexity and occurrence of extant texts over time.     
Still, while most scholars accept that the administrative and legal spheres were more 
oral in their nascent stages, and then became more written, both spheres retained important 
oral functions, traces of which can be found in biblical texts. This persistent “oral nuance” 
corresponds with Goody’s literacy hypothesis, as “orality remains a dominant form of human 
interaction, although itself modified in various ways by the addition of new means and modes 
of communication.”155 This suggests that the significance associated with orality did not 
disappear with the advent of literacy, though it may have changed. By the Achaemenid 
period, literacy appears to have been more widespread,
156
 perhaps lessening to some extent 
the formal impact of speech in administrative and legal situations and contributing to state 
centralisation.
157
 However, while writing may have been “at the core” of Israelite 
administrative and political systems,
158
 this nonetheless concludes nothing for the population 
at large. Indeed, the personal, committing nature of speech appears to have been retained 
throughout periods of both low and high literacy.  
                                                        
152 Martti Nissinen, “What is Prophecy? An Ancient Near Eastern Perspective,” in Inspired Speech, 29. 
153 Id. 
154 Additionally, the act of writing oral records, or recording direct speech can be seen as showcasing 
the time period and social context of the recorder. 
155
 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 337. 
156 Id. at 328, calling the Israelites a “society whose leading military and administrative personnel had, 
even in the seventh century, reached at least amongst its elites a high degree of literacy” and citing relevant 
evidence.  
157 See Goody, Logic, 87-126. 
158 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 329. 
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Orality and literacy seem to have coexisted, and both played important roles 
throughout the ancient Israelite history. To some extent, and as Bernard Jackson, Walter Ong, 
and Jack Goody have stressed, “writing restructures consciousness.”159 Jackson explains that 
“orality favours events rather than concepts or system… we can tolerate a complex story told 
orally, but not a complex legal document.”160 Jackson sees orality, which he equates with 
narrative, as relying on shared social knowledge, while writing is less so.
161
 But these 
features of oral and written communications are complementary, and not necessarily 
competitive. As Robert R. Wilson has noted, “traditional cultures do not in fact leave orality 
behind when they begin to use writing more heavily. Rather both oral and written literatures 
continue to exist together for a long period of time and interact with each other in various 
complex ways.”162  
In this way, Robert D. Miller has argued that Israel was “always a society of oral 
literature full of literate individuals,” though that most received these works aurally.163 
Schaper has argued that “the most important use of writing” in ancient Israel was to 
transform the written word into the spoken word.
164
 Thus, among other reasons, writing was 
important for enabling further verbal communications, including recitation and teaching.
165
 
                                                        
159 The title of chapter 4 of Ong, Orality; See also Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Bernard S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law: Linguistic, 
Psychological, and Semiotic Perspectives (Liverpool, UK: Deborah Charles Publications, 1995), 79-83; 
"Models," Journal of Law and Religion 18(2002): 8. 
160 Jackson, “Models,” 8. He cites to Basil Bernstein, infra note 161, who has distinguished between 
“restricted code,” in which “we need not say everything that we mean, because we can rely upon the shared 
social knowledge” to fill in any gaps, and “elaborated code,” in which any assumptions “need to be spelled out.” 
161 Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), chs. 5-7, especially 108-109, 123-137. 
162 Robert R. Wilson, “Current Issues in the Study of Old Testament Prophecy,” in Inspired Speech, 42. 
See also Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom-laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1-22:16 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 39. Jackson proposes an alternative viewpoint of the relationship between orality and 
literacy: that a transition from orality to writing occurs at the commencement of “paragraphing, which may well 
be a function of relatively short collections of norms.” However, this view—while important in stressing the 
development of the form of writing—seems too linear to reflect adequately the complex, relationship between 
orality and literacy.  
163 Robert D. Miller, II, Oral Tradition in Ancient Israel (Biblical Performance Criticism, 4; Eugene, 
Ore.: Cascade Books, 2011), 54. 
164 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 332-3.  
165 Id.  He maintains that this use “provided the foundation for a new relation between the written and 
the oral, between writing on the one hand and memorising, reciting, meditating and teaching on the other.” Id. 
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Oral transmission was likely not restrictive in the sense of audience: oral delivery would have 
been accessible to most of society.  
 Indeed, Niditch characterises Israel as an “essentially oral world.”166 She argues that 
even in later passages, which exhibit “literate mentality,” written materials are depicted as 
being reoralised and are more symbolic than practical:
167
 "even at the literate end of the 
continuum, the oral mentality is present and active, informing the way writing is used."
168
 
Schaper, meanwhile, insists much the same about literacy: “never in its entire history was 
Israel entirely without writing, as becomes clear from the existence of scribes in its midst 
from the earliest times onwards,” also asserting that its society was fully transformed by 
writing “from the pre-exilic period at the latest.”169 Schaper does stress however that “literacy 
here does not lead to the development of (objective) history as opposed to (communal) myth, 
nor necessarily to detachment, distance, or analytic thinking.”170These views are not 
irreconcilable, as both orality and literacy, in varying proportions, co-existed throughout 
ancient Israelite history. 
 Underscoring this discussion, however, are the truth conditions that informed 
transmissions of this kind: from oral to written and from written to written. As suggested 
above in the section on written literature as a genre, ancient Israelite conceptions of truth 
influenced how content was transferred either between or within these mediums. These 
socially-defined truth conditions color our understanding of the relationship between speech, 
text, and the community. 
                                                        
166 Niditch, Oral World, 134. 
167 Id. at 97-98; Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 336-7. 
168 Niditch, Oral World, 98. 
169 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 337; fn. 59. See also 326: “Writing is depicted as a divine activity (or 
as one occurring in the divine sphere) in Isa. lxv 6; Ezek. ii l-iii 10; xiii 9; Zech. v 1-4 and Mal. iii 16. It is 
practised by humans in Jer. xxxvi 2, 4, 18, 28, 32; li 60-64 and Hab. ii 2.” Schaper examines the “theology of 
writing” and writing in exilic and post-exilic prophecy, determining that writing is depicted as both a divine and 
a human activity. He concludes that ascribing writing to the divine realm indicates that “writing was a well-
known activity when the texts in question were authored… writing, and specifically book-keeping, was indeed a 
practice sufficiently well established and publicly known to serve, by analogy, as an illustration of the divine 
world” (327-28). 
170 Schaper, “Orality/Literacy,” 338.  
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Truth Conditions 
 The ancient conception of truth as “loyalty” rather than some objective meaning, or 
word-for-word copying, had bearing on how oral messages were written down and copied. 
Additionally, although writing and speaking seem to have been closely related, writing was 
not simply the transfer of spoken word or tradition into script. As mentioned, Raymond 
Person described faithfulness to a text in the ancient Israelite world not as exactness in script, 
that is, not “word for word” copying, but as the transmission of meaning.171  
 The advent of writing and literacy in general certainly has an impact on a community’s 
conceptions of “truth.” For example, Clanchy has argued that in medieval England, “without 
documents, the establishment of what passed for truth was simple and personal, since it 
depended on the good word of one’s fellows. Remembered truth was also flexible and up to 
date, because no ancient custom could be proved to be older than the memory of the oldest 
living wise man.”172 Similarly, Goody and Watt’s study noted that the Nigerian Tiv’s quite 
fluid, oral genealogies were often used in court cases under British administration. Once the 
British began to record these genealogies, however, the next generation of both 
administrators and Tivs found that their respective records were contradictory; to the next 
generation of Tivs, these older, written records seemed incorrect, not “true,” and proved to be 
a source of conflict.
173
  
 As Stuart Weeks has noted, “the recreated past in an oral society is not seen as 
recreated, and does not lack authority.”174 The Tivs’ reaction also demonstrates that for this 
                                                        
171 Raymond F. Person, Jr., The Deuteronomic History and the Books of Chronicles: Scribal Works in 
an Oral World (Atlanta: SBL, 2010), 48. 
172 “There was no conflict between past and present, between ancient precedents and present practice… 
‘The law itself remains young, always in the belief that it is old.’” (Michael Clanchy, From Memory to Written 
Record: England 1066-1307 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 296, quoting F. Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle 
Ages (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939), 179). 
173 Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The Consequences of Literacy,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History Vol. 5 No. 3 (1963): 311.  
174 Stuart Weeks, “Literacy, Orality, and Literature in Israel,” in James K. Aitken, Katharine J. Dell, 
and Brian A. Mastin, eds., On Stone and Scroll, Essays in Honour of Graham Ivor Davies (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2011), 477. 
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oral society, “truth” was not fundamentally conceived as some fixed, objective lasting 
thing—instead, it was a matter of agreement. Literate societies on the other hand, in many 
respects because they are so dependent on documents, see writing as “fixing” truths and 
removing any room for negotiation, with disagreements only about the authenticity and 
authority of documents.  
 But what was “truth” for the ancient Israelites? This discussion requires an 
investigation into the ancient Israelite conceptions of the conditions upon which speech was 
founded, particularly the multivalent concept of “truth.” To briefly survey “truth” as a 
philosophical concept, the correspondence theory of truth maintains that truth corresponds to 
“the” actual state of things and/or to external transcendent realities. Its roots are in Greek 
philosophy, and its primary champions in the Western philosophical tradition also assert that 
dishonesty is inherently harmful. Specific conceptions vary, including Kant’s classic, 
absolutist case-in-point of revealing the hiding-place of an innocent person to their would-be 
murderer, rather than speak dishonestly out of altruistic motives.
175
 Others see dishonesty as 
sometimes acceptable, with much ink spilled in the debate.
176
  
 In the biblical text, however, there is a dearth of specific moral injunctions against 
dishonesty in contemporary terms. The absence of specific advice about “lying” is marked. 
Some take issue with the deceptive depictions of biblical heroes in the Hexateuch
177—uneasy 
that the Bible is “condoning” dishonesty in its depictions of, for example, Abraham and Isaac 
(Gen. 12, 20, and 26), the midwives in Egypt (Ex. 1:15-20), and Rahab (Josh. 2:1).
178
 This 
                                                        
175 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. and 
trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 346-50. He continues: “a lie always 
harms another; if not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally, for it vitiates the source of law 
itself” (347). 
176 See for example, Benjamin Constant, “On Political Reactions,” France Vol. 3 No. 1 (1797): 123. 
177
 For example, Yael Shemesh gives an elaborate justification for their actions based on modern 
conceptions of truth. Yael Shemesh, “Lies by Prophets and Other Lies in the Hebrew Bible,” Journal of Ancient 
Near Eastern Studies 29 (2002): 95. He continues, “The common point in all instances is that the prophet, 
formally speaking, has not actually lied, i.e., uttered an outright falsehood, although he has misled someone in a 
sophisticated manner, consciously and deliberately.” 
178 See also Gen. 27:7, 20, 28; 29:15-30, 29:31-30:24; 30:37-31:16. 
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may be due to the fact that their conceptions of “truth,” as will be discussed, don’t correspond 
to our own, and this especially seems to be the case in their older traditions—likely earlier 
compositions in less literate contexts. “Troubling” behaviour is sometimes only troubling to 
our contemporary sensibilities.  
Indeed, unlike our contemporary sensibilities about truth, in the biblical texts, one 
must be honest as a witness or in conducting trade and business, but this does not equate to a 
conception of honesty as the objective or exact relation of things as they “are,” or a duty to be 
honest in everyday conversation. Instead, the word תֶמֱא, generally translated as “truth,” seems 
to describe a “loyalty” or “faithfulness” more than a commitment to our conception of truth 
as objective fact. For example, תֶמֱא is often coupled with the term דֶס ָ֫ ח, love or kindness.179 It 
is often used to describe God and his covenant—that God can be trusted to follow through.180 
Isa. 38:18 describes those whose wickedness is beyond reproach and who “cannot hope for 
[YHWH’s] faithfulness.” Similarly, God asks for faithfulness of those in his covenant (Ps. 
51:6). Jeremiah uses תֶמֱא to describe something sound and reliable (2:21). This conception of 
truth entails a sense of surety, describing a “sure” sign or oath (Josh. 2:12, Ps. 132:11).  
Furthermore, in terms of economics, truth is generosity, especially in treating the poor 
generously and not taking advantage of anyone. Weights and measures are often the subject 
of this sort of honesty.
181
 Trustworthy men are those who “hate dishonest gain” (Ex. 18:21). 
                                                        
179 In Proverbs, as well as in Ps. 51:6-7, truth is also listed with wisdom (ה  מְכ  ח), instruction (ר  סֹמ), and 
understanding (ה ני ִּב). It is also described with humility (ה וְנַע) and righteousness (קֶד ֶָ֫צ) (Ps. 45:4 (5)). It is coupled 
with love (דֶס ָ֫ ח) and righteousness (קֶד ֶָ֫צ) (Ps. 85:10-11 (11-12)). It is on some level seen as a divine blessing: 
something that can be given or taken away. The Psalmist asks “Never take your word of truth from my mouth, 
for I have put my hope in your laws” (119:43). Isaiah lists truth in parallel form with honesty (ח ָֹ֫כ  נ ַ), justice 
(ט פְש ִּמ), and righteousness (ה  ק  דְצ) (Isa. 59:12-15). Truth is described in opposition to evil (59:15). In Daniel’s 
prophecy, both truth and the “sanctuary” or the temple were “thrown to the ground” in Israel’s destruction 
(8:11-12). 
180 See 2 Sam. 7:28; Ps. 30:10 (9), 31:6 (5), 45:4 (5), 57:11 (10), 71:22, 86:16, 91:4, 108:5, 111:7, 
115:1, 138:2, 146:6; Micah 7:20; Isa. 38:19. תֶמֱא is also used to describe the identity of YHWH as an 
authoritative and trustworthy god, the “true” god (2 Chr. 15:3, Jeremiah 10:10). His commands are also called 
“true” (Ps. 19:10, 111:7, 119:151, 160—which use “true” and “eternal” as near synonyms, as in Jeremiah 14:3). 
It has been used in parallel opposition to wickedness (Jeremiah 9:33, Prov. 8:7) and to describe general 
righteousness (Gen. 24:48, Ps. 15:2). It arises from fearing God (Neh. 7:2) and acknowledging Him (Hosea 4:1). 
181 “Honest balances and scales are the Lord’s; all the weights in the bag are his work” (Prov. 16:11). 
Conversely, “a false balance is an abomination to the Lord, but an accurate weight is his delight” (Prov. 11:1). 
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A person who earns deceptively is wicked, in contrast with the righteous who earn “true” 
wages (Prov. 11:18). Additional proverbs are focused on dishonest gain: “The getting of 
treasures by a lying tongue is a fleeting vapor and a snare of death” (Prov. 21:6). In Ezekiel 
18, the righteous man is described as a “true judge” who does not lend at interest or take a 
profit, and who is “true” in keeping divine laws (8-9).  
 Truth is also used frequently in evaluating witnesses.
182
 In Prov. 6:16-19, God hates “a 
lying tongue” and “a false witness who utters lies” (see also Prov. 12:22). The term ‘תֶמֱא is 
also used to imply verification in some instances: if a matter is proved “true” in a juridical 
sense, then certain consequences apply.
183
 An honest witness is not described as telling “the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth,” to use modern Western terminology, but they “save 
lives”—while the deceitful witness will provide misinformation to do the opposite, to destroy 
lives (Proverbs 14:25). “Truth in justice” in Zechariah 7:9 is to have mercy and compassion. 
At the same time, Jeremiah pleads with the Lord to be a “true and faithful witness” against 
Israel if they do not obey him (42:5)—further suggesting that an “honest” witness is again 
one with both mercy and justice.  
 Continuing this theme, Zechariah 8:16 begins with a general injunction to “speak the 
truth to each other,” but then proceeds to enumerate specific injunctions for a juridical 
setting: to the mediators or judges (“render true and sound judgment”), the accusers (“do not 
plot evil against each other”) and the witnesses or accused (“do not love to swear falsely”). 
An honest witness is defined as telling the truth, and a false witness tells lies (Prov. 12:1). In 
the juridical setting, then, lies are not told with altruistic motives: altruism “is” truth, and 
manipulating the legal system for injury is deceit.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
“Differing weights are an abomination to the Lord, and false scales are not good” (Prov. 20:23). False weights 
and measures refer to defrauding a customer about the product being sold. “Diverse weights and diverse 
measures are both alike an abomination to the Lord” (Prov.20:10).  
182 Much attention is given to the deceptive witness (Prov. 14:25; 19:5; 24:28;12:17; 25:18; 10:18). 
183  See Deut. 13:15, 17:4; 22:20; 1 Kgs. 10:6; 2 Chr. 9:5. 
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 In the context of prophecy, תֶמֱא is used to describe the faithful recounting of a message, 
and dishonesty is attributing messages to God which he did not give, or saying more or less 
than was instructed  (Jeremiah 23:28-32). After Elijah’s ministrations to the widow and her 
son at Zarephath, she affirms his prophetic station by stating: “the word of the Lord from 
your mouth is the truth” (1 Kgs. 17:24). In Daniel, prophecy is described with תֶמֱא if its 
provenance is authoritative: from God (8:26, 10:21).  
These “truth” conditions of speech are perhaps nowhere more in focus than in the 
story of Micaiah and the king of Israel (traditionally understood as Ahab). There, YHWH’s 
conspiring to kill the Israelite king has been seen as morally problematic by today’s 
standards. However, as noted above, the biblical texts understand that God is “true” to man so 
far as man is “true” to him (Isa. 38:18). God’s “deception” is that he is no longer loyal to the 
Israelite king—who is, the text makes clear, no longer loyal to YHWH. Therefore, YHWH 
allows a deceptive spirit to send the Israelite king to his death. All of the prophets involved 
are ostensibly speaking in the name of YHWH, and thus speaking “truth” in the sense of that 
which is in line with his message.  
When Micaiah echoes this message, Ahab demands that Micaiah tells the “truth.” 
Ahab recognises this “good” (tov) prophecy immediately as suspect, because it is out of 
character with Micaiah’s previous behaviour.184 Here, “truth” is harmony with character—
indeed, after Micaiah revises his statement, the Israelite king smugly affirms to Jehoshaphat, 
“Didn’t I tell you? His prophecies about me are never good but only bad” (1 Kgs. 22:18). 
Ultimately, however, and as Walter Moberly has noted, Micaiah is not even necessarily 
speaking “truth,” that is, a future certainty, but rather a future possibility, spoken not to, in 
                                                        
184 “An enemy dissembles in speaking while harboring deceit within; when an enemy speaks 
graciously, do not believe it, for there are seven abominations concealed within.” (Prov. 26:24-25) This proverb 
has a narrative counterpart in the story of Micaiah.  
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fact, bring events about, but to motivate change.
185
 Israel’s loss is dependent upon Ahab’s 
decision to go up in the first place. Thus, much of the biblical prophecy, “at least, as 
articulated in the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel and as presupposed in much other prophetic 
literature—is relational, engaging language that seeks a response.”186 
 In some cases, however, “true” prophecy is used to describe events that are to 
inexorably come, events that are not conditional upon behaviour. There are very few such 
prophecies indeed, however, but they do seem to subscribe to a more correspondence theory 
of truth, concerned with relating the “actual state of (future) affairs” (see Daniel 11:2, dreams 
and visions of Joseph in the Genesis narrative). In prophecy, then, a consistent meaning of 
“truth” is fidelity to the original divine message, in meaning more than in word-for-word 
transmission.  
 Elsewhere, in Proverbs, truth is described as being taught for vocational purposes. 
Messengers are taught “to be honest and to speak the truth” in order to “bring back truthful 
reports to those [they] serve” (Proverbs 22:21). Here, again, truthfulness seems to describe 
“faithfulness”—fidelity to the original message and its provenance. Like temporal 
messengers, prophets and priests were simply bearers of (divine) messages. Malachi 2 
discusses the duties of a Levite priest—emphasising that the lips of a priest ought to 
“preserve knowledge, because he is the messenger of the Lord Almighty and people seek 
instruction from his mouth” (Malachi 2:7).  
 These ideas about truth were probably agreed upon in broader ancient Israelite society. 
The norms underlying the concept of truth are, generally, socially contrived. For example, 
although the modern West describes truth as some “objective” accuracy, this accuracy is 
nevertheless something agreed upon by the majority, or by authoritative figures whom the 
                                                        
185 See R. Walter L. Moberly, “Does God lie to His prophets? The story of Micaiah ben Imlah as a test 
case,” Harvard Theological Review Vol. 96 No. 1 (2003): 8. 
186 See Id. 
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public accepts.
187
 Similarly, in primarily oral communities, especially, truth is a sort of 
consensus gentium, an agreement of the people.
188
 Statements are taken as true because 
people generally agree upon them.
189
  
 This can be seen in the biblical texts. Isa. 43:9 describes a dramatic juridical setting 
which emphasises truth as agreement among the spectators. Isaiah invites the nations to 
gather together, asking, “Which of their gods foretold this and proclaimed to us the former 
things? Let them bring in their witnesses to prove they were right, so that others may hear and 
say, ‘It is true.’” Here, the testimony of witnesses is affirmed as truth by agreement.  
 Ultimately, the words “true” and “truth” in ancient Israel can be said to refer—not to 
states of affairs, as they arguably do today—but to properties of utterances. Like medieval 
England and the Nigerian Tivs, ancient Israel had different conceptions of “truth” than we do 
today. While certain scenarios required the accurate retelling, like in conveying a message or 
some prophecies, truth does not seem to have been some philosophical, overarching 
phenomenon, so the “truth conditions” upon which language was based in ancient Israel seem 
to have been more loyalty and fidelity than objective morality. This bears on the use and 
reception of writing in that society. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter’s discussion was two-fold, first addressing the more mechanical 
relationship between text, speech, and the community, and then moving to the less defined 
effect of ancient Israelite “truth” conceptions on this relationship. While ancient Israel may 
have been an “essentially oral world” in the way that Niditch meant, that is, a “primarily” oral 
one, it seems to have been an essentially oral world in another way. As will be seen in the 
next chapters, several communicative acts were “essentially” oral, and remained so 
                                                        
187 In the sense of verum ipsum factum, “the truth itself is made.” 
188 Of course, this should be understood in a historical rather than philosophical sense. 
189 See Imre lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
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throughout later periods when writing seems to have been more widespread. Verbal 
communication was significant in legal disputes and in public recitation. These functions 
highlight the commitment that speech implied—more so than by Western standards. By the 
same token, however, the ancient Israelite concept of truth seems to have been far looser than 
today’s Western standard. Even with the presence of writing, and the ability to “fix” 
something in time, ancient Israelites do not seem to have used an “objective” standard in 
evaluating the truthfulness of a communication. They did not require exactness, but rather 
fidelity in meaning and good intent. This chapter thus discussed the reliability of written texts 
for understanding their descriptions of speech, in order to foreground the next two chapters’ 
examinations of specific speech practices. 
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Chapter 5: The Vow and Consequences of Speech for the Community 
 
 While the previous chapter examined how speech was related to writing, and the 
Israelite community and its conception of truth and reality, this chapter brings a specific 
speech act into focus: the vow. The vow is a key action on which to focus this analysis, as it 
is attested throughout the Near East as, variously, a written and oral commitment. Ancient 
Israelite texts, however, describe this communicative act as exclusively spoken rather than 
written. The portrayal of the vow in the biblical sources exemplifies the relationship between 
speech and the community, with the concept of speech as risk and exposure. While I analyse 
“the vow” at great length in this chapter, and its individual repercussions, I also discuss how 
this individual act of communication seems to have been perceived as relating to and 
impacting the community.  
The Vow 
 We will first explore the fully committing nature of the ancient Israel vow. It was 
typically oriented toward the divine—sworn “before” and often to God. Oath-taking is 
ubiquitous in Old Testament narrative, appearing in some of the Hebrew Bible’s most archaic 
material,
190
 though it spans all genres. The vow was performed in the name of the Lord,
191
 
with the familiar oath formula using the phrase, “as the Lord liveth.”192 Yael Ziegler 
describes the nature of the oath formula:  
The oath formula, [which] always explicitly invokes God, is invariably followed by a 
solemn pledge promising that something will take place. In other words, this formula is 
used not to establish truth but rather to assume responsibility for a particular 
                                                        
190 One of the earliest attestations of Israelite oath-taking occurs in Gen. 24:2, 9, which recounts the 
enigmatic patriarchal formula of placing the hand “under the thigh” of the person to whom the oath-taker makes 
their vow. Shemesh, “Punishment of the Offending Organ in Biblical Literature,” Vetus Testamentum Vol. 55, 
No. 3 (2005): 352; Gen. 24:9: “So the servant put his hand under the thigh of his master Abraham and swore an 
oath to him concerning this matter.” cf. Gen. 24:37,41. 
191 Deut. 6:13: “Fear the LORD your God, serve him only and take your oaths in his name.”; Deut. 
10:20: “Fear the LORD your God and serve him. Hold fast to him and take your oaths in his name.”; Isa. 65:16: 
“Whoever invokes a blessing in the land will do so by the one true God; whoever takes an oath in the land will 
swear by the one true God. For the past troubles will be forgotten and hidden from my eyes.” 
192 Jer. 38:16 
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occurrence. At its core, this phrase appears to be a conditional self-imprecation. The 
gravity of such an imprecation lies in its invocation of God to enforce it.
193
 
 
The putative gravity of the spoken vow – and it is always spoken, as will be discussed below 
– is couched in the vow formula itself.194 It invokes the life or existence of the supreme divine 
being, leaving its speaker with two clear paths: to fulfil their vows and affirm the existence of 
YHWH, or to leave their vows undone and invite the fatal consequences of blasphemy.  
 An ancient Israelite individual had both initiative and responsibility in the speaking of 
an oath; they were able to create, sometimes in rather inventive terms (cf. Judges 11), a sort 
of contract with a deity—simply by speaking.195 In the biblical texts, the context of the vow 
varies—encompassing the personal, secret, compulsory, group, and political in a wide 
spectrum of situational motivations. Whatever the vow-making situation, it appears, 
fulfilment of the vow was paramount (Ps 76:11; Isa 19:21).
196
 Regardless of specific context, 
the biblical narrative always reinforces the risk and the commitment of making a vow. This is 
clearly seen in its treatment of “hasty” and “considered” vows.  
Hasty vows are vengefully made in anger—unplanned and powerful in potentially 
hazardous situations.
197
 These emotional, passion-filled oaths can be effective in persuading 
their hearers that the speaker has a sincere desire to fulfil their vow.
198
 In most of the biblical 
texts, however, these vows end with a fulfilled oath and regret, or an unfulfilled oath and 
ruin. Such vows arise in difficult situations. For example, Abner’s oath of 2 Sam. 3:8-10 
                                                        
193 Yael Ziegler, “‘So Shall God Do...’: Variations of an Oath Formula and Its Literary Meaning,” 
Journal of Biblical Literature Vol. 126, No. 1 (2007): 64. 
194 The “introductory formula of each epic vow” uses the verb רמא, “to say.” Berlinerblau, The Vow, 
86; citing Gen. 28,20; Num. 21.2; Jdgs. 11.30; 1 Sam. 1.11; 2 Sam. 15.7. 
195 This ability—especially on an individual level—is not seen in such quantities in the texts of 
neighbouring peoples.  Berlinerblau, The Vow, 83-85, 90. 
196 For example, in several political and military instances, leaders take oaths to reassure their 
followers.For example, Gedaliah “took an oath to reassure them and their men. ‘Do not be afraid of the 
Babylonian officials,’ he said. ‘Settle down in the land and serve the king of Babylon, and it will go well with 
you.’” 2 Kgs. 25:24; Jer. 40:9. More secretively, when besieged by Babylon, Zedekiah protects and reassures 
Jeremiah with an oath in order to receive his counsel. (Jer. 38:16). 
197 See, for example, Ps. 95:11: “So I declared an oath in my anger, ‘They shall never enter my rest.’” 
198 Ziegler, “Variations of an Oath Formula,” 65. 
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represents, in Fokkelman’s words, “months of pent-up frustration.”199 Likewise, Fokkelman 
sees Solomon’s oath of 1 Kgs. 2:21-29, which he makes in reaction to Adonijah’s request for 
Abishag, as the release of a “great quantity of feelings.”200 And in Genesis, Esau, starving, 
hastily makes a vow, delayed only by Jacob’s desire for procedural security and trust in the 
committing nature of the vow, demanding Esau make the vow before giving him pottage.
201
  
Those vows made in the passion of the moment are often violated. They “often prove 
to be not well thought out, impossible to guarantee—a hotheaded promise instead of a well-
planned, implementable idea.”202 The speaker of the oath must fulfil the conditions they 
vocalised, though they may not have invoked personal ruin—only personal responsibility: 
The oath formula… contains an explicit recipient of the curse in case of its violation; 
however, the curse does not necessarily fall upon the violator. Instead, the oath contains 
a conscious assumption of responsibility on the part of the speaker for the upkeep of the 
oath’s pledge. The speaker’s designation of himself as the recipient of the conditional 
curse represents his confidence, his sincerity, and his willingness to assume personal 
responsibility.
203
  
 
Because the speaker of the vow is, by their very act of speech, accepting responsibility for its 
carrying out, most vows work in conditional clauses. The risk of vows made in the heat of the 
moment is that little thought is given to such cautionary framing.  
 On the other hand, other passages describe careful hedging in forming a vow to ensure 
that the vow-maker will be able to keep it, avoiding the risks others so hastily took. These are 
more “considered” vows. The account of Rahab and the spies in Josh. 2-6 devotes much 
attention to the stipulations of an oath made by Joshua’s spies to Rahab. The spies work in 
several safety-net clauses—releasing them from their vow under certain circumstances—in 
order to ensure that they are able to fulfil it (Josh 2:17, 20). Abraham works in similar 
                                                        
199 Jan P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art and Poetry in the Books of Samuel: A Full Interpretation Based on 
Stylistic and Structural Analyses (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990) vol. 3, Throne and City, 72. Abner swears to help 
David become king, after Ish-bosheth accuses him of sleeping with King Saul’s concubine.  
200 Ziegler, “Variations of an Oath Formula,” 65; citing Fokkelman, Narrative Art and Poetry. 
201 Gen. 25:33: “But Jacob said, ‘Swear to me first.’ So he swore an oath to him, selling his birthright to 
Jacob.” 
202 Ziegler, “Variations of an Oath Formula,” 65-66. 
203 Id. 
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phrases when putting his servant under oath to find Isaac a wife, making sure to release his 
servant given potential outcomes beyond his control.(Gen 24:8).  
 The wholly-committing aspect of the vow takes on great significance when one notes 
especially difficult vows nevertheless being fulfilled. In the narrative of the Deuteronomistic 
History, Hannah makes her famous vow to dedicate the child she is given to the Lord and, 
after carrying and giving birth to Samuel, does deliver him to the temple in dedication (1 Sam 
1:11, 21). In his military struggles, Jephthah also, and quite infamously, vows to the Lord, “If 
you give the Ammonites into my hands, whatever comes out of the door of my house to meet 
me when I return in triumph from the Ammonites will be the LORD’s, and I will sacrifice it 
as a burnt offering” (Jdgs. 11:30-31).  After he is successful in battle and returns home, his 
only daughter is the first to meet him. Despite the tragedy of fulfilling his oath, his daughter 
urges: “you have given your word to the LORD. Do to me just as you promised, now that the 
LORD has avenged you of your enemies, the Ammonites” (Jdgs. 11:36). Jephthah mourns, “I 
have made a vow to the LORD that I cannot break” and indeed fulfills it (Jdgs. 11:35). Both 
his daughter, facing the prospect of death, and Jephthah, facing the prospect of sacrificing his 
very daughter, are depicted as bowing before the full commitment of the vow. They express 
sorrow, but the fulfilment of the vow is almost unquestioned because of the binding nature of 
the speech, and because God’s end of the bargain, as it were, has been completed.  
Another occurrence is recorded in Judges. After the incident of the Levite and his 
concubine in Jdgs. 19, the men of Israel swear not to betroth their daughters to Benjamites. 
Jdgs. 21:10-23 relates the difficulty of securing wives for the tribe of Benjamin after making 
this oath, however, with the Israelites resorting to murder and kidnapping to avoid breaking 
their oaths. In another instance, after Joshua swears a peace agreement with the Gibeonites, 
who met with Joshua under false pretences, he discovers their deception. The oath that he has 
sworn stays his hand, however, and he lets them live, though as servants. (Josh 9:16-22). 
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 These stories embody the Psalmist ideal of integrity, praising “the one… who keeps an 
oath even when it hurts, and does not change their mind” (Ps 15:1-4). The oath-makers cited 
here performed a variety of difficult tasks rather than renege on the vows they had spoken. 
But as much as oath-makers may have sought to achieve some ideal, they also probably 
wanted to avoid unpleasant consequences. Deuteronomy advises: “If you make a vow to the 
LORD your God, do not be slow to pay it, for the LORD your God will certainly demand it 
of you and you will be guilty of sin. But if you refrain from making a vow, you will not be 
guilty” (Deut. 23:21-22). Moses also warns that those who stray from the covenants they 
have made “will bring disaster on the watered land as well as the dry” (Deut. 29:19). Malachi 
curses the man who, after vowing to give an acceptable male from his flock, offers a 
blemished animal, and Isaiah warns those who similarly take false oaths (Mal 1:14; Isa 48:1). 
The typical consequence for nonfulfillment of a vow was “God’s wrath” (i.e. Josh 
9:20). When Shimei failed to keep his oath, he was killed. (2 Kgs 2:41-46). Ezekiel foretells 
the death of Zedekiah when he breaks his oath with King Nebuchadnezzar, and Zedekiah dies 
in captivity in Babylon (Ezek. 17:16-19). Saul binds his people under oath, swearing that 
those who eat on the day of battle with the Philistines will be cursed. When his son Jonathan 
eats honey, Saul takes personal responsibility for his oath, “May God deal with me, be it ever 
so severely, if you do not die, Jonathan.” Rather than fulfilling his vow, however, Saul, 
persuaded by his men and loth, no doubt, to kill his son, invites God to, as Saul purportedly 
put it, “deal with [him], be it ever so severely” (1 Sam 14:24-28, 43-45). As he leaves his 
vow unfulfilled, Saul soon loses divine mandate and his kingship (1 Sam 15:25-28). 
 Ziegler sees the violation of the oath as integral to—and perhaps the very point of—the 
stories in which it appears. Those who desecrate the oath are “presented as negative 
characters that could easily be dismissive of oaths that they take in God’s name. … Their 
behavior may be interpreted as negative and consistent with the behavior of one who breaks 
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oaths.”204  These texts emphasise the personal and powerful commitment of the spoken vow, 
and the inexorable consequences of leaving the vow unfulfilled. As 1 Kgs. 8:31-32 puts it, 
disrespect for oaths “demands the intervention of God as judge.”205 
There are some notable exceptions to the vow’s commitment, however, that seem to 
relate to the need to protect certain classes: women and the mentally incompetent. Num. 30 
describes a woman’s vow: it will stand if her father or husband “remain silent,” or refrain 
from nullifying the oath with a verbal rebuke. The husband and father have an obligation to 
speak in order to nullify the vows of the females under their stewardship.
206
 
 In the other circumstance for which the oath can be revoked, Lev. 5 lists measures for 
rectification of a “thoughtless” oath: 
if anyone thoughtlessly takes an oath to do anything, whether good or evil (in any 
matter one might carelessly swear about) even though they are unaware of it, but then 
they learn of it and realise their guilt… they must confess in what way they have 
sinned. As a penalty for the sin they have committed, they must bring to the LORD a 
female lamb or goat from the flock as a sin offering; and the priest shall make 
atonement for them for their sin.
207
 
 
                                                        
204 Ziegler, “Variations of an Oath Formula,” 64. 
205 Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, 42-3 (commenting on 1 Kgs. 8:31-2): “The implication is that good 
and bad actions are not always seen to have their appropriate consequences, and that therefore the moral order – 
in this case respect for oaths – demands the intervention of God as judge. It followed that any threat to the moral 
order risked calling into question either the power or the justice of God. These implications are apparent in the 
religiously inspired aphorisms of the two large collections in Proverbs. The idea of an intrinsic link between act 
and consequence is still detectable – for example, in proverbs which speak of sowing and reaping (26:27; 28:10) 
– but the monotonous contrast between the fate of the righteous and that of the wicked is based on specifically 
religious premisses. Expressions like the following could hardly arise out of observation alone: ‘No ill befalls 
the righteous, but the wicked are filled with trouble.’ 12:21 or ‘The righteous has enough to satisfy his appetite, 
but the belly of the wicked suffers want.’ 13:25.’” 
206 This practice is also described in Qumran texts—though with some significant alterations. As G. J. 
Brooke notes in a discussion of 4Q416 2 iv 6-9 and CD 16, 10-12, Qumran law simplifies and exaggerates the 
regulations of Num. 30, suggesting that every vow a wife makes must be “annulled and directly.” (4Q416 2 iv 
6-9: “Over her spirit he has set you in authority so that she should walk in your good pleasure, and let her not 
make numerous vows and votive offerings; turn her spirit to your good pleasure. And every oath binding on her, 
to vow a vow, annul it according to a (mere) utterance of your mouth; and at your good pleasure restrain her 
from performing […]"). This alteration might restrict the “rights” of a wife, but it might also be seen as a form 
of blanket protection, to reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding. The obligation of the father or husband in 
this respect again emphasises the perceived binding power of the spoken oath. This perception—or at least the 
use of this perception to justify such action—spans at minimum several centuries. See, e.g., G. J. Brooke, 
“Biblical Interpretation in the Wisdom Texts from Qumran,” in The Wisdom Texts from Qumran and the 
Development of Sapiential Thought (eds. C. Hempel, A. Lange and H. Lichtenberger; Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2002), 211. 
207 Lev. 5:4-6 
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This measure is not for the hasty vow. This is only applicable to those vows made without 
real awareness; it suggests that the person speaking does not realise they are speaking a 
vow—emphasising the power of the speech itself, and not necessarily the intent behind it. 
The Hebrew verb here
208
 implies “babbling” or immature chatter, perhaps even of those not 
fully cognisant (i.e. infantile or senile). This seems a simple protective mechanism for the 
simple-minded, rather than a means of escape for the casual oath-maker. 
In conclusion, the literate class describes severe consequences for leaving an oath 
unfulfilled. Wisdom texts attest to the folly of a hasty vow, emphasising the likelihood of 
such a vow remaining sinfully unfulfilled. Proverbs warns that “It is a trap to dedicate 
something rashly and only later to consider one’s vows.”209 Deuteronomy warns, “Whatever 
your lips utter you must be sure to do, because you made your vow freely to the LORD your 
God with your own mouth.”210 Thus, the biblical texts describe the vow as fully committing, 
with only limited exceptions, as discussed above. Multiple examples support the message that 
a vow must be honoured, no matter the difficulty, with worse consequences for avoiding oath 
fulfillment. There is often no simple undoing of the spoken vow; its terms must be met.  
The Spoken Nature of the Vow  
Although portrayed as fully committing in most circumstances, the vow is 
nevertheless described as exclusively spoken in the biblical sources. In every biblical oath-
making incident, vows are depicted as spoken. Furthermore, as Berlinerblau has noted, 
Jeremiah 44:17 and 25 refer to the action of vow-making as words literally leaving 
someone’s mouth.211 On the receiving end of the vow, vows are described as being “heard” 
by the deity, which typically indicates they have been fulfilled.
212
 
                                                        
208
 bata’ 
209 Prov. 20:25 
210 Deut. 23:23 
211 Berlinerblau, The Vow, 87-89: “Here then, the authors reveal that in Jeremiahs’ dialect making a 
vow is synonymous with words leaving a person’s mouth. In Deut. 23.24 we again receive evidence of this 
idiomatic association between spoken words and the making of vows. … This one verse demonstrates two 
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This may be unlike ancient Israel’s neighbours. H. L. Ginsberg has noted that non-
Israelite, ancient Near Eastern forms of public acknowledgement to the deity were “very 
often epigraphic,” while Israelite forms were generally verbal.213 Vows described in northeast 
Semitic and other ancient Near Eastern texts appear to generally be written, while the process 
of vow-making is recorded with “unusual clarity and consistency” in Israelite texts as 
spoken.
214
 Along with the biblical Israelite texts, two other northwestern Semitic texts, in 
Ugaritic, also demonstrate vocalic invocations.
215
 In Phoenician and Punic sources, it is 
assumed that the vow was spoken aloud to the deity, as indicated by the “hundreds of votive 
stelae containing the rather trite assertion that the deity in question has ‘heard the voice’… of 
the worshipper.”216 This suggests that northwestern Semitic vow-making traditions were 
largely vocalic and not written like their eastern neighbours.
217
 This is not to say that the 
written vows were not accompanied by oral prayers, but that the ancient Israelite vows do not 
appear to have required or generally used written components.  
As Berlinerblau suggests, “this emphasis on the spoken nature of the vow may have 
had some sort of internal significance for the literati of Israel and Ugarit. They seem to 
subscribe to an ethos which maintains that a spoken obligation to a god was to be taken with 
                                                                                                                                                                            
important aspects of a vow: a vow is an act which requires speech, and once uttered to the deity it is a binding 
obligation that must be fulfilled. … Similar emphasis on the importance of the spoken word, and the gravity of 
its betrayal, can be found in the later wisdom traditions, for example in Eccl. 5.3. The Psalms also abound with 
references to the vocalic dimensions of this religious act. In Ps. 22.25, 66.14, 116.4, and 56.10.” 
212 Berlinerblau, The Vow, 89-90: “A corollary of the principle that the vow must be spoken to the deity 
is that the god actually ‘listens’ (shma) to the entreaty of the worshipper. This usage functions as an idiomatic 
expression: when a deity has ‘heard’ or ‘listened to’ the demand of a votary it always means that the former has 
in fact fulfilled the supplicant’s request. See Num. 21.3, pss. 22.25; 61.6; 65.3; 66.18; 116.1; job 22.27.” 
213 Ginsberg, “Inscriptions of Petition,” 169.  
214 Berlinerblau, The Vow, 83: In northwest Semitic texts, “supplicants typically speak, cry, call out or 
even scream to the god(s).” He continues to cite evidence in support of the “mechanism of ‘spoken invocation.’”  
215 Id.; citing KTU 1.15.111, which describes the anger of the goddess Asherah with King Keret for 
refusing to pay back his vow. In a fragment of the Aqhat epic, Danel prefaces his spoken vow with “listen!”—an 
imperative to gain a deity’s attention. While much about these two texts is not known, it is clear that the vows 
are spoken to the various deities. 
216
 Id. at 89; citing for example KAI 47, 63, 66, 68, 84, 88, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108. 
217 Id. at 90: “the literati of various northwest Semitic cultures, writing at different times and in 
different places, depict the fundamental components of voitive initiation in a nearly identical manner. It is 
everywhere assumed that the worshiper must speak aloud to the deity, making use of his or her mouth and lips. 
As Davies notes, the term ndr itself ‘suggest[s] the spoken word, the promise, or the ‘outgoing from the 
mouth.’” 
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the utmost seriousness.”218 Indeed, as G. B. Gray put it, “An intention only becomes binding 
when it has been embodied in speech, and so gained an independent existence; consequently 
stress is frequently laid… on the utterance of the vow.’219 This perspective spans the Old 
Testament. The vow is consistently portrayed as both vocalic and binding in its 
pronouncement. This is not isolated to one period or genre.   
On the other hand, the vows of elsewhere in the ancient Near East were written. The 
vow-texts of the Sumerians and Old Babylonians, for example, indicate a sort of making of 
the vow in its composition: a sort of votive receipt of sorts. The vow-texts do not indicate any 
verbal counterpart, nor do they intimate any sense of vocalic dialogue. In William Hallo’s 
study of the neo-Sumerian “letter prayer,” which was inscribed onto a votive object and 
placed into a deposit near the statue of the deity, he describes them as “taking the place of the 
suppliant, and relieving him of the need to proffer his prayer in his own person, orally and 
perpetually.”220 In Old Babylonian sources, similar texts are found in the temple for vows 
related to illness—that is, vowing to offer certain artefacts if the God blesses them with the 
recovery of their health.
221
  
While in the ancient Israelite texts, the vow is made to and by the gods directly, 
privately, and orally, elsewhere it is made indirectly, through mediation and writing.
222
 
Indeed, one priestly or scribal function in other communities would have been to aid in the 
preparation of these vow-texts. But this votive process is not attested in any extant Israelite 
                                                        
218 Id. at 86. 
219 G. B. Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1906), 415. 
220 Hallo, “Individual Prayer,” 75; see also Berlinerblau, The Vow, 91. 
221 Berlinerblau, The Vow, 91-2:  “A corpus of texts containing the expression salmu baltu often depicts 
the plight of a worshipper who is ill and who promises to pay back the deity what she or he ‘owes’ upon 
regaining her or his health. To some, these texts indicated that an individual, while ill, had merely taken out a 
temple loan.  … [R.] Harris concluded that these texts were not pure loans but vows. Thus, there existed a 
mechanism whereby an ill supplicant claims to ‘owe’ a sun disk, which he or she will place around the neck of 
the god when he or she recovers. In reality, however, the supplicant has vowed that if he or she recovers this 
religious artefact will be donated to the temple. Harris’s identification of such a practice with the process of 
vowing is reinforced by the appearance of the salmu baltu clause in a text containing the word  ikribu, the 
Assyrian noun-form for ‘vow.’ The relevant section of this text reads i-nu-ma ba-al-tu u sa-al-mu ikribisu ana 
(d)Sin PN inaddin, ‘when he is physically well and solvent PN will give his votive offering to Sin.’”  
222 Id. at 91. 
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texts—highlighting the persistence of and preference for verbal vow-making throughout these 
periods. The available evidence fully supports this theory.
223 
The only accompaniment to the 
enunciation of the vow seems to have been, occasionally, an offering.
224
 Even when made 
with an offering, however, the vow’s enactment only came about with its enunciation.  
So the very speaking of the vow seems to have been what made it bind the speaker, as 
might be recalled from the provision for the “thoughtless” vow discussed above. It does not 
seem to have required a person’s actual, free will intent. A number of vows are described as 
(or implied as) being forced, with the oath used to induce someone else to behave in a 
particular manner, rather than instigated by the oath-speaker him/herself. In Genesis, first 
Joseph and then the Israelites are “made” to swear oaths about the burials of Jacob and 
Joseph, respectively (Gen 50:5). Under King Asa’s reign, all who would not make an oath to 
“seek the Lord” were killed (2 Chr. 15:13-15). Nebuchadnezzar is described as forcing 
Zedekiah to “take an oath in God’s name” (2 Chr. 36:13). Ezra puts all of Israel under oath to 
                                                        
223 Id. at 92-3: “The likelihood that such a mechanism actually existed increases when it is taken into 
consideration that northwest Semitic authors, writing in different times and places, all seem implicitly to 
acknowledge this aspect of the votive procedure. It might legitimately be asked whether this data actually 
constitutes implicit evidence. The fact that vows are vocalized to the deity is, after all, explicitly mentioned by 
the literati. It is significant, however, that such information is repeated over and over again, in nearly the exact 
same way, in almost every northwest Semtitic vow-text examined. It appears to have had little resonance for the 
biblical author insofar as this reference to vocalized petitions is never commented upon. Further like all good 
implicit evidence, it appears to have absolutely nothing to do with the theological agenda of the Yahwist party. 
It is the repetitive, uncontroversial and mundane nature of this evidence which leads me to label it as implicit.” 
224 Often individuals or groups performed offerings at the commencement and/or completion of their 
vows. The Pentateuchal references to oath-taking are dominated by “vowed” offerings. Leviticus, Numbers, and 
Deuteronomy make mention of offerings given to “fulfil a vow.” (Lev. 7:16; 22:18, 21; 23:38; 27:2, 8-9, 11; 
Num. 15:3, 8; 29:39; Deut. 12:6, 17; Deut. 23:18.) Typically, these offerings are contrasted with “freewill” 
offerings and entail detailed stipulations. These are not freewill offerings as they form the realisation of a 
spoken, and obligating, vow. 2 Kings attests the usage of money “received from personal vows”—as opposed to 
money either collected in the census or money brought voluntarily to the temple. (2 Kgs. 12:4). Psalms specifies 
“thank offerings” as a method of fulfilling vows—likely a sign of gratitude after a request had been made and 
positively answered. (Ps. 50:14; 56:12). Numbers also introduces the procedure for performing Nazirite vows, 
which entails certain behavioural sacrifices. After a set period, the Nazirite performs offerings within the 
temple, which typically mark the end of the behavioural changes and “fulfilment” of the vow. (Num. 6:21). In 
many cases, however, the commencement and the fulfilment of the vow may not have been two distinct events, 
but the offering likely accompanied the oralisation of the vow, thereby both confirming and fulfilling the vow 
concurrently. Then there may have been offerings that acted as confirmation that someone would fulfil what 
they had vowed to do, implied by the Psalmist in the saying, “I have taken an oath and confirmed it, that I will 
follow your righteous laws.” (Ps. 119:106; emphasis added). Jon. 1:16 is also a notable passage. Jonah’s 
seafaring companions make vows when they encounter a frightening storm, “At this the men greatly feared the 
LORD, and they offered a sacrifice to the LORD and made vows to him” (Jon. 1:16). Contrary to some 
interpretations that see the two actions as sequential (Berlinerblau, The Vow, 70), it seems the sailors with Jonah 
offered an offering after making fearful vows during a storm, thereby paying their vows.  
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send away any foreign women they have married (Ezra 10:5). Similarly, Nehemiah “beat 
some of the men and pulled out their hair. I made them take an oath in God’s name and said: 
“You are not to give your daughters in marriage to their sons, nor are you to take their 
daughters in marriage for your sons or for yourselves” (Neh. 13:25). In each of these 
instances, there is no notion of a requirement of free will to make the oath—once it is made, 
once it has been spoken before God, it is binding. Even for the thoughtless oath, the vow, 
once spoken, was made—though it could be nullified for lack of understanding.   
This seems to be why Qoheleth warns: 
Guard your step when you go
225
 to the house of God. Go near to listen rather than to 
give fools' offering, for they only know how to do wrong. Do not be quick with your 
mouth, and do not hurry in your heart
226 
to bring speech before God.
227 For God is in 
heaven and you are on earth, so your words should therefore be few. Just as a dream 
comes with much worrying, a fool’s speech comes with many words. When you make 
a vow to God, do not delay to fulfill it. Because he has no pleasure in fools, fulfill 
your vow. It is better not to make a vow than to make one and not fulfill it. Do not let 
your mouth lead yourself into sin. And do not say to the messenger that it was a 
mistake. But fear God,
228
 or God may be angry at what you say and destroy the work 
of your hands. Much dreaming and many words are meaningless. (Eccl. 4:17-5:6)  
 
This pericope seems to be a sort of dramatic mini-narrative: evoking memorable images of a 
sequence of events—a bumbling fool who enters the temple, misspeaks his vow, and hastens 
to protest to temple officials “my vow was a mistake!”229  
In discussing this passage, Nili Shupak has suggested that this passage embodies the 
value of “listening” as “a characteristic quality of the wise man.”230 While listening (or, 
                                                        
225 Adele Berlin, Marc Zvi Brettler, and Michael A. Fishbane, The Jewish Study Bible: Jewish 
Publication Society [JPS] Tanakh Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). The JPS version 
translates this phrase, “Be not overeager to go. . .” 
226 “‘[H]eart’ sometimes designates the organ of speech; cf. Isa. 33.18; 59.13; Ps. 19.15; 49.4; Job 
8.10[.]” Berlin, Brettler, and Fishbane, JPS. 
227 This pericope may also seem to be interested in “internal” speech—but the phrase “do not be hasty 
in your heart to utter anything before God” (Ecclesiastes 5:1 [2]) should be understood in the sense of “do not 
let your heart be hasty to utter anything before God.” Crenshaw presents this phrase as a “reference to discourse 
with a distant deity” (James L. Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions: Collected Writings on Old 
Testament Wisdom (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1995), 216)—though admits that this discourse is less 
related to prayer than it is to vows. He continues, “Gerhard von Rad correctly perceived that Qoheleth had given 
up on trying to enter into dialogue with God” (216). In Ben Sira, on the other hand, there is mention of internal 
speech as prayer. 
228 The JPS edition moves this phrase up from verse 6 for clarity. Berlin, Brettler, and Fishbane, JPS. 
229 See Bartor, “Juridical Dialogue,” 451. 
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simply, silence) may have been a sagacious characteristic, this passage does not emphasise 
listening so much as it emphasises circumspection in vow-making:  “To draw near to listen is 
better than to offer sacrifices like the fools…” (Eccles. 4:17) suggesting that one would do 
better to just listen, rather than vow too hastily, with little thought to the conditions of the 
vow. The oral vow did not have the inherent self-editing, or at least slow pace (with added 
time to give greater thought), that laborious dictation and writing would require.  
 Even with their severity of binding power, made all the more severe by the ease and 
speed with which they could be made, oaths seem to have been an expected, even customary 
sign of commitment and righteousness. Qoheleth equates those who are afraid to take oaths 
with “the wicked, the bad, the unclean, the sinful.”231 If someone fears verbal commitment, 
they understand the binding nature of it; they understand that to make a false oath or to bind 
oneself with no intention of follow-through is to incite wrath both human and divine. To fear 
making an oath emphasises the power and commitment of this act of speech. The 
commitment of uttering a vow was so great that one would be foolish to hasten their speech: 
rather, one should remain silent until they are fully prepared, rather than “make a mistake” in 
speaking their vow.
232
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
230 Nili Shupak, “Learning Methods in Ancient Israel,” Vetus Testamentum Vol. 53, No. 3 (2003): 417: 
“In the Ancient Near East listening was a characteristic quality of the wise man (Prov I 5; xv 31; Job xxxii 2, 
34). The importance ascribed to listening in ancient Israeli is shown by the common saying that compares it to 
offering a sacrifice: ‘To draw near to listen (lismoa) is better than to offer sacrifices like the fools…’ (Eccles. Iv 
17); ‘Behold, to listen (s’moa’) is better than to sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams,’ says the prophet 
(1 Sam. 15:22).” 
231 Eccl. 9:2: “All share a common destiny—the righteous and the wicked, the good and the bad, the 
clean and the unclean, those who offer sacrifices and those who do not. As it is with the good, so with the sinful; 
as it is with those who take oaths, so with those who are afraid to take them.” 
232 This is why conditional clauses and careful framing of the vow were so important. In a way, 
prophecies are a species of the oath and also include conditional clauses or contingencies. (i.e. “except you 
repent, the city will be destroyed). This may have been treated traditionally in scholarship as a way to hedge 
against unfulfilled prophecy, that is, a way to remain a reputable seer even if a prophecy does not come to pass, 
these conditional clauses also (or perhaps alternatively) indicate the extent to which speech . By uttering or 
recording a prophecy, a prophet was setting in motion or summoning divine activity that was so powerful or 
unavoidable that it needed to be mitigated by these conditional clauses. Walter Moberly’s discussion of ancient 
Israelite prophecy emphasises its perlocutionary nature: “In essence, prophecy—at least, as articulated in the 
books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel and as presupposed in much other prophetic literature—is relational, engaging 
language that seeks a response.” (Moberly, “Micaiah ben Imlah,” 8.) In seeking a more immediate response, 
prophecy hopes to avoid the more distant calamities it foretells. Like oaths, the conditional language of 
prophecy is the guarantor of action: it seeks to initiate a change in behavior or the fulfillment of some promised 
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The Vow and the Community 
 As a spoken communication to the divine, and not a written one, the vow’s description 
is quite egalitarian. As noted above, in other social contexts in similar time and space, making 
vows required the not inconsiderable resources for writing (variously, tools, clay, and know-
how or the ability to hire a scribe with these). This necessarily limited vow-making to only 
those people who were able to access these resources. Here, however, the literate class 
portrays vow-making as open to all (and dangerously so, as the Proverbs intimate), allowing 
all to freely communicate with—and establish a contract of sorts with—deity, simply by 
saying His name in certain formulaic phrases.  
 This vow-making system would facilitate community interactions – perhaps nowhere 
more so than in the juridical setting. The outcome of disputes was, in many cases, based not 
on what actually happened but on the risks one was willing to take—or in other words, the 
oaths they were willing to make. Oaths formed the foundation of Israelite legal procedure. 
Having reviewed the spoken, committing nature of the ancient Israelite vow, we can 
also analyse it in terms of speech-act and language theories to understand more about how the 
literate class perceived ancient Israelite society. The vow was an overt action of speech, a 
“speech-act” that aided in making orderly social interaction possible in all levels and 
functions of society. It had to be spoken in the ancient Israelite context.
233
  
 Building upon Wittgenstein’s and Winch’s ideas about language, the meaning of the 
vow—the understanding of the oath formula and the words of which it is generally 
composed—cannot be reduced to a “singular essentialist meaning.”234 Each instance of a vow 
was dependent upon the particular, essential role it played in the dynamic socio-linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                                            
action. As discussed above, prophecy seems to have had significant written and oral components. In either case, 
what the prophets reveal is always conditional—to protect their communication and ensure that what they 
foretell does not happen on certain conditions, as the utterance is fully committing. 
233 As G. B. Gray stated in his discourse on the ancient Israelite vow, “An intention only becomes 
binding when it has been embodied in speech, and so gained an independent existence[.]” Gray, Numbers, 415.  
234 George and Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent,” 273.  
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systems of ancient Israel.
 
 To speak a vow was to engage in a speech act, giving “meaning to 
the activities which make up social reality.” 235 Speaking the vow affected—and, in a sense, 
effected—ancient Israelite reality. It was a form of speech that had been particularised to 
denote a significant commitment in multiple varieties of circumstances. The speakers of vows 
shaped and sustained Israelite culture while their own understandings of the nature of the 
physical and the social world were continuously updated and reinforced. It was a significant 
social action.  
More apt here, however, is Austin’s speech-act theory. The vow was often voiced in a 
public place when made directly to YHWH (accompanying the sacrifice in a temple). When 
not made to YHWH, but while still appealing to the divine realm, vows were made in the 
temporal realm between two (or more) parties. The vow was enacted with performative 
language and brought about change. To adopt the speech-act theory terms defined by Austin 
and Searle, it was at once illocutionary and perlocutionary: in itself it was an act—the act of 
vowing, or oath-making—and it also inherently, in its vocalisation, achieved something—by 
vowing, for example, a person became a Nazirite, or, more specifically, by vowing, Jephthah 
and his army are said to have defeated the Ammonites. Thus the “vow” as a speech act is 
illocutionary in its promising to do something, and perlocutionary in its binding of the 
speaker (among a variety of other possible perlocutionary effects, like reassuring or 
threatening someone). To use Searle’s categories, the vow was a commissive act: it 
committed its speaker to certain behaviours or actions.
236
 
That vows were implicitly accepted without any indication of suspicion, at least in the 
recorded data, indicates that both the speaker and the hearer understood the vow as an act of 
                                                        
235
 Id. 
236 At the same time, however, it could be supplemented by or made up of other categories of 
illocution: assertives (i.e., a witness in a juridical setting might vow that something is either true or false), 
directives (i.e. causing a second party to commit to certain behaviours or actions), expressives (i.e. vows made 
in anger), and declaratives (i.e. vows which changed a certain state of affairs upon being pronounced, like 
Nazirite vows).  
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full obligation. The vow can be seen as the enactment of hexis in that it enacted significant 
intentions. In the framing of the vow, a speaker displayed their judgements of their own and 
deity’s abilities, and expected the vow to be unequivocally trusted, as it was unequivocally 
binding. The vow demonstrates that in ancient Israel, speech could be wholly binding; the 
word was powerful and sometimes dangerous (cf. Num. 30).  
 The specific language of the vow is rooted in socio-cultural context—that is, devoted to 
the God of Israel, and allowing a number of transactions to go forward where otherwise 
dishonesty and mistrust might weigh too heavily on the system.
237
 In the vow-making attested 
in narrative texts, the commitment of the vow is ratified by the response of the addressees. 
These narratives never question the commitment of the vow,
238
 only whether or not the party 
in question will honour that commitment. These texts never suggest that one who has not 
fulfilled a vow will escape its consequences, even in the skeptical book of Ecclesiastes.  
Choosing to be Silent Rather than Make a Vow 
Against this backdrop, ancient Israelite texts advocate remaining silent rather than 
taking a vow. This was especially so in the legal arena, where oaths were often used either as 
evidence or, sometimes, as the instigation of legal disputes (i.e. an indictment for an 
unfulfilled oath). The seriousness of the oath would allow ancient Israelites to settle conflicts 
with more finality: even if a party was silent and refused to take the oath, that could still 
resolve the conflict with as much finality. 
Beginning in the patriarchal period and continuing through the monarchic, several 
oaths are described as taken at an altar.
239
 In the test for an unfaithful wife of Num. 5, the 
                                                        
237 In an interesting point, McDowell argues that the “formalization of ritual speech decreases its 
accessibility to both potential performers and audiences; this suppression of the referential function enhances its 
efficacy.” J. H. McDowell, “The Semiotic Constitution of Kamsa Ritual Language. Language in Society Vol. 12 
(1983): 23-46. The divine aspect of the vow, i.e., “in the name of the Lord,” may have lost its referential 
function and simultaneously become more effective as a trope in its own right. 
238 The identity of one party or another is ratified by the “actions of another who assumes a 
complementary identity toward him/her.”  Goodwin and Heritage, “Conversation Analysis,” 292. 
239 1 Kgs. 8:31;  2 Chr. 6:22; Gen. 26:31 ;  Gen. 31:53 
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priest puts an accused woman under oath, essentially affirming that if she is guilty she will be 
cursed in a sort of trial by ordeal.
240
 The woman must submit to the oath vocally—her speech 
ratifying the priest’s curse. The outcome of the ritual would provide the evidence in a case 
where no witnesses or physical evidence existed. Failing to vocalise acceptance of this oath 
would be akin to confession of the misdeed.  
Exodus describes the making of an oath to settle a robbery dispute. Such an oath 
would end the matter: the owner of the missing property in question “is to accept this, and no 
restitution is required.”241 Proverbs describes the failure to take an oath as one’s own 
undoing: “The accomplices of thieves are their own enemies; they are put under oath and 
dare not testify.”242 Such silence could only be interpreted as guilt—a reticence to make 
oneself accursed before God, who ultimately presided over the law. In this legal environment, 
taking false oaths was the definition of depravity.
243
 With no material evidence at hand, legal 
disputes were decided upon oaths and witnesses. Weighty fines, among other severe 
punishments, were assessed to false witnesses as a deterrent to undermining the judicial 
system.  
The book of Job also can be understood as a tribunal of sorts, with a series of 
accusations between Job, God, and his friends. After hearing his companions’ words, Job 
asks, “Can anyone bring charges against me? If so, I will be silent and die.”244 Here Job 
concedes that, were he guilty of any sin or crime, he would be silent. As he is not, however, 
he continues to answer his companions’ accusations—eventually speaking with God.  
 Other texts describe silence on the part of the injured party. In Genesis 34, for 
example, Jacob is silent after being informed of Hamor’s wrong against his daughter Dinah, 
                                                        
240 Num. 5:19-22 
241 Ex. 22:11 
242 Prov. 29:24  
243 Hos. 10:4 ; To illustrate the extent to which Israel is deceitful, guilty, and soon to receive the Lord’s 
destruction, Hosea writes that “lawsuits spring up like poisonous weeds in a plowed field” as the people of Israel 
take false oaths. 
244 Job 13:19 
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though his silence seems to have an adjourning function, postponing the case until all who 
should be involved are called from the field. Similarly, in 1 Sam. 10:27, Saul also keeps silent 
as the wronged party: “But some troublemakers said, "How can this fellow save us?" They 
despised him and brought him no gifts. But Saul kept silent.” These offenders “reviled 
against the king,” and could have been punished.245 Here, Saul’s keeping silent is indicative 
of withholding an accusation and avoiding any ultimately unnecessary dispute.  
Conclusion 
 The vow allowed ancient Israelites to create enforceable ties individually with one 
another, as a self-perpetuating mechanism for community cooperation without a formal 
bureaucratic or policing system. In theory, it was highly efficient and, by all accounts, was 
also effective. Ancient Israelite speakers were seen as “enacting intentions” with their speech, 
and thus speaking was a form of high risk-taking. The ancient Israelite scribal class portrays  
the vow as fully committing within the community, facilitating economic transactions, 
deciding legal disputes, and enabling a number of complex interactions that might not 
otherwise have been so feasible.  
Many wisdom texts advocate remaining silent rather than making a vow, even when 
silence was not simply the lack of speech, but was itself a significant action. In legal settings, 
for example, silence could indicate guilt. In the ancient Israelite community, speech is 
portrayed as a way to negotiate reality and silence was a form of assent. Even when accused, 
silence allowed the guilty to essentially assent to the accusation without formally 
incriminating him or herself, or creating further conflicts and endless words or the temptation 
to make a false oath. This is because the spoken word could bind and expose. 
 
 
                                                        
245 Although Saul’s kingship may not yet have been recognised, and as the first king of the united 
monarchy, this law may not have yet been in force. 
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Chapter 6: God, Community, and Speech 
 While previous chapters have referenced the relationship between certain Israelite 
theological conceptions and various communicative practices, this chapter explores these 
theological conceptions in terms of speech. It does so by exploring depictions of language as 
carrying material force and by exploring the perception that God was audience for speech. It 
builds on the observation made in chapter 4 that while writing was involved in divine 
communication down the line, or from the divine, only speech was involved in 
communications made up the line, or to the divine. 
 This seems to be related to ancient Israelite “theology,” if that term can be applied, with  
a conception of writing as limited, static, predictable, and “peaceful”—associated with the 
positivity and peace of God—and speech, while it could have these attributes, being more 
unpredictable, potentially noisy, and potentially excessive—“ungodly” in these latter 
attributes. This idea will be explored in an analysis of wisdom texts. The term “theology” 
may be a bit imprecise here, but it is intended not in the sense of a systematic set of beliefs so 
much as in the sense of that which is related to the divine—here, the nature of the perceived 
relationship between speech and God in ancient Israel.  
Ancient Israelite Language as Action  
 The Mosaic Law was concrete, built on action. In such an environment, speech was 
commitment. By and large, the thought’s relationship to an act, whether relatively good or 
evil, seems to have little bearing on how the consequence of that action is described in the 
biblical sources. There are some exceptions: the most notable seems to have been the custom 
of cities of refuge, which were provided for accidental or non-intentional murders (see Num. 
35, Deut. 19, Josh. 20). Moreover, it is difficult to argue—especially across so many 
centuries—that there was one view, even one prevailing view, of language in ancient Israel.  
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Still, in many cases, it seems that speech is assumed by the scribal class to be, as will 
be explored, “dynamic” and “essential”—particularly when related to the divine realm, and 
regardless of thought or intention. The “noetic” and “dynamic” views of language refer 
respectively to the word conveying an intellectual idea in the former, and to the word as 
material force in the latter.
246
 Von Rad has seen these two views as evolutionary and binary, 
arguing that the modern use of language is almost exclusively noetic, antithetical to the 
primarily dynamic use it had in the ancient world.
247
 While this seems to be an 
overgeneralisation,
248
 it certainly appears to be true that more of ancient Israelite 
communication was dynamic than noetic—and certainly more of ancient Israelite 
communication was dynamic than our own communication today.  
Similarly, Aristotle described words as “essentially” connected to the things they 
denote. This viewpoint seems true of ancient Israelite words, especially those related to the 
divine realm. For example, Isa. 55:10-11 discusses God’s speech:  
As the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and do not return to it without 
watering the earth and making it bud and flourish, so that it yields seed for the sower 
and bread for the eater, so is my word that goes out from my mouth: It will not return 
to me empty, but will accomplish what I desire and achieve the purpose for which I 
sent it. 
 
                                                        
246 O. Proksch, “The Word of God in the Old Testament,” Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament (ed. G. Kittel, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), vol. 4, 92-3; G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1965), vol. 2, 80.  
247 Id. This binary assessment is erroneous, in the first place, in its assertion of an evolutionary view of 
language, and, in the second place, in its assumption that these views of language are the only two that exist—
and in an either/or arrangement, at that. While it may be true that, as Malinowski has suggested, language 
frames thought “only in certain very special uses among a civilised community… in worlds of science and 
philosophy… to control ideas and to make them the common property of civilised mankind,”  Malinowski, 
“Meaning in Primitive Languages,” 316. 
248 Not all of modern language is used to convey thought, and, similarly, it does not seem that all of 
ancient language was used in a functional, material way. On the contrary, in both periods, if we understand the 
attestation of literature as signification of written thought, both views of language are present. Even in some 
“primitive” societies, where much speech is “deeply implicated in the daily purposes of life, and in that sense, 
highly effective and functional.” Ernest Gellner, Language and Solitude: Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the 
Habsburg Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146. Oral poetic traditions suggest higher 
thought-communicating life philosophies. Derek Kidner, in his commentary on Proverbs, notes several themes 
related to “words” in Proverbs, one of which is the “weakness of words”: they cannot replace deeds and are not 
guaranteed to compel response or alter circumstances (see Prov. 14:23, 29:19). They can also be deceptive 
(24:12; 26:23-28; 28:24). (46-48). Additionally, as Thiselton notes, blessings and cursings are not irrevocable 
(287). There seem to have been both views of language, then, in the ancient Israelite world. 
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In creation texts, too, things—variously the earth, light, plants, animals, and humans, among 
others—are brought into being through the speech of divine creators.249  
 When the biblical sources depict humans speaking, many words still seem to maintain 
this essentialism, though most examples are associated with the divine realm, which might 
lend its essentialist character. The vow invoked deity, and the prophecy was a message from 
deity. The ancient Israelites literate class viewed the words of the oath as imbued with a sort 
of connective power; that it was these words which inherently signified oath-making, and that 
there was an essential “meaning” that existed outside of and that had emerged with these 
words.
250
 Additionally, in the prophetic texts, there is an array of ostensible evidence for the 
above view; with prophecies, once pronounced, irretractable, as if the action of speech had by 
its essentialist characteristic set divine workings into motion (see, for example, Deut. 18:15-
22; Jer. 1:9-10, 5:14, 23:29, Isa. 44:26-27; Amos 7:17).
 251
  These ideas related to human 
speech are predicated on the divine being able to “hear” or receive the earthly 
communication. It seems that speech acts were dynamic, essentialist events, as well as 
                                                        
249 See Gen. 1-2 for a description of the ancient Israelite creation; Fergus Fleming and Alan Lothian, 
Ancient Egypt’s Myths and Beliefs (New York: Rosen, 2012), 25, for a description of Ptah’s creation text. 
250 See, for example, Anthony C. Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics: Collected Works with New 
Essays (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 53-66; Procksch, “The Word of God”; von Rad, Old Testament 
Theology. Modern language philosophers—Wittgenstein, in particular—have countered “linguistic 
essentialism,” a view typically attributed to Aristotle, who described words as “essentially” connected to the 
things they denote.  
 
251 Prophecies also include conditional clauses or contingencies, and might also be considered a sort of vow. (i.e. 
“except you repent, the city will be destroyed). While these may have been treated traditionally in scholarship as 
a way to hedge against unfulfilled prophecy – that is, a way to remain a reputable seer even if a prophecy does 
not come to pass – these conditional clauses may also (or perhaps alternatively) indicate the extent in which 
these prophecies were believed. By uttering or recording a prophecy, a prophet was setting in motion or 
summoning divine activity that was so powerful or unavoidable that it needed to be mitigated by these 
conditional clauses. 
 Walter Moberly’s discussion of ancient Israelite prophecy emphasises its perlocutionary nature: “In 
essence, prophecy – at least, as articulated in the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel and as presupposed in much 
other prophetic literature – is relational, engaging language that seeks a response.” Moberly, “Micaiah ben 
Imlah,” 8. In seeking a more immediate response, prophecy hopes to avoid the more distant calamities it 
foretells. Like oaths, the conditional language of prophecy is the guarantor of action: it seeks to initiate a change 
in behavior or the fulfillment of some promised action. What the prophets reveal is always conditional—to 
protect their communication and ensure that what they foretell does not happen on certain conditions, as the 
utterance is fully committing. 
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present before God. The latter of these characteristics requires further inquiry, as an aspect of 
the “theology” of speech. 
God as Audience for Everyday Speech 
 The texts seem to assume that God was audience for everyday speech, not audience for 
any forms of writing. In this section, I focus on the salient points of this concept in the 
Hebrew Bible, especially as contained in the text of Qoheleth 5:1-6 [4:17-5:5], which 
describes the folly of loquacity (“many words mark the speech of a fool… many words are 
meaningless”) and the idea of God as the audience for speech (“do not be hasty in your heart 
to utter anything before God. God is in heaven and you are on earth, so let your words be 
few”). It is quite clear in biblical wisdom, and throughout the Hebrew Bible, that 
overabundant or hasty speech is considered foolish—even “wicked.” But beyond the content 
and quality of speech, certain spatial and invocational aspects of discourse are seen to 
intensify its potential of being heard (whether favourably or not) by the divine. Thus, we can 
understand mores of speech as founded in part on this understanding of God as audience. 
 First, ancient Israelites are only portrayed as communicating with YHWH through 
speech, not writing. While YHWH himself is depicted as communicating through writing, the 
prophets’ communications are always described as oral, and writing is nowhere described as 
a means of communication up the line in the biblical texts (←), addressed to God. So it 
appears that speech was the vehicle for communication with YHWH, and the features of this 
specific form of communication (as opposed to writing) seem to inform many of the concerns 
described in the texts.  
Unlike writing, speech is a seemingly inexhaustible resource; there are no real 
intrinsic or physical limitations to our ability to speak, other than anomalies like stuttering. It 
requires little physical energy (and too often, as the ancient scribes lament, little mental 
energy as well). There seems, then, to be little physical advantage, as it were, to 
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circumspection in speech. Any such limitations in terms of speech to the divine seem 
motivated instead by the sociological and, to the extent that “theological” can be abstracted 
therefrom, also theological.  
Second, the location of speech or the substance of speech might make speech more 
susceptible to being heard by the divine. In Ecclesiastes 5, the temple is depicted as a location 
where speech is heard by the divine, and ancient Israelites consistently refer to their speech 
being heard by the divine. Mal. 3:16 describes people talking with another after hearing a 
divine prophecy, with YHWH listening to and hearing their conversation, then writing “a 
scroll of remembrance… concerning those who feared the Lord and honoured his name.” 
Such speech, then, directly or indirectly invoking the divine realm—whether spatially (i.e. in 
the temple) or thematically (i.e. discussing the divine)—seems to be seen as highly 
susceptible to being overheard by the divine. Qoheleth maintains this attitude, asserting that 
those who fear God are reverent before him (8:12).  
Third, biblical texts encourage communication to or before the divine to reflect divine 
qualities. In Ecclesiastes 4:17-5:6, the audience is instructed to “let your words be few” 
because “God is in heaven and you are on earth.” Crenshaw presents this passage as a 
“reference to discourse with a distant deity.”252 However, the proposed “distance” between 
heaven and earth does not seem to be motivation for succinctness, as if the distance 
necessitated terse communication such as that of the telegraph, because of the 
“technological” limitations, as it were. Rather, this admonition to limit words, to speak 
efficiently, is further explained with the excursus: “Just as a dream comes with much 
worrying, a fool’s speech comes with many words.” and later, in poetic echo and completion 
of the section, “Much dreaming and many words are meaningless.” 
                                                        
252 Crenshaw, Urgent Advice, 216. 
87 
 
 Thus, limiting one’s words because God is in heaven and people are on earth seems to 
be a theological reference more than a geographical one. God’s being in heaven is a 
description of his divine environment, one of peace and intellectual loftiness—where much is 
understood, much more, apparently, than on earth, and where less needs to be said. On earth, 
there is less wisdom and understanding, more disagreement and discussion required. A 
parallel concept seems to be present in Isaiah:  
For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the 
Lord. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways 
and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Isa. 55:8-11). 
 
This passage similarly uses physical distance to illustrate theological difference. It illustrates 
the theological distinction, in both form and content, between heavenly and earthly 
communication, which mirrors the physical distinction or distance between heaven and 
earth.
253
 
 As discussed above, it seems that writing was more easily ascribed to God as it is 
innately limited, static, predictable, and “peaceful,” while speech is not innately so; speech’s 
innate potential for unpredictability, loudness, and excess is much greater. For example, 
Eliphaz describes Job’s speech as hindering devotion to God and prompted by sin: 
Would a wise person answer with empty notions or fill their belly with the hot east 
wind? Would they argue with useless words, with speeches that have no value? But 
you even undermine piety and hinder devotion to God. Your sin prompts your mouth; 
you adopt the tongue of the crafty. Your own mouth condemns you, not mine;  your 
own lips testify against you.
254
 
 
Elihu makes his own response, presenting a reality where God speaks in order to correct and 
instruct those on earth. He exposes inefficient speech as foolish—lacking the understanding 
                                                        
253
 Katharine Dell emphasises the tension between divine and human knowledge (wisdom) in Job, 
supporting this emphasis with Elihu’s speech in Job 32-37. Elihu rebukes Job, accusing him in 34:35 of 
“speaking ‘without knowledge’ (da’at) and ‘insight’” (“Does God Behave Ethically in the Book of Job?” in 
Ethical and Unethical in the Old Testament: God and Humans in Dialogue (ed. Katharine Dell; New York: T & 
T Clark, 2010), 181). 
254 Job 15:2-6 
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that he sees as divinely endowed. When one fills up the air with speech, there is no room for, 
as Elihu put it, “the breath of the Almighty” to pass on understanding (Job 33).  
These ideals are consistent throughout the wisdom corpus: thoughtless, excessive 
speech is ungodly and not appropriate before God. For example, Qoheleth emphasises the 
importance of reverence before God (8:12) and Prov. 29 distinguishes between one who 
“speaks in haste” and a “fool,” suggesting that foolish speech, while still far from the norm, is 
better than rash, impulsive speech.
255
 The Proverbs value the “peace” that proper 
communication provides. “Better a dry crust with peace and quiet than a house full of 
feasting, with strife.” (Prov. 17:1; see also 29:9, 17). Peace is a ubiquitous community goal, 
and the proverbs seek to achieve this peace by idealising careful, quiet speech as godly and 
providing rules for this proper communication; rules that, if followed, would minimise 
community conflicts and disputes. This is related to restraint in speech, as will be discussed 
below in chapter 7.  
Finally, in later texts, this idea of divine purview over communication seems to 
extend to that which is unspoken—to thoughts. This is clearly the case by the time of the 
New Testament texts, with Jesus’ sermon on the mount equating, for example, mental 
adultery with physical adultery (i.e. Matt 5:28). This idea may have been present by the time 
of Qoheleth, who refers in chapter 5 to being quick with the mouth or the heart in uttering 
anything before God, which seems to matter-of-factly assume that thoughts are (a) as 
accessible to God as speech and (b) judged by God like speech. In this particular passage, 
Qoheleth is referring to thoughts of one within the temple, which may indicate a spatial 
anomaly. Or, this passage might simply be referring to the heart as the spring of speech, as in 
Prov. 4:23: “Above all else, guard your heart, for everything you do flows from it.” If 
                                                        
255 Prov. 29:20: Do you see someone who speaks in haste? There is more hope for a fool than for them. 
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Qoheleth is actually describing thoughts as under divine purview, however, then it seems to 
be as an emerging concept in a late Israelite text.   
Ultimately, it seems that the ancient Israelite scribal class, especially during the 
earliest periods, did not consider thoughts to be accessible and assessable, as such. Rather, 
that class depicts speech as the means by which community members were evaluated by the 
community and by God. There is much greater emphasis on what is said and done than one’s 
thoughts or intentions—when the latter are mentioned, it is only in conjunction with action or 
as a means to better control action. The later attitude, which sees thought or intention as 
important as action, seems to be just that: later. Silence, then, does not seem to be significant 
as a “placeholder” for action, or as an indication of thought or contemplation. Instead it is in 
itself a significant action, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
 In sum, it appears that the ancient Israelite scribal class saw divine speech as 
“essentialist,” bringing about events simply by speaking about them. Insofar as community 
members’ own speech invoked the divine realm, it also is portrayed as having this essentialist 
nature. Although it is difficult to assert that speech in general was perceived as having an 
essential nature, when one is described as speaking a vow in the biblical texts, they are 
understood to have committed to the divine realm. A vow-maker needed to fulfil that 
commitment in order to avoid the divine consequences. For this reason, the biblical texts 
advise against making too many vows, or, for that matter, making too many long-winded 
speeches, whether to heaven or earth. Restraint and reverence in communication were 
associated with God, while only fools spoke impulsively. This idea may have led to later 
theological development: in communicating like God, one almost became “nearer” to him. In 
that, theological difference – and thus the divine distance – was decreased. The concept of 
“thoughts” being open to the divine, however, seems a clearly later development. Instead, 
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speech was the means by which you were evaluated by the community and God. Thus, as will 
be discussed in chapter 7, silence could be a compelling alternative to speech, especially 
when that speech could expose one to social and divine judgments.  
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Chapter 7: The Effect of Community on Speech 
Where the vow was a formal, formulaic communicative act, the biblical texts also 
express concern with the commitment of speech in more informal situations. There are 
several informal social protocols regarding speech throughout wisdom literature. Chattiness 
and imprudent speech, for example, are described as potential faults in everyday, less formal 
situations—potential indications of Kripke’s “incorrigible deviance,” as discussed in the 
introduction. These kinds of protocols were shaped and enforced by the community—or at 
least, a certain class of the community—and are portrayed as significant cues for social 
achievement. The major themes of these informal or implicit social protocols involve using 
speech and deliberate silence to (1) communicate respect (giving silence—“deference”—to 
those whom one respects), (2) exercise restraint (the virtues of speaking with discretion and 
follies of failing to do so), and (3) communicate correction (if, when and how one should give 
or receive correction). Buttressing these themes are considerations of social situation: how 
speech and restraint are markers of relative class through which individuals assert or 
subordinate themselves. Some speech protocols apply to specific social classes or vocations, 
while others make specific classifications of social standing based on an individual’s 
“discretion” in speech. 
 Again, one must acknowledge the distinction between ideal and practice in the texts’ 
discussion of speech—while at the same time recognising that the two can, and sometimes 
do, coincide. It may be impossible to reconstruct the speech of ancient Israelites, but it is 
possible to identify ancient Israelite speech ideals, at least as perceived by the scribal class.  
Respect and Social Status 
Silence – or “peace” – is described as a great marker of respect in the wisdom texts. 
Job describes his lack of peace and quietness as one of his chief misfortunes (Job 3:24) and 
the object of his fear and dread (3:25-26). Much of his own speech is asking for peace from 
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his companions: “will your long-winded speeches never end?” (16:3; see also 21:3). In 
contrast to this later “turmoil,” Job’s friends are initially “silent” upon joining him 
immediately after he is struck with catastrophe.
256
This has been interpreted as one of the 
phases of ritual lament: his friends are silent out of respect.
257
 Job is the one to break the 
silence, allowing his friends to, in turn, also speak.
258
 Generally, it appears the grief-stricken, 
like Job, as well as the elderly and those with otherwise high social status “earned” highly-
valued silence out of respect.
259
  
Indeed, according to Job, before his calamities his social status commanded silence as 
a sign of respect. He describes his social reception using speech-acts, which had previously 
been respectful: 
When I went to the gate of the city and took my seat in the public square, the young 
men saw me and stepped aside and the old men rose to their feet; the chief men 
refrained from speaking and covered their mouths with their hands; the voices of the 
nobles were hushed, and their tongues stuck to the roof of their mouths. Whoever 
heard me spoke well of me, and those who saw me commended me (Job 29:7-11). 
 
People listened to me expectantly, waiting in silence for my counsel. After I had 
spoken, they spoke no more; my words fell gently on their ears. They waited for me 
as for showers and drank in my words as the spring rain. When I smiled at them, they 
scarcely believed it; the light of my face was precious to them. I chose the way for 
them and sat as their chief; I dwelt as a king among his troops; I was like one who 
comforts mourners (Job 29:21-30:1). 
 
After his calamities, however, Job describes his social reception using scornful speech-acts: 
 
People open their mouths to jeer at me; they strike my cheek in scorn and unite 
together against me (Job 16:10). 
 
Surely mockers surround me; my eyes must dwell on their hostility. . . . God has made 
me a byword to everyone, a man in whose face people spit (Job 17:2, 6). 
 
                                                        
256 Job 2:13-3:1 “Then they sat on the ground with him for seven days and seven nights. No one said a 
word to him, because they saw how great his suffering was. After this, Job opened his mouth and cursed the day 
of his birth.” 
257
 See, for example, Norbert Lohfink, “Enthielten die im Alten Testament bezeugten Klageriten eine 
Phase des Schweigens?” Vetus Testamentum Vol. 12, No. 3 (1962): 260-277. 
258  This is likely related to social decorum; Job describes his high social standing, where people would not 
speak before him, in chapters 29-30. 
259 As Elihu notes in the preface to his speech, the elderly commanded the place of honour in conversation and 
thus were entitled to respect and its accompanying silence, or at least communicative deference (32:4, 6-12).  
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I summon my servant, but he does not answer, though I beg him with my own mouth. 
. . . Even the little boys scorn me; when I appear, they ridicule me (Job 19:16-18). 
 
But now they mock me, men younger than I, whose fathers I would have disdained to 
put with my sheep dogs (Job 30:1).   
 
And now those young men mock me in song; I have become a byword among them. 
They detest me and keep their distance; they do not hesitate to spit in my face. Now 
that God has unstrung my bow and afflicted me, they throw off restraint in my 
presence. . . . Terrors overwhelm me; my dignity is driven away as by the wind, my 
safety vanishes like a cloud (Job 30:9-15). 
 
Oh, that I had someone to hear me! I sign now my defense—let the Almighty answer 
me (Job 31:33-35). 
 
Despite the honour of his age, Job’s social situation is perceived as so lowly that he loses the 
social respect, or the silence of deference.  
 Job’s loss of wealth may have been a significant factor in this result. The book of Ben 
Sira similarly illustrates the difference between the rich and the poor by using contrasting 
speech acts: 
If the rich person slips, many come to the rescue; he speaks unseemly words, but they 
justify him. If the humble person slips, they even criticise him; he talks sense, but is not 
given a hearing. The rich person speaks and all are silent; they extol to the clouds what 
he says. The poor person speaks and they say, “Who is this fellow?” and should he 
stumble, they even push him down (13:21-23). 
 
Silence seems to have been highly valued, something “earned” not only by old age or grief, 
but also by wealth.
260
 This is not to say that the wealthy or high-stationed were automatically 
                                                        
260 On the other hand, the “poor” were expected to maintain this respect, and, it seems, guard their speech most 
carefully. It is again difficult to know exactly who belonged to this class. The Proverbs provide some rationale 
for circumspection in speech for lower classes: “One who loves a pure heart and who speaks with grace will 
have the king for a friend” (22:11). Proper speech is seen as a sign of wisdom and necessary for vocational 
success. Prov. 16:13 advises that “Kings take pleasure in honest lips; they value the one who speaks what is 
right,” while “Sending a message by the hands of a fool is like cutting off one’s feet or drinking poison.” (Prov. 
26:6-11 “Sending a message by the hands of a fool is like cutting off one’s feet or drinking poison. 7 Like the 
useless legs of one who is lame is a proverb in the mouth of a fool. 8 Like tying a stone in a sling is the giving of 
honour to a fool. 9 Like a thornbush in a drunkard’s hand is a proverb in the mouth of a fool. 10 Like an archer 
who wounds at random is one who hires a fool or any passer-by. 11 As a dog returns to its vomit, so fools repeat 
their folly.”) The figurative language warning against “sending a message by the hands of a fool” seems to 
indicate that this message is oral. Thus, a message is not to be given to the fool, but to someone who speaks 
properly. If we understand Prov. 26:6-11 as a group, then sending a message orally was perhaps an honour and 
required some skill—not to be entrusted to a random “fool or any passer-by.” Qoheleth, too, does acknowledge 
some advantages of speaking wisely with superiors: “If a ruler’s anger rises against you, do not leave your post; 
calmness can lay great offenses to rest” (10:4) and “The quiet words of the wise are more to be heeded than the 
shouts of a ruler of fools” (9:17).  
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“wise,” and the poor “foolish,” but rather that social respect was borne out through 
communicative deference, and the valuation of respect depended on who and when. Thus, 
social expectations regarding speech and silence are portrayed as being built in to social 
class:  the rich, elderly, or aggrieved are given respectful silence, and, as Ben Sira more 
directly suggests, their speech is highly valued. Those not in these classes, however, are not 
afforded respectful silence, but generally rebuked, mocked, criticised, or ignored. 
Restraint and Discretion in the Community 
Regardless of social station, on the other hand, restraint and discretion are described 
as communicative ideals for all in ancient Israel. Qoheleth famously describes a “season” for 
everything: “a time to be silent and a time to speak” (Ecc. 3:7b). Restraint (המרע) and 
discretion (המזמ) form a major theme of biblical wisdom literature, and this section will 
examine both of these terms in turn to better understand these ideals. It will then discuss 
discretion and restraint as making choices between speech and silence. 
המזמ 
המזמ is a mem-prefix participle from the root ממז: “to consider,” “to devise,” “to have 
a thought, plan, purpose.” It conveys a sense of wilfulness and intent—that one’s actions 
have cognitive antecedents. It is not inherently positive; indeed, in Job 21:27, Job tells his 
companions “I know full well what you are thinking, the schemes (תומזמ) by which you 
would wrong me.”261 But in the first section of Proverbs, chapters 1-9, it is used exclusively 
in a positive sense. These are the only such positive attestations corpus-wide: 
2:11 Discretion will protect you, and understanding will guard you. 
 
5:1-2 My son, pay attention to my wisdom, turn your ear to my words of insight, that 
you may maintain discretion and your lips may preserve knowledge. 
 
8:12 I, wisdom, dwell together with prudence; I possess knowledge and discretion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
   
261  See also Job 42:2; Ps. 10:2; 21:11; 37:7; 139:20; Prov. 12:2; 14:17; 24:8; and Jeremiah 11:15 for 
negative associations and Jeremiah 23:20; 30:24; 51:11 for neutral associations 
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המרע 
Like המזמ, the term המרע is not inherently positive; it is probably best understood as 
the neutral “shrewdness,” but its meanings range to describe the more sinister “craftiness” 
(see Ex. 21:14; Josh. 9:4; 1 Sam. 23:22; Ps. 83:3) as well as the more praiseworthy 
“prudence.” One of the objectives of the book of Proverbs, listed in the book’s opening 
verses, is “to give prudence to the naïve” (1:4). In the personification of wisdom in Prov. 8, 
Wisdom calls out, “You who are simple, gain prudence; you who are foolish, set your hearts 
on it” (8:5) She continues, “I, wisdom, dwell with prudence; I possess knowledge and 
discretion” (8:12).  
Prudence seems to be the goal of correction. Whoever heeds correction shows 
prudence (Prov. 15:5). A simple person must be flogged to learn prudence, while someone 
who is discerning requires only a verbal rebuke (19:25). Prudence is an internal state, 
manifested in external speech. This is why Prov. 4:23-24 warns: “Above all else, guard your 
heart, for everything you do flows from it. Keep your mouth free of perversity; keep corrupt 
talk far from your lips.”262  
Thus, it seems to be “prudence” that keeps Job from speaking against God in the 
opening chapters of Job. The narrator takes pains to note that “Job did not sin in what he 
said” (2:10). As William P. Brown has noted, Job proves himself patient amid horrific 
circumstances by not uttering one word against God. He proves himself to be a man of few 
words, embodying a traditional ideal among the sages” 263 Brown continues, “The outcome of 
                                                        
262 See also 6:12-19; 10:8-14, 19-21, 31; 11:9; 25:28 
263 Brown, Character, 53-54: “As he is known in the new Testament and in pseduepigraphical literature 
(see jas. 5:11 and the testament of Job), … His character is one of patient endurance, accepting his misfortunes 
without a word, except in deference to God. Again the key word that most sharply describes Job’s character is 
tam, usually translated ‘blameless,’ along with the cognate term tumma, ‘integrity.’ Integrity ‘denotes a person 
whose conduct is in complete accord with moral and religious norms and whose character is one of utter 
honesty.’ One who is tam is one whose life is coherent and consistent in the ways he or she makes ethical 
choices within the life of the community. Consequently, tumma denotes a certain wholeness or coherence of 
character. While Proverbs focuses almost exclusively on the specific virtues, the book of Job begins with the 
issue of their internal coherence, specifically of their coherence in light of Job’s world turned topsy-turvy. … It 
is precisely this issue that dramatically contrasts the characters of the satan and Job. Gob, the blameless one, 
96 
 
the test will be determined by what Job has to say about God. As in proverbial wisdom, 
speech provides a window into one’s integrity (or lack thereof); it is by nature revelatory of 
one’s character. In Job’s case, accusing God would irrevocably compromise Job’s 
integrity.”264  
 Later, however, Job loses his restraint, bucking against the assumed norms of speech 
that his companions would have him follow. Eliphaz uses rhetorical questions to at once 
describe the discretion of the wise and accuse Job of sin. 
Would a wise person answer with empty notions or fill their belly with the hot east 
wind? Would they argue with useless words, with speeches that have no value? But you 
even undermine piety and hinder devotion to God. Your sin prompts your mouth; you 
adopt the tongue of the crafty. Your own mouth condemns you, not mine; your own lips 
testify against you.
265
 
 
This final sentence is most significant; it emphasises one of the primary reasons for public 
restraint and discretion: to avoid self-condemnation or incrimination.
266
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
would forsake his integrity if he were to assume the role of the satan by charging God with wrongdoing. Perhaps 
that is the sole prerogative of this heavenly prosecutor, or perhaps the satan has overstepped his boundaries. The 
text remains tantalisingly unclear. However, it is obvious that the satan is a foil for Job: Job adamantly refuses to 
do what the satan has done, namely accuse Yahwh of moral indiscretion. Moreover, the respective perspectives 
of Job and his accuser are entirely at odds. On the one hand, the satan accuses God of affording Job special 
privileges, making it worth Job’s while to act piously. On the other hand, if Job were to accuse God of anything, 
it would be for having singled him out for special oppression, as he does in the poetic discharge that follows. 
But Job does no such thing in the opening chapters. Rather, his grip on integrity, as profiled in the prologue, 
remains firm.”  
264 Id.  
265 Job 15:2-6 
266 Person, Scribal Works in an Oral World, 60-61 (speaking of the discourse section vs. the prologue): 
“Job the silent has become Job the verbose, full of bitter complaints. Indeed, the verbal excess with which Job 
com pains gives expression to what is essentially unspeakable in the prose. It is no coincidence, then, that the 
Testament of Job, a later revision of the biblical story, by and large passes over Job's outbursts against God and 
the friends, preferring rather the clear and unambiguous portrait of Job presented in the prologue/epilogue. Yet 
enmeshed in the unorthodox words of his poetic discourse in the biblical account, Job is somehow still able to 
lay claim to his integrity, an integrity that is defamed by his friends, deconstructed by the poet, and reformed by 
Yahweh. In the prologue, Job categorically rejected the curse as an appropriate response. Now his lips are filled 
with cursing (Job’s ‘birthday curse’ in 3:1). … By calling for a reversal of creation, Job curses not only a 
particular day on the calendar, his birthday, but by extension all of creation itself, signified by light, the first act 
of creation (Gen. 1:3). Job cannot but help perceive the world through the prism of his tormented life. His curse 
begins with a structural and theological antithesis to Gen. 1 (job 3:4a) Let that day be darkness! Moreover, the 
reference to the seven days during which Job’s friends dare not speak is a counter echo to the Priestly Creation 
account, in which all creation is brought about and structured by divine speech (Gen. 1:1-2:4a)” (emphasis 
added). 
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Qoheleth also advises speaking with discretion, though his arguments for doing so 
also seem to include pragmatism: “The more the words, the less the meaning, and how does 
that profit anyone?” (6:11) He explains that “fools are consumed by their own lips. At the 
beginning their words are folly; at the end they are wicked madness—and fools multiply 
words” (10:12-14). Here, words can be dangerous; the foolish are unable to control their 
speech, and they consequently harm themselves (and potentially those around them). This is 
perhaps a reference to the more formal, committing modes of communication, like the vow. 
Thus, discretion was clearly valued, it seems, to avoid wasting time, on the one hand, and, on 
the other – and perhaps most importantly – to avoid sinning through speech. 
Discretion as Knowing When to Be Silent 
Discretion or restraint might also be described as knowing when to “refrain” from 
speaking. Some work has been completed on what “good” speech was and the relative 
differences between bad, good, and better speech and silence—but not on “discretion” as the 
choice to speak or remain silent. The tension between speech and silence in ancient Israel and 
the varied instructions regarding silence in wisdom literature have been the focus of very few 
works—most notably those of Walter Bühlman, Elizabeth Huwiler, and Nili Shupak.  
Treatment in Academic Literature 
Walter Bühlman published Vom rechten Reden und Schweigen: Studien zu Proverbien 
10-31 in 1976, and he essentially categorised all the Proverbs relating to speech or silence, 
with extensive grammatical and stylistic observations. His method led to little by way of 
conclusions, and, for all of its meticulousness, seemed to simply synthesise the varied 
positions described in Prov. 10-31. Bühlmann argued that the ultimate reason for silence in 
the Proverbs is to honour God and to avoid mocking the poor.
267
 The work is most important, 
                                                        
267 Walter Bühlmann, Vom rechten Reden und Schweigen: Studien zu Proverbien 10-31 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 252-54. “Den tiefsten Grund fuer das sinnende Schweigen erfahren wir in 
zwei Proverben (29:13 und 22:2). Sowohl der Reiche wie der Arme sind Geschoepfe Gottes. Der Einsichtige ist 
sich dessen bewusst und wird sich deshalb nicht veraechtlich ueber den Armen aeussern, sondern versinkt in 
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however, in asserting that the ideals of “correct” speech and silence belong not only to the so-
called “court setting”, but also to the family setting (Sippenweisheit).268  
 Elizabeth Huwiler examined speech and silence within Proverbs in her dissertation of 
the 1980’s, coming to the conclusion that silence is either positive or negative depending on 
the subject’s association with an approved group, “the wise” or “the righteous.”269 She argued 
that members of the approved groups used speech or silence positively and that, ultimately, 
Proverbs urges its audience to be part of approved groups and to only trust the speech or 
silence of those in approved groups.
270
 She also suggested that “the relationship between 
individuals or behaviors and outcome suggests a modification of current proposals about the 
connection between deed and consequence: the correspondence is between the evaluation of 
the individual or behavior and the evaluation of the outcome, rather than the actual behavior 
or character and the outcome.”271 Huwiler concluded that, ultimately, speech and silence 
protocols are ambiguous.
272
  
 Finally, Nili Shupak’s 1993 monograph “Where Can Wisdom be Found?” emphasised 
the connection between the apposite types in the Egyptian Instruction of Amenemope and 
those in Proverbs.
273
 The Egyptian texts, particularly Amenemope, are concerned with the 
“hot” and the “cool” man. Albrecht Alt’s 1953 synopsis of the Egyptian texts in this regard 
has been largely maintained: “Der Mensch, wie er sein soll, ist für ihn der "Schweigende", 
der die egoistischen Regungen seiner Gefühle und seines Willens zu unterdrücken und sich 
auch in üblen Lagen zu bescheiden weiss, im Gegensatz zu dem "Heissen", der seinen 
                                                                                                                                                                            
nachdenkliches Schweigen. Im Gegensatz dazu masst sich der Einfaeltige an, einen von Leid end Elend 
Geplagten zu verschaehen.” Id. at 253 
268 See id. At 243. 
269
 Huwiler, Control of Reality, 238 
270 Id. at 238-9. 
271 Id. at ii. 
272 Id. at iii. 
273 For example, in Shupak, “Where Can Wisdom Be Found,” she presents the “negative human type” 
as the “heated” man (129), and the “positive human type” as quiet, calm, and cool (150). 
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Leidenschaften freien Lauf lässt und sich dadurch selbst ins Unglück stürzt.”274 These types, 
however, while quite polarised in Amenemope’s work, only retain such differentiation in 
select parts of the book of Proverbs. Shupak argued that directly equating the wise man of 
Israel’s wisdom texts with the “cool,” “silent” man of Egypt’s is not altogether satisfactory.  
 She identified two “human types” in both Egyptian and biblical wisdom: the “silent, 
cold-tempered” positive human type, and the “heated” negative human type.275 She argued 
that the “silent man” as such does not appear in biblical wisdom, that Egyptian’s grw has no 
counterpart in Hebrew.
276
 While this may be true lexically, a cursory study of biblical 
wisdom will find the ideal of “silence” emerge as one of the sage’s chief traits. At the same 
time, however, as Shupak also noted, “in Hebrew wisdom the central topic is not the polarity 
of ‘silence’ and ‘speech’ but the confrontation between ‘restraint’ or ‘self control,’ and the 
‘lack of self-control.’ The emphasis is not on the contrast between the ‘silent’ and the ‘hot-
tempered’ man but between the ‘wise man’ and the ‘fool.’”277 This is an important 
distinction, and central to Shupak’s analysis.  
Speech and Silence in Wisdom Texts 
While the polarity between speech and silence may not be wisdom’s “central” theme, 
it is nevertheless a significant one. Silence in Proverbs—indeed, throughout the Bible—is 
multivalent: both sage and fool are admonished to silence as a variously appropriate course. 
In Prov. 24:7, fools are urged to silence because wisdom is out of their reach: “Wisdom is too 
high for fools; in the assembly at the gate they must not open their mouths.” At the same 
time, in Prov. 10:19b and 11:12b, silence is seen as the hallmark of the prudent and wise: “the 
prudent hold their tongues”; “the one who has understanding keeps quiet.”  
                                                        
274
 Alt, “Analyse der Weisheit,” 21. Alt continues, “Von diesen beiden Menschtypen war auch in der 
älteren ägyptischen Weisheit schon manchmal die Rede gewesen; aber bei Amenemope rückt ihre 
Gegenüberstellung in den Mittelpunkt der Ermahnungen und Warnungen.” 
275 Shupak, “Where Can Wisdom Be Found,” 178, note 4.  
276 Id. at 147, 170, 342. 
277 Id. at 342. 
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Most significantly, there is much talk of silence and discretion as protection.
 278
 The 
most prevalent motivation for cautions to silence appears to be for “protection,” be it spiritual 
or physical (though these were not, perhaps, distinct), for individuals and the community. 
There is first a concern for protecting knowledge.
279
 There are several iterations of 
maintaining silence when a neighbour asks for a pledge—that to agree to put up security for a 
neighbour or stranger should result in silence rather than acquiescence: “Whoever puts up 
security for a stranger will surely suffer, but whoever refuses to shake hands in pledge is 
safe” (Prov. 11:15).280 Another verse, Prov. 13:3, also advocates guarding lips for physical 
and perhaps material preservation: “Those who guard their lips preserve their lives, but those 
who speak rashly will come to ruin.
281” Some passages discuss intellectual protection, others 
material and physical protection (often in a forensic setting), and still others the protection of 
reputation. These instances imply the danger of speech, of the entrapment of the word. Thus 
discretion or restraint is knowing when to stay silent. 
Indeed, in what may be termed the “legal” or “conflict resolution” arena, silence had 
much significance.
282
 Discretion was also knowing when to speak and not stay silent. In 
                                                        
278 Silence is in some cases symptomatic of that which is unable to be expressed, which is mystically beyond 
description. However, this does not seem to be apparent in Israelite texts until the time of Qumran. In the 
Qumran scrolls, at the very least, there appears to be an appreciation of those things that are “secret” or 
“hidden”; things which are inexpressible or which cannot be described in words. This idea of ineffability is also 
present in various Pauline epistles.  For example, the “man in Christ” who was caught up to heaven “heard 
inexpressible things.” (2 Cor. 12:1-4). Those who have trouble praying are advised to seek the Spirit, which 
“makes intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered” (Romans 8:26). But this clear idea of 
ineffability in later texts finds little precursor in earlier concepts of secrecy and revelation—the texts of the 
Hebrew Bible allude mostly to secret or hidden things in the sense of unknown or unrevealed things. See, for 
example, Jdgs. 3:19; Job 15:11; Ps. 44:21; Prov. 3:32; 11:13; 20:19; 25:9; Dan. 2:18-19, 30; Amos 3:7; Isa. 
48:6; Ob. 1:6. There is perhaps some discussion of mystically inexpressible things in Judges 13:8, when a divine 
messenger states “Why do you ask my name? It is beyond understanding.” This translation is somewhat 
ambiguous, however. Even Deuteronomy 29:29 and Proverbs 25:2, which also deal with divine “secrets,” 
describe them as simply concealed, not yet revealed—not because they are inexpressible or beyond 
comprehension, however, but simply because this is God’s prerogative. 
279 Prov. 12:23: “The prudent keep their knowledge to themselves, but a fool’s heart blurts out folly;” 
Prov. 5:2: that you may maintain discretion and your lips may preserve knowledge” 
280 See also 6:1-5 
281 See also Prov. 21:23: “Those who guard their mouths and their tongues keep themselves from 
calamity.”) 
282 This has been noted in several studies of the legal codes and narrative in the Hebrew Bible and other 
ancient Near Eastern sources. Most notably, Pietro Bovati’s work, “Re-Establishing Justice,” performs a 
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Esther 4:14, Mordecai tells Esther that her remaining silent will be a concession: she and her 
family will die. Ps. 109 records a plea to the Lord not to be a silent advocate, implying that 
such silence would lead to indictment. This is echoed in Lev. 5:1, which warns that failing to 
testify in a case to which one is privy is tantamount to whatever crime is being tried: “If 
anyone sins because they do not speak up when they hear a public charge to testify regarding 
something they have seen or learned about, they will be held responsible.” Prov. 30:32-33 
caution, “If you play the fool and exalt yourself, or if you plan evil, clap your hand over your 
mouth! For as churning cream produces butter, and as twisting the nose produces blood, so 
stirring up anger produces strife.” The connective preposition יכ at the beginning of verse 33 
intimates that the behaviours described in the preceding verse (playing the fool, exalting 
yourself, or planning evil) cause—with a predictability as assured as a butter churn—the 
unfortunate events of the second verse (stirring up anger and, consequently, strife). In his 
analysis of these verses, Walter Bühlman noted quite matter-of-factly that a dispute can only 
be mitigated if one is silent instead of angry.
283
 
The aforementioned aspects of silence within legal settings have variations of setting, 
perspective, and genre. However, a common thread through these nuanced instances is the 
emphasis of circumspection in speech. Recognising that silence in legal situations is 
multivalent—but far from arbitrary—is to understand the real dynamism of social 
(non)speech, rooted in socio-cultural context. It echoes Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the 
multiplicity of meanings found in social activity: “the meaning of a term/word/symbol could 
not be assumed to correspond to some essential and externally derived foundation or object, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
systematic study of legal terminology and procedure in ancient Israel and cites silence on the part of the accused 
as a concession of guilt. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, 340-43. 
283
 Bühlmann, Reden und Schweigen, 225: “Die rechte Haltung aber, naemlich die des legens der hand 
auf den mund als zeichen des verstummens, entspringt einem klugen Nachdenken. doch scheint diese 
auffassung nicht gerade gut mit den begrundungssaetzen ueberinzustimmen. mit einer doppelfrage wird aber das 
mahnwort besser verstaendlich: wenn einer zornig geworden ist, sei es aus leidenschaft oder aus berechtigten 
gruenden, so ist das beste, wenn er in der folge schweigt, damit kein streit entfacht wird.” See also pages 227-
228. 
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but was dependent upon the particular constitutive role it played in socio-linguistic systems 
or ‘language games.’”284  
 The above motifs seem to be sub-units of a broader theme in wisdom literature, one that 
has been addressed throughout this dissertation: the power—and specifically the hazards—of 
speech. Job warns, “Words from the mouth of the wise are gracious, but fools are consumed 
by their own lips. At the beginning their words are folly; at the end they are wicked 
madness—and fools multiply words.”285 Ben Sira also warns his audience to be circumspect 
around those who are wealthier than they are: "Do not quarrel with a rich man, lest his 
resources outweigh yours; for gold has ruined many, and has perverted the minds of 
kings."
286
 Qoheleth sees much talk as unprofitable: “the more the words, the less the 
meaning, and how does that benefit anyone?”287 Discretion – staying silent at appropriate 
times – would have served community cohesion by preventing conflict. In the scribes’ minds, 
if “fools” were silent, then they were not provoking disputes.  
Correction 
Relatedly, the texts of ancient Israel emphasise “correct” speech. Wisdom texts not 
only appeal to their audiences to exercise restraint in using proper speech and behaviour, but 
also emphasise the correction and instruction of those who have failed to do so, whose speech 
or behaviour is improper. The bulk of the book of Job, for example, is founded on dialogues 
of mutual correction. But the ideals of correction do not seem to be exclusive to those social 
groups out of which wisdom creators and compilers arose: typically described as a “scribal 
class” and perhaps the court. While that class may very well have been the one perceiving 
and recording these ideals, as James Crenshaw has noted, “A list of living teachers within 
Israelite society would include virtually everyone, inasmuch as instruction is both positive 
                                                        
284 George and Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent,” 273. 
285 Job 12:12-14  
286 Ben Sira 8:2, 13:2. See also Goff, Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom, 138. 
287 Eccl. 6:11; cf. 5:2-7 [5:1-6] 
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and negative, intentional and unintentional.”288 Unlike the general “instruction” that 
Crenshaw noted, the “rebuke” is generally negative and intentional. But like the list of living 
teachers, “living rebukers” within Israelite society could, arguably, also include virtually 
everyone. Indeed, the biblical texts suggest a broader social setting—that is, a setting not 
exclusive to a single class—in which one felt obligated to speak for correction, and to be 
silent when receiving such correction.
289
  
This informal correction is situated in the legal and theological obligations present in 
the text; one significant example is in Lev. 19:17: “Do not hate a fellow Israelite in your 
heart. Rebuke your neighbour frankly so you will not share in their guilt.” These and other 
didactic texts suggest that there was a sense of community obligation to correct (see also Lev. 
5:1, Jeremiah 2:19, Amos 5:10, Ruth 2:16, Isa. 30:17).  
Elisabeth Huwiler has argued that this obligation arose out of a desire to preserve the 
community. She posits that in the putatively tightly-closed community of ancient Israel, 
threatened by surrounding, “wicked” communities, the composers of Proverbs sought to 
encourage loyalty to their own group and resistance of the “other.”290 While this might be an 
over-generalisation, enforcing community boundaries was likely a goal of the creators and 
compilers of Proverbs, at the very least in a moral sense. The idea might have been that 
verbal correction would improve the community’s resistance to “sin” and, in a community 
that believed in shared guilt, be a means of self-preservation. 
In addition to describing the obligation to correct other community members, many 
texts also describe how to properly receive correction. The book of Proverbs, itself, is a work 
of potential “rebuke” or instruction, and it prepares its audience for humbly receiving such 
instruction. In numerous instances, it cites the wisdom of taking advice and responding to 
                                                        
288 Crenshaw, Education, 208. 
289 See, e.g., Prov. 9:7; 13:1. As such, students (youth) are taught not to resent that correction; they are 
young and without experience (wisdom). 
290 See Elizabeth Huwiler, Control of Reality in Israelite Wisdom (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Duke 
University, Durham, NC, 1988).  
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rebukes (see 13:1, 10, 18; 15:5, 31; 16:20; 17:10; 27:5; 28:4). At the same time, it also warns 
of the dangers (often mortal) of ignoring its instruction, vilifying those who do so. For 
example, it is only “a mocker” who “does not respond to rebukes.” (Prov. 13:1). Although the 
mocker would likely verbally respond to rebukes—as the hallmark of the mocker is the 
(over)use of proud and condescending speech about others—here, the mocker “does not 
respond” in the sense that he fails to act upon the rebukes. (cf. 9:7-8;13:10; 14:9; 19:28; 
21:24; 22:10; 29:8). Indeed, “mockers resent correction, so they avoid the wise.” (Prov. 
15:12). This phrase assumes that “the wise” correct others. Thus, the book of Proverbs, as a 
book of instruction, established itself as the product of “the wise” while shaming those who 
would avoid or mock such instruction (see 13:18; 29:1). The wise will accept and respect the 
corrector, while the unwise will mock or abuse the corrector (Prov. 9: 7-9). In masterful 
strokes, it both forwards a practical ideology while promoting its own preservation and 
veneration. 
Still, the texts describe some situations where instruction and correction would be of 
no use, where silence would be the better route. Wisdom texts recommend silence if the 
potential recipient is already a far-gone fool. A rebuke will have its most profound effect on 
likewise discerning recipients: “A rebuke impresses a discerning person more than a hundred 
lashes a fool” (Prov. 17: 10). Accordingly, many proverbs consider the “wisdom” of the 
potential recipient a priori in determining whether or not to correct them. In general, the 
proverbs advise speaking to the wise and the righteous, and remaining silent with mockers 
and the “wicked.” Prov. 9:7-9 outlines guidelines for imparting correction and instruction by 
detailing with whom to be silent and with whom to speak: 
7 Whoever corrects a mocker invites insults;  
   whoever rebukes the wicked incurs abuse.  
8 Do not rebuke mockers or they will hate you;  
   rebuke the wise and they will love you.  
9 Instruct the wise and they will be wiser still;  
   teach the righteous and they will add to their learning. 
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The wise are even counselled to go so far as remain silent before fools: “Do not speak to 
fools, for they will scorn your prudent words” (Prov. 23:9).  
In this line of reasoning, if someone fails to heed corrections, they have marked 
themselves as foolish and further censure would be futile. Prov. 26:4-5 illustrates how this 
might seem to be contradictory, and the quandaries the wise might face in accepting the 
above line of thought: 
4 Do not answer a fool according to his folly,  
or you yourself will be just like him.  
5 Answer a fool according to his folly,  
or he will be wise in his own eyes.  
 
Here, the advantages of two alternate paths are listed consecutively, emphasising discretion to 
paint a picture of various situations—even seemingly analogous ones—in which either 
speech or silence might be best. This is taught through overt contradiction. Christine Roy 
Yoder has noted the use of contradiction as a pedagogical technique in Proverbs, citing the 
“incongruous proverbs scattered throughout the book, inviting readers into a sort of 
disputational dialogue. . . . Insofar as Proverbs preserves such divergent points of view, it 
ensures a certain ambiguity: wisdom does not afford only one perspective on . . . most 
anything.”291 We cannot treat the Proverbs as truisms or “cultural facts”: just as the English 
proverbs “Birds of a feather flock together” and “Opposites attract” are contradictory, it is 
                                                        
291 Christine Roy Yoder, “Forming ‘Fearers of Yahweh’: Repetition and Contradiction as Pedagogy in 
Proverbs,” in Seeking Out the Wisdom of the Ancients (Ronald L. Troxel et al., eds., Winona Lake, Ind.: 
Eisenbrauns, 2005), 179. She further states that in a “study of pedagogy in Prov. 10:1-31:9, William P. Brown 
identifies an ‘overarching editorial arrangement and pedagogical movement of the book as a whole,’ namely, a 
progression from Israelite to international wisdom, an increasing variety and complexity of literary forms, and 
an increasing breadth and complexity of moral purview. Thus, the book guides readers through a process of 
maturation from a silent, dependency son (chaps 1-9) to a mature adult companion of wisdom (31:10-31). 
Progressing pedagogically from ‘basic staples’ to ‘more advanced variegated fare,’ Proverbs develops readers 
by its content and its arrangement.” (167; citing W. P. Brown, “The Pedagogy of Proverbs 10:1-31:9,” in 
Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation (ed. W. P. Brown; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002): 152, 153, 181).  
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important to note that “proverbs are not universal truths but rather limited pieces of folk 
wisdom that are valid only in certain situations.”292 
So here, the motivations for, variously, rebuke and silence, concerned community and 
individual responsibility. These ideas seemed to occasionally be at odds with one another. 
This is well illustrated in the book of Job. It is a work in mutual rebuke: instruction and 
correction between Job, his companions, and ultimately YHWH, with his friends giving up, 
one by one, after offering instruction.
293
 Job’s friends each make a resolute, collaborative 
effort to either silence Job or eke a confession out of him. To their way of thinking—the 
traditional act-consequence rationale—he must have committed some wrongdoing 
proportionate to his suffering.
294
 Their persistence, far from literary exaggeration, seems 
commensurate with the expectations of Proverbs and Leviticus—indeed, their very 
persistence may indicate their fear at being held accountable. 
 First, Eliphaz reminds Job of the times Job’s own words have “supported those who 
stumbled,” how he “instructed many” (Job 4:3-4). Having referenced Job’s own verbal 
correction and instruction of others, Eliphaz then asks: “If someone ventures a word with 
you, will you be impatient? But who can keep from speaking?” (4:1, emphasis added). Next, 
Zophar implies that Job’s speech must be corrected: “Are all these words to go unanswered? 
Is this talker to be vindicated? Will your idle talk reduce others to silence? Will no one 
rebuke you when you mock?” (11:2-3). Third, Bildad references ancestral teachings, urging 
Job to consider the wisdom of the ancients (Job 8:8). 
                                                        
292 Wolfgang Mieder, Proverbs: A Handbook (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004), 134. 
293Several commentators have described their dialogues as battles of words—with phrases like, “Job’s 
words have become his weapons,” “Job’s verbal battle with his friends,” “the onslaught he must suffer at the 
mouths of his friends.” Brown, Character, 105-106; Louis Stuhlemann, 314. Even Job asks: “How long will you 
torment me and crush me with words? Ten times now you have reproached me; shamelessly you attack me” 
(Job 19:2-3). 
294 Joseph Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering of Life in Israel and 
Early Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43. 
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The companions felt obligated to speak to Job—if not out of compassion, then to 
fulfill certain ideals: (1) from Proverbs, the ideal of true wisdom as correcting those in need 
of correction and (2), from Leviticus, the principle of shared culpability if one does not 
rebuke their neighbour. But after the three companions’ concerted attempts, they follow the 
advice of Prov. 23:9 and 26:4-5, answering Job’s foolishness with silence: “So these three 
men stopped answering Job, because he was righteous in his own eyes” (32:1). They had 
fulfilled their obligation. 
It is at this point that Elihu, steps in, further iterating the practices found in Proverbs. 
He first justifies his correction of an elder, saying that although he dared not to do so at first, 
none of his companions adequately refuted Job’s words.295 He explains that he “must speak 
and find relief” (32:18-20) and warns Job, like an unruly son, to listen to his words and pay 
attention to everything he says (Job 33:1-3; 31-33): “be silent, and I will teach you wisdom.”  
Elihu presents a reality where God speaks in order to correct and instruct those on 
earth, and the description of this reality forms a part of his rationale for correcting Job 
himself. This foreshadows the text’s resolution. Job, exasperated, submits that because his 
words have not been successfully “corrected” by his companions, he has only spoken the 
truth and that no correction was warranted. However, the final and primary rebuke here, as in 
the rest of the Old Testament, comes from YHWH.
296
 This correction finally satisfies Job.  
Most of the central portion of the book of Job is comprised of dialogue, including the 
statements discussed above. This dialogue lends drama and authenticity to the text, enabling 
the narrators to expose the character of each speaker without imposing their own overt 
                                                        
295 I thought, ‘Age should speak; advanced years should teach wisdom.’ But it is the spirit in a person, 
the breath of the Almighty, that gives them understanding. … Therefore I say: Listen to me; I too will tell you 
what I know.  I waited while you spoke, I listened to your reasoning; while you were searching for words, I gave 
you my full attention. But not one of you has proved Job wrong; none of you has answered his arguments” (Job 
32:7-12). 
296 See, for example, Job 33:14-18. “For God does speak—now one way, now another—though no one 
perceives it. In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falls on people as they slumber in their beds, 
he may speak in their ears and terrify them with warnings, to turn them from wrongdoing and keep them from 
pride, to preserve them from the pit, their lives from perishing by the sword.”           
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evaluations.
297
 The direct speech would allow the audience to evaluate the character of the 
speaker for themselves.
298
 The “primacy of dialogue” in Job also seems to reflect the scribes’ 
perception that speech was one of the foremost mechanisms for exposing and evaluating 
character.  
Conclusion 
 As speech could be binding, especially in terms of a vow, pledge, or legal setting, 
wisdom texts emphasise restraint and discretion, even in more informal communications. In a 
community that subscribed to the concept of shared guilt, and in which speech could be used 
to sin, correction is an obligation to keep the community safe. But beyond this, the texts also 
outline informal rules for communication, advocating community respect and restraint. Each 
of these – respect, restraint, and correction – seem to have been designed to contribute to 
conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and cohesion in the community.  
These “rules” for communication were often based on the intended recipient of one’s 
speech, and they became somewhat elaborate. For example, the obligation to correct did not 
extend to those who were so foolish that correction would have no effect. While the foolish 
earned the silence of ignoring, rather than correction – in a shift from community to 
individual responsibility – it appears that others earned deferential silence, a sort of lack of 
correction, out of respect.  This kind of silence seems to have been highly-valued, something 
“earned” by old age, wealth, or grief. Respectful and calm communication fostered important 
community values: giving honour to the elderly and minimising grief. 
Additionally, speech and restraint could be markers of relative class, through which 
individuals could assert or subordinate themselves. Several passages in the wisdom texts 
describe speech acts in terms of class or wealth. As mentioned above, the wealthy are 
described as listened to and not mocked, while the humble or poor are described as ridiculed 
                                                        
297 See Bartor, “Juridical Dialogue,” 451.  
298 See Alter, Biblical Narrative, 85, 86-87. 
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and ignored. There are similar descriptions of the wise and the poor. There may be some 
overlap between the wise and the wealthy, on the one hand, and the poor and the foolish on 
the other hand, but there is not enough evidence to suggest that these classes were congruent. 
On the contrary, it seems at least that the authors of the Proverbs considered one’s speech 
alone as the indicator of wisdom or folly. The scribal class portrays the wise as both receiving 
and making corrections, with the discretion to know when to be silent, while the foolish don’t 
do either. The scribes also seem to consider silence as a specific action of communication. In 
a community where speech was exposure and could involve high risks, silence was a 
conscious communicative decision.  With the exception of a legal accusation, silence allowed 
community members to participate in the community without subjecting them to the adverse 
consequences that speech might bring about. 
Finally, the wisdom texts emphasise correction. Job’s companions have few qualms in 
correcting him, which can be better understood in a corpus where correction was seen to 
better the community and enforce community boundaries. Prov. 28:23 promises that 
“Whoever rebukes a person will in the end gain favor, rather than one who has a flattering 
tongue.” Ultimately, the rebuke is seen as a gesture of community participation; it 
demonstrates care for the community and for the recipient: “As iron sharpens iron, so one 
person sharpens another” (Prov. 27:17). 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has emphasised the value and importance of “speech” concepts in 
ancient Israel. It has summarised key points and drawn out indicative issues in hopes of 
bringing more attention to these matters. More attention is needed because something as 
fundamental to our own society as “speech” is also more prone to anachronism, and 
anachronistic views on this subject might well lead to problematic results. Here, I attempted 
to provide a starting-point from which broader studies can continue.  
This work has relied on modern theories about speech to better frame the identified 
concepts. Of particular value have been speech-act theory, language game theory, the theory 
of hexis, and dialogue theory. These have provided some structure in evaluating speech as 
described in written text, and they support the idea that we can understand how ancient 
Israelite scribes perceived their society’s expectations and judgments based on what they 
wrote about speech. The biblical sources show a continuing interest in speech as a vehicle for 
communication, and this interest is often most explicit in the wisdom literature.  
In order to better understand “speech” as a specific mode of communication, this 
dissertation then explored the development of writing and its possible effect, if any, on oral 
communication. Broadly speaking, varied means of communication are adopted for varied 
purposes and meanings. Certain trends in communication developments can be observed, 
though they are by no means deliberate or absolute every time, or across every society. 
Writing typically comes about in primitive societies first in “economic” contexts—to record 
inventory or transactions, as a way to reckon and divide, or to identify artisan products by 
their owner or creator.  As writing develops, speech retains its previous functions, on the 
whole, but it also becomes significant in its contrast. It becomes, for some people and in 
some situations at least, an option—something chosen for its comparative advantage in 
fulfilling the objective at hand.  
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Obviously, in pre-literate communities, speech is the medium through which every 
“thing” is communicated. With the advent of writing, more attention is given to whether or 
not something qualifies, based on whatever criteria this particular society emphasises, for 
being “fixed” in writing or communicated broadly through speech. In terms of community, 
however, it is difficult (if not impossible) to know the extent to which ancient Israel was 
literate, and speech remained an option available to all. It does seem clear, however, that a 
literate class of scribes composed or recorded the works that comprise the Hebrew Bible 
today.  
The biblical sources reflect the interests and ideas of this literate class, which tends to 
project its own literacy on to its depictions of religion and society, despite the fact that, 
historically, much of the population probably did not belong to that class. The authors of the 
biblical texts advocate certain communicative rules for ancient Israelite society and intimate 
certain ideas about appropriate speech. Some of these seem to be based on theological 
conceptions, and others seem to be based on effective community control. In reviewing the 
texts, there are some trends that appear. 
First, as discussed in chapter 3, the texts often associate writing with divine 
communication. Most fundamentally, writing is part of the community identity as a covenant 
people, bound by written covenants made through Moses. The Law of Moses is referred to as 
“what was written,” and the texts’ narrators evaluate behaviors or histories against this 
standard.  
Additionally, writing is involved in prophetic transmission from the divine. Both 
writing and speech occurred in a variety of alternating or concurrent patterns down the 
theological line (→) (e.g., Jeremiah receiving a vision from God and dictating it to Baruch, 
Baruch delivering the scroll to Jehoiakim, and Jehoiakim having it reoralised or read to him), 
but only speech is used to communicate up the theological line, to God (←). Where everyday 
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people relied on speech, God relied on writing. Writing is portrayed as rendering the divine 
word immutable. A written text could act as a “witness” of receipt of prophecy. Writing was 
innately limited, static, predictable, and “peaceful”: more congruent with theological 
conceptions of God as distant and incorporeal. This is not to say that the ancient Israelite 
scribes necessarily perceived writing as more authoritative, but just that it served different 
functions than speech (with speech important for public recitation, for example).  
 Second, as discussed in chapters 2-4, there was often not only overlap in the functions 
of speech and writing, but there was often transmission between the two modes. Oral 
traditions and divine communications were written down, just as they were then later 
reoralised. Understanding the ancient Israelite conception of “truth” underscores our 
understanding of this process, as well as speech and writing in their own rights. Rather than 
exactness or some objective state of affairs, truth seems to have referred to community 
agreement, justice, good intent, loyalty, or fidelity in message. 
Even with the advent of writing, however, there does not appear to be any point on the 
continuum of literacy in ancient Israel at which orality becomes less significant. Instead, it 
seems to have remained important in various functions throughout. Although there is some 
debate about the prevalence of writing and literacy in ancient Israel, “speech” retained 
important functions even when writing became more common. In a context where writing 
was difficult (i.e. due to the scarcity of materials or the amount of time and training required), 
this makes sense pragmatically. However, this dissertation explored other reasons for this 
preference.  
Third, as discussed in chapters 5-6, speech implied commitment, and ancient Israelites 
depicted God as audience to speech. No speech act was more committing, perhaps, than the 
vow. The utterance of the vow bound the speaker to fulfill the conditions spoken, at the risk 
of the fatal consequences of blasphemy. The scribal class does not describe any exception to 
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the vow’s commitment based on mistake or coercion—once spoken, it is depicted as fully 
committing. In this way, speech is portrayed as dynamic. Vows and prophecy, once 
pronounced, are described as essentially setting divine workings into motion. Thus, through 
speech alone, and not writing, they were able to invoke a sort of ratification of any vow and 
make these spoken vows “essentialist” in nature, bringing about the spoken consequences by 
the invocation of the divine realm, should the speaker not fulfill his or her commitment. 
 In terms of community, this described vow-making system would facilitate an orderly 
society. It would allow community interactions and transactions to go forward in the face of 
what might otherwise be too much uncertainty. It would also create expectations in terms of 
conflict resolution: if someone would not vow that they were innocent, this was essentially an 
admission of guilt. The biblical sources imply this commitment in both formal (i.e. 
structured/procedurally proscribed) and informal (i.e. not structured/procedurally proscribed) 
settings. 
Fourth, as discussed in chapters 6-7, speech was the means by which individuals were 
evaluated by the community and God. The scribal class seems to have assumed that the 
divine can receive spoken communications, and they depict God in the biblical texts as 
audience for everyday speech. But this assumption leads to the worry about speech as 
exposure. The biblical texts describe speakers and speech as imbued with hexis. One’s speech 
demonstrated one’s intentions and enacted one’s own judgments (of others) and expected 
judgements (from others, including YHWH). Through speech—and variously, silence—
ancient Israelites revealed their evaluations, understandings, and intentions to other 
community members—both directly and indirectly.  
 In other respects, speaking could lead to self-incrimination or “sin,” loosely defined. It 
could also create much community conflict, as alluded to throughout the wisdom texts. These 
texts therefore forward a variety of communicative rules, in order to avoid this conflict and 
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encourage community cohesion. The incorrigible deviant who cannot follow these rules is 
“the fool,” and is described as a failure both socially and theologically. Speaking could 
therefore give rise to certain obligations and commitments, and where one “took a chance” 
when speaking, silence was often recommended. In the ancient Israelite community, speech 
was a way to negotiate reality—but it could be risky. Silence was a safer form of assent, and 
would be especially helpful in preventing or diffusing conflicts. It could also save a 
community member from the judgment of the community and the divine. Discretion is 
therefore described as a chief virtue, and can be understood as knowing when to be silent. 
 Clearly, communication is foundational to the formation and continuation of society. 
The ancient Israelite community—or at least parts of it—recognised that some 
communicative practices are more effective than others in facilitating a peaceful continuation 
of society. At the same time, they had complex ideas about the divine—and specifically, how 
their communication involved the divine. While this dissertation has attempted to explore and 
define these issues, much work remains to be done. 
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